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 This PhD thesis deals with the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. Today, in Europe, 
fundamental rights are simultaneously protected at the levels of the states, of the European Union 
and of the European Convention on Human Rights. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the 
implications of this multilevel architecture and to examine the dynamics that spring from the 
interaction between different human rights standards in Europe. To achieve this task, the thesis 
develops a “neo-federalist” narrative based on an empirical and conceptual comparison with the 
federal arrangement for the protection of rights of the United States of America. Rejecting both a 
“sovereigntist” and “sui generis” approach to the study of fundamental rights in Europe, the thesis 
argues that only a comparative approach can shed light on the comprehensive set of dynamics 
which are at play in the European multilevel architecture. The thesis identifies two recurrent 
challenges in the interplay between different state and transnational human rights standards – a 
challenge of ineffectiveness and a challenge of inconsistency. It explains that these challenges arise 
when transnational law operates either as a floor or as a ceiling of protection for a specific human 
right. In addition, the thesis maps the most important transformations taking place in the European 
system and assesses their impact on these challenges. To provide empirical evidence for its 
arguments, the thesis then considers four case studies. First, the right to due process for suspected 
terrorists. Second, the right to vote for non-citizens. Third, the right to strike. Fourth, the right to 
abortion. Since these case studies cover all the four “generations” of rights traditionally identified in 
constitutional scholarship (civil, political, social and “new generation” rights), the thesis aims to 
offer a complete analytical framework which can also be useful for future research on the protection 
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This doctoral thesis deals with the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. Its purpose is to 
analyze the implications that emerge from a multilevel human rights system. In the last two 
decades, the protection of fundamental rights in Europe has experienced an unprecedented 
expansion. Human rights are nowadays simultaneously entrenched in the constitutional systems of 
the states, in the legal order of the European Union (EU) as well as in the framework of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). A charter of rights has been adopted in each layer 
of the European architecture and a plurality of institutions – notably courts – ensure an active 
protection of fundamental rights both at the state and at the transnational level in Europe. Yet, what 
are the consequences of this complex constitutional architecture? What dynamics spring from the 
interaction between state and transnational human rights laws in Europe? 
 To answer this question, the thesis develops a new narrative, called “neo-federalist”. This 
narrative claims that it is methodologically necessary to compare the European multilevel human 
rights architecture with the models for the protection of fundamental rights of other federal systems 
and that, by reconceptualising the European system as a “neo-federal” arrangement, it is possible to 
gain essential insights to understand the complex dynamics at play in it. Since the prevailing 
narratives on fundamental rights in Europe are based on weak theoretical or methodological 
assumptions, their capacity to explain the phenomena that take place in a multilevel human rights 
system is limited. On the contrary, by comparing the European architecture with other federal 
systems – notably the United States of America (USA) – and by taking advantage of the rich 
theoretical discussion on federalism and rights that has taken place there, “neo-federalism” provides 
a comprehensive account of the implications of a multilevel human rights system. 
 The thesis argues that the overlap and interplay between state and transnational human rights 
standards generates several recurrent synchronic and diachronic dynamics. In a synchronic 
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perspective, the European multilevel architecture creates several challenges. Indeed, relevant 
differences often exist in the degree of protection which is accorded to each given human right both 
at the horizontal level (i.e. among the EU member states – with some states providing vanguard 
forms of protection for the specific right, and others providing laggard forms of protection) and at 
the vertical level (i.e. between the state law and supranational law). Because of these differences, 
the interaction of human rights standards in the European multilevel system produces tensions. The 
nature of these tensions, however, changes depending whether the standard of protection of human 
rights provided at the transnational level operates as a ceiling (i.e. as a maximum standard of 
protection that cannot be superseded by state law) or as a floor (i.e. as a minimum standard of 
protection that can well be integrated and enriched by state law).  
 As I endeavour to explain, two challenges can therefore be identified in the functioning of 
the European human rights architecture. A challenge of ineffectiveness emerges when a 
transnational law setting a ceiling of protection for a specific human right interacts with state laws 
which ensure a more advanced standard of protection for that right. In this situation, transnational 
law challenges the effectiveness of the vanguard states’ standard and pressures it toward the less 
protective maximum set up at the transnational level, while leaving the standard in force in the 
laggard states unaffected. Vice versa, a challenge of inconsistency arises when a transnational law 
setting a floor of protection for a specific human right interacts with state laws which ensure a less 
advanced standard of protection for that right. In this situation, transnational law challenges the 
consistency of the laggard states’ standard and pressures it toward the more protective minimum set 
up at the transnational level, while leaving the standard in force in the vanguard states unaffected. 
The European architecture presents, however, also important diachronic dynamics. The 
system is subject to constant transformations because of changes and reciprocal influences between 
human rights norms and institutions. These transformations may over time provide satisfactory 
answers to the challenges that emerge from the interaction between state and transnational laws. To 
this end, I map the most relevant judicial and institutional transformations currently taking place in 
the European system and evaluate their impact on the existing challenges of ineffectiveness and 
inconsistency. In addition, I suggest that scholars may take into account the historical experience of 
other federal systems to envision additional proposals for reforms of the European architecture. 
With all due caveats, in particular, a comparative-based assessment of the US constitutional 
experience may offer useful models and anti-models for reforming de jure condendo the European 
multilevel architecture, especially in those areas of the law where challenges of ineffectiveness or 
inconsistency appear to be left unanswered by the ongoing transformations. 
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 To provide an empirical backing for these arguments, the thesis takes into account four case 
studies. The case studies are: the right to due process for suspected terrorists, the right to vote for 
non-citizens, the right to strike and the right to abortion. The case studies cover all the four 
“generations” of rights traditionally identified in constitutional scholarship. The first case study 
deals with a civil right; the second deals with a political right; the third with a social right; and the 
fourth with a so-called “new generation right”. The first and third case studies provide evidence of 
the challenge of ineffectiveness while the second and the fourth exemplify the challenge of 
inconsistency. The case studies address issues that are often controversial. However, by selecting 
topics such as counter-terrorism law, migration and voting rights, strike law and abortion law, the 
thesis considers a number of recent milestone rulings of the European courts which have been the 
object of attentive legal and political debate in Europe. 
All the empirical chapters of the thesis follow a common structure. Firstly, I outline how the 
standard of protection of each specific right significantly varies among the EU member states. 
Secondly, I examine the growing impact of EU and ECHR law in the field and explain how the 
interaction between state and transnational law revealed a challenge of either ineffectiveness or 
inconsistency in Europe. Thirdly, by adopting a comparative perspective, I highlight how analogous 
dynamics have emerged in the federal system for the protection of fundamental rights of the US and 
underline how the US example proves that pluralist systems are endowed with the internal 
mechanisms to successfully face these challenges, and to enhance over time the protection of 
fundamental rights. In light of this, I explore the more recent jurisprudential and institutional 
transformations taking place in Europe and, finally, I discuss what the future prospects for the 
protection of each of these specific rights in Europe could or should be.  
Overall, the content of this thesis is analytical rather than normative. The thesis is, in fact, a 
study in comparative constitutional law and not in legal or political theory. By bridging the gap 
between EU constitutional law and comparative constitutional law, this work aims to enhance the 
scientific understanding of the European multilevel system for the protection of fundamental rights. 
As such, Chapter 1 introduces the analytical framework for the examination of the challenges and 
transformations at play in the European human rights architecture. Here I design the contours of my 
“neo-federalist” narrative, emphasize its advantages vis-à-vis the other existing narratives, and 
present the core arguments of my work. The subsequent chapters analyze each of the four case 
studies. Chapter 2 considers the right to due process for suspected terrorists. Chapter 3, the right to 
vote for non-citizen. Chapter 4, the right to strike. Chapter 5, the right to abortion. It is my hope that 
the analytical framework of this thesis will invite further research to assess whether and to what 












Of Floors, Ceilings & Human Rights: 











The European continent is endowed with one of the most sophisticated systems for the protection of 
fundamental rights world-wide. At the height of two decades of unprecedented transformations, the 
European human rights architecture is today characterized by the existence of three layers of norms 
and institutions which overlap and intertwine together to ensure an advanced degree of protection of 
fundamental rights and liberties. Human rights are proclaimed in the constitutions of the states, in 
the law of the European Union (EU) and in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). At 
the same time, institutions charged to protect and vindicate human rights – notably courts 
empowered to exercise judicial review – are set up at each layer of this multilevel system. What are 
the consequences of this complex human rights architecture? The research question that this thesis 
attempts to address is that of examining what constitutional dynamics arise in the protection of 
specific fundamental rights from the interaction between different layers of human rights norms and 
institutions in Europe. 
The constitutional transformations that the European human rights architecture has recently 
undergone – and particularly the expansion of the machinery for the protection of human rights at 
the transnational level – have challenged conventional approaches to the study of fundamental 
rights in Europe and underlined their inadequacies in explaining the dynamics at play in a 
multilevel constitutional system. Indeed, to a large extent, the European human rights architecture 
remains today a puzzling object, as the prevailing scholarly narratives have been unable to provide a 
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comprehensive and persuasive account to explain its complex implications. In the legal literature, 
two leading narratives have emerged. A first narrative, which I call “sovereigntist”, has mainly 
stressed the problematic features of a multilevel human rights architecture. A second narrative, 
which is generally referred as “pluralist”, has instead assessed the operation of the European system 
optimistically. Both these narratives, however, present a major methodological weakness: by failing 
to use the comparative method, they offer only a partial view of the dynamics at play in the 
European multilevel human right architecture. 
This chapter advances therefore a new narrative – which I will call “neo-federalist”. The 
“neo-federalist” narrative claims that it is methodologically necessary to compare the European 
multilevel human rights architecture with the models for the protection of fundamental rights of 
other federal systems and that, by reconceptualising the European system as a “neo-federal” 
arrangement, it is possible to gain insights that are essential to understand the complex dynamics at 
play within it. Recourse to the comparative method for the purpose of studying the European 
multilevel human rights architecture may appear innovative but, in fact, is an inevitable choice. As 
the late EUI professor Mauro Cappelletti used to remind us, comparative law is the only laboratory 
which lawyers have to verify or falsify the appropriateness of their theories.1 The comparative 
method is therefore the only instrument capable of yielding convincing analytical results in an 
attempt to answer the research question concerning the constitutional dynamics at play in the 
European human rights architecture. 
As the “neo-federalist” approach underlines, the European human rights architecture is not a 
unique, sui generis arrangement. Rather, the European multilevel system shows several empirical 
and conceptual points of analogy with other federal human rights systems. In particular, I argue, the 
European system can be meaningfully compared with the United States of America (US). The US 
system presents several empirical features which makes it structurally the most similar case for 
comparison with the European multilevel architecture. First, in the US, as in Europe, fundamental 
rights are codified in a multiplicity of binding Bills of Rights, enshrined in both state and the federal 
constitutions. Second, in the US, as in Europe, a plurality of institutions is in place for the 
protection of rights – especially because of the existence of several separate orders of jurisdictions, 
both at the state and federal levels, that are empowered to exercise judicial review.  
 In addition, the US tradition of combining federalism and the protection of fundamental 
rights offers a rich conceptual and normative background to explore the European human rights 
system. In the US experience, the concept of “federalism” conveys ideas that are particularly 
                                                 
1
 See Mauro Cappelletti, Il controllo giudiziario di costituzionalità delle leggi nel diritto comparato (Giuffrè 1972). As 
it will emerge throughout this and the next chapters, the comparative work of Professor Mauro Cappelletti has been an 
evergreen intellectual guidance for my research 
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valuable in making sense of a multilevel constitutional system. Whereas in Europe, federalism has 
traditionally been equated with the notion of the sovereign state, in the US, federalism has been 
regarded as the constitutional tool and theory par excellence to split the atom of sovereignty. As 
will become clear, therefore, by drawing conceptually on the US experience, I endeavour to recast 
federalism de novo as a principle governing non-statist, polyarchic constitutional arrangements and 
to use it as a powerful framework to analyze the implications of the European multilevel human 
rights system. In order to avoid conceptual confusion with the European brand of “federalism”, 
however, I will phrase my narrative in “neo-federalist” terms, building a bridge between the 
tradition of US federal thought and the contemporary debates about human rights in Europe. 
By comparing the European multilevel human rights architecture with the US federal 
experience, I aim to design an analytical framework to examine the constitutional dynamics that 
arise in the European system and to explain the implications of a multilevel arrangement in the 
protection of a selected number of fundamental rights. As I will argue, a “neo-federalist” narrative 
illustrates the existence in Europe of a complex set of synchronic and diachronic dynamics which 
the traditional “sovereigntist” and “pluralist” narratives are unable to capture. In particular, in order 
to answer my research question, I will explain that the interaction between different state and 
transnational human rights standards generates in the European architecture a series of 
constitutional phenomena which can be described through the notions of federal “floors” and 
“ceilings” of human rights protection.  
The functioning of the European pluralist system reveals, in fact, several recurrent 
synchronic dynamics. Since the human rights standards in force at the state and transnational levels 
often differ, the interaction between state and transnational laws generates possible tensions. The 
nature of these tensions, however, depends on: a) whether transnational law provides more or less 
protection than state law to the specific fundamental right de quo; and b) whether transnational law 
operates as a ceiling (i.e. as a maximum standard of protection that cannot be superseded by state 
law) or rather as a floor (i.e. as a minimum standard of protection that can be well integrated and 
enriched by state law). In the abstract, this generates multiple hypotheses of interaction between 
state and transnational law. However, taking into account that relevant horizontal differences exist 
between the human rights standards of the states – with some states providing a vanguard degree of 
protection and other states providing a laggard degree of protection for any given right – I argue 
that the impact of transnational law on state law simultaneously triggers different dynamics in 
different states and I therefore distinguish between what I define as: a challenge of ineffectiveness 
and a challenge of inconsistency.  
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A challenge of ineffectiveness emerges when a transnational law setting a ceiling of 
protection for a specific human right interacts with state laws which ensure a more advanced 
standard of protection for that right, challenging the effectiveness of the vanguard states’ standard 
and pressuring it toward the less protective maximum set up at the transnational level (while leaving 
the standard in force in the laggard states unaffected). A challenge of inconsistency emerges instead 
when a transnational law setting a floor of protection for a specific human right interacts with state 
laws which ensure a less advanced standard of protection for that right, challenging the consistency 
of the laggard states’ standard and pressuring it toward the more protective minimum set up at the 
transnational level (while leaving the standard in force in the vanguard states unaffected).  
The European human rights architecture also presents, however, important diachronic 
dynamics. The European multilevel system, like the US federal system, is constantly evolving 
because of changes and reciprocal influences between human rights norms and institutions and, as I 
argue, these transformations may, over time, provide satisfactory answers to the challenges that 
emerge from the interaction between state and transnational laws. To this end, I map the most 
relevant judicial and institutional transformations currently taking place in Europe and evaluate 
their impact on the existing challenges of ineffectiveness and inconsistency. In addition, I suggest 
that scholars may take into account the historical experience of the US federal system to envision 
further proposals for reforms of the European architecture. With all due caveats, in fact, a 
comparative-based assessment of the experience of the US may offer useful models and anti-models 
for reforming the European multilevel human rights system de jure condendo, especially in those 
areas of the law where challenges of ineffectiveness or inconsistency appear to be left unanswered 
by the ongoing transformations. 
Making use of this general analytical framework I select four case studies (which will be the 
object of detailed analysis in the following four chapters of the thesis) and briefly describe how, in 
each of these cases, it is possible to identify either a challenge of ineffectiveness or a challenge of 
inconsistency because of the interaction between state and transnational human rights standards in 
Europe. In addition, I emphasize how analogous dynamics have also been at play in the US federal 
system, and I explore the ways in which the current or prospective transformations taking place in 
Europe may improve the status quo. The case studies concern different human rights: a civil right 
(the right of due process for suspected terrorists), a political right (the right to vote for non-citizens), 
a social right (the right to strike) and a so-called “new generation” right (the right to abortion). Each 
of these cases addresses different situations but all the examples reveal recurrent patterns. By 
identifying the existence of the same dynamics in the four different examples, I expect to provide 
stronger empirical backing for the conceptual arguments I advance in this chapter. In addition, I 
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hope that the analytical conclusions of this work will invite further research to assess whether and to 
what extent the patterns I identify can be generalized also to other areas of European human rights 
law. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1, I outline the main features of the 
European multilevel human rights architecture and underline the most important constitutional 
transformations that have taken place in the protection of fundamental rights over the last two 
decades. In Section 2, I review the narratives that have prevailed in the legal literature and assess 
why both the “sovereigntist” and the “pluralist” approaches appear insufficient in making sense of 
the complexities of the European human rights system. In Section 3, I outline the contours of a 
“neo-federalist” narrative, explaining how the European architecture can be compared with the US 
federal system and how conceptualizing the European system in “neo-federal” terms can yield 
essential analytical insights. In this Section, I also explain why I prefer to speak of “neo-federalism” 
rather than “federalism”, distinguishing between a statist idea of federalism that has traditionally 
dominated the European public discourse and a pluralist idea that is instead proper to US 
constitutional thought and which – I argue – should be rediscovered in Europe. Having clarified my 
narrative, in Section 4 I attempt to design a comprehensive analytical framework for the study of 
fundamental rights in Europe. Here, I map the synchronic and diachronic dynamics at play in the 
European system, I define the challenges of ineffectiveness and inconsistency emerging from the 
interaction between state and transnational law, and I explore the transformations at play in the 
European system. In light of this framework, finally, in Section 5 I briefly synthesize how these 




1. The European multilevel system for the protection of fundamental rights 
 
In the last two decades, the protection of fundamental rights has seen a remarkable expansion in 
Europe.2 Fundamental rights have risen in importance in each layer of what is conventionally called 
the European multilevel architecture.3 In fact, nowadays, fundamental rights are simultaneously 
                                                 
2
 In this work, I will often refer to Europe, rather than simply to the EU, in order to include in the analysis also the 
ECHR as a third constitutional layer for the protection of fundamental rights. On the multilevel nature of the European 
constitutional system, comprising the member states, the EU and the ECHR see the works of Ingolf Pernice: ‘Multilevel 
Constitutionalism in the European Union’ (2002) 27 European Law Review 511 and ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel 
Constitutionalism in Action’ (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 349 
3
 On the European multilevel system for the protection of fundamental rights see especially Maria Cartabia, ‘L’ora dei 
diritti fondamentali nell’Unione Europea’ in Maria Cartabia (ed), I diritti in azione (Il Mulino 2007) 13 and Aida Torres 
Pérez, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A theory of Supranational Adjudication (OUP  2009) chap 2  
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protected by national (state), supranational (EU), and international (ECHR) norms and institutions. 
Each layer of the multilevel architecture is endowed with a substantive catalogue of fundamental 
rights. In addition, institutional remedies – most notably through the instrument of judicial review 
exercised by courts – are duly established at every level to ensure the protection of these 
constitutionally entrenched liberties. 
At the state level, the protection of fundamental rights has been a defining feature of all the 
Constitutions adopted after World War II (WWII) by European countries that had experienced an 
authoritarian regime.4 In the subsequent waves of constitutionalization which have taken place in 
Europe in the past 50 years – in the late 1940s in Italy and Germany,5 in the late 1970s in Spain, 
Portugal and Greece,6 and in the early 1990s with the transition to democracy of the post-
Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe7 – an event of paramount importance has been 
the adoption of a binding catalogue of fundamental rights enshrined in the supreme law of the land 
and safeguarded by the creation of specialized Constitutional Courts based on the Kelsenian model.8 
An early example of this European constitutionalist trend is, for instance, Italy. Here, 
fundamental rights are extensively proclaimed in the first part of the 1948 Constitution,9 a higher 
law that can be amended only through a complex process of constitutional revision. Besides the 
ordinary judicial system, charged to review the action of the executive branch,10 then, a centralized 
Constitutional Court, the Corte Costituzionale, has been set up to review the compatibility of 
ordinary statutes with the Constitution11 and its fundamental rights.12 An analogous arrangement 
                                                 
4
 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (OUP 2000); Martin Shapiro, ‘Rights in 
the European Union: Convergent with the USA?’ in Nicolas Jabko and Craig Parsons (eds), The State of the EU 
(Volume 7): With US or Against US? European Trends in American Perspective (OUP 2005) 378 
5
 See Hans Rupp, ‘Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany’ (1960) 9 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 29 (on Germany) and Alessandro Pizzorusso, ‘Italian and American Models of the Judiciary and of Judicial 
Review of Legislation: A Comparison of Recent Tendencies’ (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 373 (on 
Italy) 
6
 See Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Constitution-Making, Identity Building, and Peaceful Transition to Democracy: Theoretical 
Examples Inspired by the Spanish Example’ (1998) 19 Cardozo Law Review 1891 (on Spain); Philippe Schmitter, 
Portugal: Do autoritarismo à democracia (Imprensa de Ciências Sociais 1999) (on Portugal) 
7
 See Wojciech Sadurski, Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Post-communist States of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Springer 2005) 
8
 See Giuseppe de Vergottini, Le transizioni costituzionali (Il Mulino 1998). On the introduction of constitutional 
review of legislation in Europe compared with the US experience see Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Constitutional Adjudication in 
Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts’ (2004) 2:4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 633 and 
Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Two Hundered Years of Marbury v. Madison: The Struggle of Judicial Review of 
Constitutional Questions in the United States and Europe’ (2004) 5:6 German Law Journal 685 
9
 See for a general and philosophical overview Valerio Onida, La Costituzione (Il Mulino 2004) and Gustavo 
Zagrebelsky, La legge e la sua giustizia (Il Mulino 2008) 
10
 See Aldo Sandulli, ‘La giustizia’ in Sabino Cassese (ed), Istituzioni di diritto amministrativo (Giuffré 2004) 381 
11
 On the role of the Constitutional Court see Enzo Cheli, Il giudice delle leggi (Il Mulino 1996) and for a recent 
account Tania Groppi, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a ‘Multilevel System’ of Constitutional Review’ 
(2008) 3:2 Journal of Comparative Law 101 
12
 On the protection of fundamental rights in the Italian legal system see Augusto Barbera et al, ‘Le situazioni 
soggettive. Le libertà dei singoli e delle formazioni sociali. Il principio di uguaglianza’ in Giuliano Amato and Augusto 
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exists in Germany, where a core list of un-amendable fundamental rights is codified in the 1949 
Basic Law and enforced against the unlawful action of the executive, the legislative and the judicial 
branch (both in the Bund and the Länder) by a powerful Bundesverfassungsgericht.13  
At the same time, in the last few years, fundamental rights have also gained a new 
momentum in those countries of Western and Northern Europe in which no such constitutional 
transformation took place after WWII. Hence, in France, in 2008 a constitutional reform has 
introduced a path-breaking system of a posteriori constitutional review of legislation,14 which 
allows all individuals affected by an act of Parliament to contest the legality of the measure when it 
infringes the rights and liberties that the Constitution provides.15 In the Netherlands, where courts 
already exercise an ECHR-based contrôle de conventionnalité, a debate about the appropriacy of 
introducing a form of constitutional review of legislation has gained ground in the last few years.16 
Equally, in the United Kingdom (UK) – where arguably fundamental rights received their 
first historical recognition in a written document, the Magna Charta of 121517 – the question of the 
protection of fundamental rights re-emerged when, in 1998, the Parliament decided to incorporate 
the ECHR into domestic law through the Human Rights Act (HRA).18 The HRA empowered 
ordinary courts to adjudicate fundamental rights cases and to declare the incompatibility (without 
affecting the validity, however) of an act of Parliament with the ECHR when it infringes upon the 
rights and liberties codified therein.19 Even in the Nordic countries, finally, human-rights-based 
judicial review has emerged as a prominent feature of contemporary constitutionalism.20 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Barbera (eds), Manuale di diritto pubblico (Il Mulino, 1991) 117 and Augusto Barbera and Andrea Morrone (eds), I 
diritti fondamentali (Cedam 2012) 
13
 On the protection of fundamental rights in the German constitutional system see Donald Kommers, The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Duke University Press 1997) 
14
 For an assessment of the reform introduced by the Loi constitutionnelle n° 2008-724 J.O.R.F., 24 juillet 2008, p. 
11890 (Fr.) compare Federico Fabbrini, ‘Kelsen in Paris: France’s Constitutional Reform and the Introduction of A 
Posteriori Constitutional Review of Legislation’ (2008) 9:10 German Law Journal 1297 with François-Xavier Millet, 
‘L’exception d’inconstitutionnalité en France ou l’impossibilité du souhaitable’ [2008] Revue du droit public 1445 
15
 The discovery of a binding Bill of Rights in the Preamble to the 1958 Constitution had been accomplished by the 
Conseil Constitutionnel already in its Décision 71-44 DC. See Alec Stone Sweet, The Birth of Judicial Politics in 
France: The Constitutional Council in Comparative Perspective (OUP  1992); Louis Favoreu and Louis Philip, Les 
grandes décisions du Conseil Constitutionnel (Dalloz 2005) 177 
16
 See Gerhard van der Schyff, ‘Constitutional Review by the Judiciary in the Netherlands: A Bridge Too Far?’ (2010) 
11:2 German Law Journal 275 
17
 See the masterpiece study of Charles McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Cornell University Press 
1947) 
18
 On the UK Human Rights Act 1998, 46 Eliz. 2, c. 42 (Eng.) see Douglas Vick, ‘The Human Rights Act and the 
British Constitution’ (2002) 37 Texas International Law Journal 329. See also Peter Leyland, ‘Human Rights Act 1998: 
Riportare i diritti a casa?’ [2000] Quaderni Costituzionali 83 (explaining that the decision to incorporate the ECHR in 
domestic law was inspired by the will to “bring fundamental rights home.”) 
19
 For a more detailed explanation of the effect of the so-called “declaration of incompatibility” see Andrew Clapham, 
‘The European Convention on Human Rights in the British Courts: Problems Associated with the Incorporation of 
International Human Rights’ in Philip Alston (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills of Rights (OUP  1999) 233; 
Richard Gordon and Tim Ward, Judicial Review and the Human Rights Act (Routledge 2001) 
20
 On the rise of human rights-based judicial review in the Scandinavian countries see Joakim Nergelius, ‘Judicial 
Review in Swedish Law. A Critical Analysis’ (2009) 78:2 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 142 (on Sweden); Tuomas 
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At the supranational level, fundamental rights have also recently gained in importance and 
visibility. From the historical point of view, the introduction of a system of fundamental rights at 
the supranational level has been one of the greatest achievements of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).21 Since the 1957 European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty eluded the issue of human 
rights,22 it was the ECJ that, through a praetorian jurisprudence, recognized step-by-step 
fundamental rights as general principles of EEC law.23 Some scholars have argued that the case law 
of the ECJ was a response to the jurisprudence of the Italian and German Constitutional Court on 
“counter-limits”,24 and that it was therefore an attempt to foster the doctrines of supremacy and 
direct effect of EEC law within the national legal systems.25  
However – as Brun-Otto Bryde has powerfully demonstrated – the case law of the ECJ was 
not a purely defensive move: despite the willingness of the ECJ to thwart potential threats coming 
from the national courts, the jurisprudence of the ECJ represented instead “an impressive step in the 
development of a human rights culture in Europe.”26 Indeed, when the ECJ first identified an 
unwritten catalogue of fundamental rights in the general principles of EEC law, the protection of 
human rights was still much underdeveloped in the legal systems of the member states. In addition, 
the rise of a fundamental rights jurisprudence at the EU level predates the Solange decisions of the 
national Constitutional Courts – whose concern for fundamental rights has therefore been described 
by some as “a disguise for the opposition to supranational power as such.”27 
Be that as it may, the results of the ECJ’s jurisprudence were later codified in Article F of 
the EU Treaty signed in Maastricht (afterward renumbered as Article 6 EU Treaty by the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Ojanen, ‘From Constitutional Periphery Toward the Centre: Transformations of Judicial Review in Finland’ (2009) 78:2 
Nordic Journal of Human Rights 194 (on Finland) 
21
 Bruno de Witte, ‘The Past and the Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights’ in 
Philip Alston at al (eds), The EU and Human Rights (OUP  1999) 859 
22
 As Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor’ (2011) 105 
American Journal of International Law 649 has recently explained, human rights represented a fundamental pillar of the 
project for the establishment of a European Political Community discussed during 1952-1953. However, after the 
rejection of the European Defence Community Treaty by France in 1954, the founding member states decided to pursue 
a path toward integration focused on economic issues, in which human rights were not specifically considered 
23
 Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419; Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125; Case 4/73 
Nold [1974] ECR 491. See José N. Cunha Rodriguez, ‘The Incorporation of Fundamental Rights in the Community 
Legal Order’ in Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loïc Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU 
Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 89. See also Takis Tridimas, The 
General Principles of EU Law (OUP  2007) 298 
24
 C. Cost sent. 183/1973 Frontini; BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) Solange I (holding that the supremacy of EU law can not 
extend to the point of undermining the protection of state constitutional rights) 
25
 Jurgen Kühling, ‘Fundamental Rights’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jurgen Bast (eds), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2006) 501; Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Competition and Community: Constitutional 
Courts, Rethorical Action and the Institutionalization of Human Rights in the European Union’ in Berthold Rittberger 
and Frank Schimmelfennig (eds), The Constitutionalization of the European Union (Routledge 2007) 100  
26
 Brun Otto Bryde, ‘The ECJ’s Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence – A Milestone in Transnational Constitutionalism’ 
in Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loïc Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited 
on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 119, 122 
27
 Ibid 121, quoting Hans Peter Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Mohr 1972) 716 
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Amsterdam Treaty), which recognized that the EU respects fundamental rights as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the member states and the ECHR.28 The ECJ, through direct 
recourse or preliminary references, currently verifies that fundamental rights are complied with by 
EU institutions as well as by member states when they implement EU rules or when they restrict the 
exercise of a common market freedom.29 The Amsterdam Treaty, otherwise, also set up in Article 7 
EU Treaty a political mechanism (later refined by the Nice Treaty) to ensure member states’ 
compliance with EU fundamental rights.30 
In 2000, then, a Bill of Rights for the EU31 – the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) – 
was drafted and solemnly proclaimed by the EU institutions.32 Conceived as a restatement of the 
general principles of EU fundamental rights law but de facto quite innovative in many respects, the 
CFR was soon – despite its non-binding status – actively employed by the EU (and national) 
judiciaries as an advanced instrument for the protection of fundamental rights.33 Furthermore, since 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the CFR has acquired the same legal 
value as the EU treaties and binds the EU institutions and the member states when their action falls 
under the scope of application of EU law.34 
At the international level, finally, the ECHR has acquired a key importance as a 
constitutional source for the protection of basic civil and political rights throughout the European 
continent.35 The ECHR was adopted in Rome in 1950 by the state parties of the Council of Europe 
                                                 
28
 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights at the Core of the 
European Union’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1307 
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 Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609; Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925. See Zdenek Kühn, ‘Wachauf and 
ERT: On the Road from the Centralized to the Decentralized System of Judicial Review’ in Miguel Poiares Maduro and 
Loïc Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the 
Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010) 151 
30
 See Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Adding Bite to Bark: The Story of Article 7, E.U. Enlargement, and Jörg Haider’ (2010) 16 
Columbia Journal of European Law 385 
31
 Koen Lenaerts and Eddy de Smijter, ‘A “Bill of Rights” for the European Union’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law 
Review 273 
32
 On the CFR see Lucia Serena Rossi, ‘La Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali come strumento di costituzionalizzazione 
dell’ordinamento dell’UE’ [2002] Quaderni Costituzionali 565 and Gráinne de Búrca and Jo Beatrix Aschenbrenner, 
‘European Constitutionalism and the Charter’ in Steve Peers and Angela Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: Politics, Law and Policy (Hart Publishing 2004) 4 
33
 Koen Lenaerts and Eddy de Smijter, ‘The Charter and the Role of the European Courts’ (2001) 8:1 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 90; Piet Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal 
Question’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 945 
34
 On the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the protection of fundamental rights in the EU system see Marta Cartabia, ‘I 
diritti fondamentali e la cittadinanza dell’Unione’ in Franco Bassanini and Giulia Tiberi (eds), Le nuove istituzioni 
europee: Commento al Trattato di Lisbona (Il Mulino 2008) 81; Michael Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: 
Winning Minds, Not Hearts’ (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 617 
35
 As argued by Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Sur la constitutionnalisation de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme’ 
(2009) 80 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 923 the ECHR, despite its Treaty-like nature, has undergone 
tremendous transformations in recent years and may be today accounted as a trans-European Constitution. In particular, 
the existence of a strong court such as the ECtHR, able to condemn contracting parties for their human rights violation 
and having (since 1998) compulsory jurisdiction over the claims raised by private individuals, has had a major role in 
enhancing the ECHR. This distinguishes the ECHR from other international human rights regimes (established by 
treaties adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe or the United Nations) which, despite their normative 
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and was later integrated by several additional protocols. As membership to the ECHR steadily 
expanded to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1990s, moreover, the 
institutional devices for the protection of fundamental rights were refined and the role of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was strongly enhanced.36 
In particular, since the enactment of the 11th additional Protocol to the ECHR in 1998, the 
ressortissants of the signatory states may commence legal proceedings in front of the ECtHR when 
they believe that an individual right proclaimed in the ECHR has been unlawfully abridged by their 
state, and they have unsuccessfully exhausted all national remedies. In addition, they can receive 
damages if the state is found guilty.37 The ECtHR therefore exercises an external and subsidiary 
review on the national systems of fundamental rights protection by remedying potential 
malfunctions at the state level.38 The success of the ECHR review machinery, however, is such that 
the ECtHR has been literally flooded by individual applications in the last decade. Because of this, 
additional reforms to the ECHR were introduced in 2010 with the enactment of Protocol 14th aimed 
at enhancing the capacity of the ECtHR to cope with its soaring case law.39  
The constitutional role of the ECtHR40 creates an incentive for national courts to take the 
ECHR into account in domestic adjudication,41 even in those member states where the ECHR is not 
incorporated into the national legal order with the status of a constitutional text.42 Moreover, in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
relevance, still lack strong adjudicatory and enforcement mechanisms and thus have a more limited capacity to 
influence the legal systems of its member (and non-member) states 
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 Robert Harmsen, ‘The Transformation of the ECHR Legal Order and the Post-Enlargement Challenges Facing the 
European Court of Human Rights’ in Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino (eds) The National Judicial Treatment of 
ECHR and EU Laws. A Comparative Constitutional Perspective (Europa Law Publishing 2010) 27 
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 See Articles 34 and 41 ECHR (right to individual application and just satisfaction to the injured party). See also 
Antonio Bultrini, ‘Il meccanismo di protezione dei diritti fondamentali istituito dalla Convenzione europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo. Cenni introduttivi’ in Bruno Nascimbene (ed), La Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Profili ed 
effetti nell’ordinamento italiano (Giuffré 2002) 20 
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 Palmina Tanzarella, ‘Il margine di apprezzamento’ in Maria Cartabia (ed), I diritti in azione (Il Mulino 2007) 145, 
150; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Human Rights, International Economic Law and “Constitutional Justice”’ (2008) 19:4 
European Journal of International Law 769, 777 
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 See Lucius Caflish, ‘The Reform of the European Court of Human Rights: Protocol No. 14 and Beyond’ (2006) 6:2 
Human Rights Law Review 403. The need of new reforms in the machinery of the ECHR has recently been voiced also 
in the ‘Final Declaration’ of the High Level Conference on the Future of the ECtHR, Brighton (UK) 20 April 2012.  
40
 Compare Jean Francois Flauss, ‘La Cour européenne des droit de l’homme est-elle une Cour constitutionnelle?’ 
[1998] Revue française de droit constitutionnel 711 with Luzius Wildhaber, ‘A Constitutional Future for the European 
Court of Human Rights?’ (2002) 23 Human Rights Law Review 161 
41
 See Alec Stone Sweet and Helen Keller, ‘The Reception of the ECHR in National Legal Orders’ in Helen Keller and 
Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights (OUP  2008) 3; Giuseppe Franco Ferrari, ‘National Judges and 
Supranational Laws. On the Effective Application of EU Law and ECHR’ in Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino 
(eds), The National Judicial Treatment of ECHR and EU Laws. A Comparative Constitutional Perspective (Europa Law 
Publishing 2010) 21 
42
 A paradigmatic example of what is argued here is represented by Italy, where, thanks to the jurisprudence of the 
Corte Costituzionale – C. Cost sent. 348/2007 and sent. 349/2007 – the ECHR (despite having an infra-constitutional 
status within the Italian legal system) is nowadays utilized as a source integrating the Constitution, i.e. as one of the 
parameter on the basis of which national legislation is reviewed. See Diletta Tega, ‘Le sentenze della Corte 
costituzionale nn. 348 e 349 del 2007: la CEDU da fonte ordinaria a fonte ‘sub-costituzionale’ del diritto’ [2008] 
Quaderni Costituzionali 133 and Mario Savino, ‘Il cammino internazionale della Corte Costituzionale dopo le sentenze 
n. 348 e 349 del 2007’ [2008] Rivista Italiana Diritto Pubblico Comunitario 747. See also Joel Andriantsimbazovina, 
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several European countries, the ECHR has de facto become the common instrument through which 
ordinary courts exercise judicial review of national legislation: indeed, in many European 
jurisdictions, when a national statute is found to be contrasting with the rights established in the 
ECHR, ordinary courts disapply, in the case at hand, the national act – even where the Constitution 
prohibits courts from reviewing the constitutionality of acts of Parliament.43 
 
As this brief description outlines, in the last two decades the protection of fundamental 
rights has blossomed in Europe. Fundamental rights are nowadays proclaimed in national 
Constitutions, in the ECHR, as well as in the EU Treaty (which defines the constitutional traditions 
common to the member states and the ECHR as general principles of EU law). Moreover, since the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, they are codified in a CFR which has the same legal value as 
the EU treaties. National courts (ordinary judges and Constitutional Courts), EU courts (the ECJ 
and the Court of First Instance (CFI), now renamed the General Court), as well as the ECtHR 
provide judicial remedies against the infringements of rights. 
The protection of fundamental rights in Europe is hence ensured today through a multilevel 
structure in which different overlapping normative orders intertwine.44 The emergence of this 
pluralist structure represents a significant departure from the constitutional tradition of the European 
states where rights used to be protected by a single institution (either the Parliament or the Supreme 
Court). Yet, this system is the result of well-known historical necessities.45 The memory of the 
tragedies of the 20th century had made crystal clear to Europe’s political elites that the protection of 
fundamental rights could not be confined solely to the states and that additional norms and 
institutions beyond the states were necessary to ensure liberty and peace on the European 
continent.46  
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This is for sure the historical explanation of the ECHR – enacted in the aftermath of WWII 
and significantly strengthened after the fall of the Berlin Wall.47 However, the same logic also 
explains the creation of the EEC and its subsequent development into the EU.48 Originally 
conceived as a political plan, only later to be recycled as an economic venture,49 the project of 
European integration pursued the goal of strengthening the relationship between the member states 
by overcoming the deadly features of Westphalian politics that had twice, in less than thirty years, 
bloodied Europe.50 Fundamental rights, as checks against the abuse of public authorities, were 
certainly part of this enterprise – as evidenced by the jurisprudence of the ECJ, dating back as early 
as the 1960s, and by the subsequent codification of human rights in the EU in the late 1990s.51  
The growth of a fundamental rights culture in Europe in the last few decades, otherwise, has 
been supported by a continuous dynamic of mutual reinforcement. Indeed, whenever fundamental 
rights have beem strengthened at one of the levels of the European multilevel system, this has 
created the incentive for an expansion of the norms and institutions for the protection of 
fundamental rights in the other layers of the European system too. While state pressures arguably 
pushed the ECJ to begin protecting fundamental rights at the EU level,52 the development of 
fundamental rights in the framework of the EU and the ECHR have recently triggered major 
constitutional reforms in countries like France and the UK, bringing the protection of fundamental 
rights to the center of their constitutional systems.53 In addition, the mutual influences and virtuous 
competition between the ECJ and the ECtHR have greatly contributed to the enhancement of, and 
convergence between, human rights standards at the transnational level in Europe.54 
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The above-mentioned processes, however, have not produced a uniform conception of 
fundamental rights across Europe. As will be emphasized later in this chapter, significant 
differences remain in the understanding and scope of fundamental rights. Variations in the standards 
of protection regarding specific rights exist both at the horizontal level (between the member states) 
and at the vertical level (between state law, EU law and ECHR law). As such, the European system 
for the protection of fundamental rights can be described as a pluralist constitutional arrangement. 
The existence of 1) a plurality of constitutional sources enshrining fundamental rights, 2) a plurality 
of constitutional actors endowed with the power to protect them and thus 3) a plurality of 
constitutional views on human rights is hardly a contestable fact. But what are the consequences of 
this complex constitutional arrangement? What are the dynamics at play in the European multilevel 
human rights system? Scholars have advanced very different approaches to make sense of this new 
constitutional reality, and the persuasiveness of these narratives needs now to be investigated. 
 
 
2. Two narratives and their limits: “sovereigntism” vs. “pluralism” 
 
The extraordinary expansion of fundamental rights that has occurred over the last two decades in 
Europe represents a major challenge to the study of this field of law.55 The development of an 
advanced system for the protection of fundamental rights at the transnational level, in particular, has 
called into question traditional theories about the protection of fundamental rights and has generated 
opposing academic reactions. In the European literature it is possible to identify two prevailing 
narratives that examine the implications of a multilevel architecture for the protection of 
fundamental rights.56 According to several scholars, the emergence of layers of human rights 
beyond the state represents a negative challenge, threatening the sovereignty of the state. According 
to other scholars, instead, the events which have recently reshaped the European human rights 
arrangement must be assessed as a positive development, enhancing the overall European human 
rights record.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
Diritti dell’Uomo sugli atti di Comunità ed Unione Europea’ in Luca Mezzetti and Andrea Morrone (eds), Lo strumento 
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 These two narratives depart from different theoretical premises and offer diverging 
understandings of the current European reality.57 The first narrative – which I call the 
“sovereigntist” approach, since it is doctrinally grounded on the theory of the sovereign state as the 
primary locus for the protection of fundamental rights – mainly stresses the negative outcomes of 
the European multilevel system. The second narrative – which can be defined as the “pluralist” 
approach, since it departs from the theory of constitutional pluralism – provides instead a more 
optimistic assessment of the functioning of the European multilevel architecture, which praises the 
emergence of a common culture of fundamental rights in Europe. Yet, in their polarization, these 
two narratives offer only a partial view of the dynamics at play in Europe. For the methodological 
reasons that I will clarify below, both narratives present serious limitations in their capacity to 
explain comprehensively the implications of a multilevel architecture for the protection of 
fundamental rights. 
 A negative reading of the transformations that have recently occurred in the European 
multilevel human rights architecture can be detected in the work of a number of scholars from 
various EU member states. The emergence of sources and mechanisms of fundamental rights 
protection in the framework of the EU and the ECHR and the impact of these developments within 
the state legal system have been criticized in several areas of the law, as a challenge to the domestic 
standards of human rights protection.58 Although often formulated in different tones, these negative 
conceptions of the transformations taking place in the European human rights system are driven by 
an underlying common “sovereigntist” narrative, with strong roots in the UK59 but recently 
revitalized also in continental Europe.60 According to this narrative, the protection of fundamental 
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rights should be a primary function of the state, which exercises it, within the framework of the 
Constitution, through the action of its democratically-elected Parliament or through the activities of 
its courts.61 Hence, the development of human rights at the transnational level is seen as 
jeopardizing domestic standards and conceptions of rights and limiting the capacity of the state to 
decide about the scope of protection that should be granted to certain rights or liberties.62 
The dogmatic underpinnings of the “sovereigntist” approach find their historical roots, in the 
British case, in the centennial tradition of the “Sovereignty of Parliament”,63 and, in continental 
Europe, in the doctrinal thought of the late 19th-century Staatsrechtslehre.64 In his celebrated theory, 
Dicey conceptualized the practice of Parliamentary sovereignty as consisting in the power of the 
Queen-in-Parliament to make or unmake any law whatsoever. Furthermore, according to Dicey, no 
other authority has the right to over-ride or set aside legislation in the UK.65 In his influential 
System der subjektive öffentliche Rechte, instead, Jellinek constructed fundamental rights as the 
product of an act of self-limitation of the state, which placed boundaries on itself in order to ensure 
a space for freedom to the citizenry.66 According to Jellinek, “the State recognizes individual 
liberties, as they have historically developed, through its act of self-limitation, that is through a 
‘sovereign’ decision.”67 Individual rights were regarded as created and secured because of the 
existence of the state as the personified sovereign and therefore their protection could make sense 
only within the close and self-contained framework of the state’s legal authority.68 
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For understandable reasons, the tradition of Parliamentary sovereignty has been much more 
resilient in the UK, while Jellinek’s theories have been partially superseded in continental Europe. 
Since the UK has never experienced a totalitarian regime, the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty 
could legitimately survive in Britain even after WWII.69 In continental Europe, instead, the 
enactment of the post-WWII Constitutions described in Section 1, was driven by the desire to 
recognize fundamental rights as pre-political individual entitlements and to institutionalize them as 
the outer boundaries of state action.70 Nevertheless, the influence of “sovereigntist” thinking seems 
to have survived also on the European continent. In fact, the conviction that rights should be 
essentially confined within the sovereign state has heavily and enduringly shaped the contemporary 
European discourse about fundamental rights – and is today echoed in public conversation,71 in the 
case law of several national courts,72 and even in the measures adopted by national governments 
and legislatures.73 
A positive reading of the transformations taking place in the field of fundamental rights 
protection in Europe is instead offered by another group of scholars. These scholars praise in 
general terms the emergence of a jus commune of fundamental rights in Europe, applying to the 
field of human rights some of the most important conceptual accomplishments of the theory of 
constitutional pluralism.74 The theory of constitutional pluralism, which has been developed to 
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rationalize the current legal reality of competing constitutional claims of final authority and of 
judicial attempts at accommodating them, advances an optimistic vision of the European multilevel 
arrangement.75 Constitutional pluralists, in fact, not only accept the reality of a multiplicity of 
constitutional loci in Europe but actually regard this state of affairs as a normatively valuable 
situation. In the words of one of the earliest proponents of this theory, Professor Neil Walker, 
constitutional pluralism has, besides an explanatory claim, a normative and epistemic function.76 
In this “pluralist” narrative, fundamental rights no longer appear as directly and univocally 
related to the sovereign state. Rather, they are conceived as autonomously and simultaneously 
entrenched in a plurality of legal sources and a multiplicity of legal frameworks which intertwine 
and overlap.77 The state is but one of the authorities endowed with the power to acknowledge and 
secure fundamental rights and cannot advance any a priori greater claim of legitimacy vis-à-vis the 
other public authorities operating in the field of human rights protection beyond the state.78 As such, 
constitutional pluralism rejects the idea of a systemic, abstract superiority of the state in the 
protection of fundamental rights, in favour of an open-ended, heterarchical approach – to use the 
words of Professor Daniel Halberstam – which emphasizes the relative capacities of the various 
institutions involved in rights-protecting activities.79 
According to the theory of constitutional pluralism, therefore, the existence of a plurality of 
constitutional sites and authorities for the protection of fundamental rights should in general be 
defended as a valuable post-Westphalian setting80 in which different institutions cooperate, as in a 
musical counterpunct,81 to achieve a greater protection of fundamental rights while simultaneously 
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respecting the legitimate claims of authority made by each of the participants.82 In addition, as is 
emphasized, pluralism is the constitutional arrangement in which the needs for uniformity and 
diversity in the protection of fundamental rights can be best accommodated and reconciled and, as a 
consequence, Europe should strive to preserve it de jure condendo.83 
 
 Despite their different theoretical premises, both the “sovereigntist” and the “pluralist” 
narratives present common methodological limits that seriously weaken their capacity to 
systematize the implications of a multilevel human rights system.84 Both narratives capture some of 
the truth in the constitutional dynamics at play in the European architecture. The “sovereigntist” 
narrative correctly points out that the rise of transnational standards for the protection of 
fundamental rights has in some cases produced challenges in the domestic systems, threatening the 
state standards of protection of several rights. The “pluralist” narrative, at the same time, rightly 
emphasizes how the existence of a multilevel architecture has often enhanced the degree of 
protection of fundamental rights in the last decades in Europe. Nevertheless, because of a common 
methodological mistake, both narratives miss the general picture of fundamental rights in Europe 
and are therefore unable to convincingly explain the complex dynamics of such a multilevel 
architecture.85 
Indeed, both the “sovereigntist” and the “pluralist” narratives lack a comparative 
perspective, and approach the protection of fundamental rights in Europe from only a partial 
viewpoint.86 The “sovereigntists” consider a specific EU member state as their exclusive frame of 
reference and fail to undertake any internal comparison among EU member states. Hence, in 
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examining the implications of the interaction between state and transnational laws in Europe, the 
“sovereigntist” narrative neither appreciates the differences between EU member states nor explores 
how the impact of transnational human rights standards varies across the EU member states. The 
“pluralists”, on the other hand, focus solely on the European multilevel architecture, failing to 
undertake any external comparison between Europe and other multilevel systems for the protection 
of rights. Hence, in studying the dynamics at play in Europe, the “pluralist” narrative develops a sui 
generis vision, conceiving the European system as a unique, exceptional arrangement with no 
equivalents worldwide. 
As such, the analysis of both the “sovereigntists” and the “pluralists” appears to be based on 
an ideographic methodology. The “sovereigntists” see only what the interaction between state and 
transnational law produces in their country, without considering what – from an internal (European) 
comparative perspective – the consequences of this interaction are for other EU member states. The 
micro focus of the analysis and the lack of any cross-units comparison (i.e. comparison with other 
units of the European architecture) has however a serious drawback: the “sovereigntist” narrative 
results in a ideological preconception against transnational human rights law which misses the 
manifold and variable consequences of the interaction between state and supranational laws in the 
European multilevel architecture. The “pluralists”, instead, idealize the interplay between multiple 
sources of law in the European architecture as a sui generis phenomenon, without attempting to 
explore – from an external comparative perspectives – what dynamics arise in other multilevel 
human rights architectures. The macro focus of the analysis and the lack of any cross-systems 
comparison (i.e. comparison with other multilevel human rights systems) is therefore also 
problematic: the “pluralist” narrative crystallizes European reality and is unable to provide the 
benchmarks and guidelines needed to examine the evolving operation of the European system.  
In the general constitutional law literature, however, this kind of ideographic methodological 
approach has been the object of recurrent criticism from students of comparative law. Indeed, 
comparative lawyers have quite convincingly clarified the manifold advantages of the comparative 
method.87 The comparative method, on the one hand, is the most effective cognitive instrument to 
understand the structures and functions of juridical systems by underscoring the commonalities and 
diversities between cases.88 On the other hand, it is an extremely powerful method to explicate the 
dynamics and processes that characterize the functioning of a specific system and to illuminate 
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those structural regularities that would otherwise pass unnoticed.89 These advantages have been 
defined by Vicki Jackson as the “mirror function” of comparative law, i.e. the attitude of looking at 
the others to better understand oneself.90 
The comparative method has also been identified as a valuable tool to supply models in the 
perspective of legal reforms and to advance transformations and unifications in the law.91 Needless 
to say, however, comparison as a method is prima facie indifferent to the outcome of its analysis. 
The primary purpose of the comparative method is to explain phenomena rather than to prove 
convergences or similarities between the cases studied: a comparative analysis, in fact, may well 
reach the conclusion that the systems compared are different and divergent, and that solutions 
prevailing in one jurisdiction cannot, or should not, be exported into others. Hence, although the 
circulation of constitutional ideas is certainly an important component of the comparative method,92 
its main purpose is descriptive rather than prescriptive and as such it aims at enhancing scientific 
knowledge rather than advising legal reforms. 
 Constitutional scholarship has, at the same time, defined with growing precision and 
attention the principles that should guide case-selection in comparative law.93 Ran Hirschl has 
thoroughly identified four different models of comparative analysis,94 and has underlined how the 
value of the comparative assessment and its practical significance in shaping policy reforms is 
greatest under the so-called “most similar cases logic of comparison”, i.e. when the systems to be 
compared present structural similarities under most considered variables.95 Aware of the virtues of 
the comparative method, several students of European law have maintained that any research that 
focuses on the European system should resort to a comparative methodology and thus benefit, if 
possible, from the lessons that can be learnt from other legal systems.96 According to these scholars, 
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in fact, the European system is not a unique case, and there is more to gain than to lose from 
comparing it with other polities sharing its polycentric constitutional features.97  
Interestingly, the legal comparative approach in the study of European constitutionalism was 
quite widespread till the 1980s,98 but it later “fell into a medieval slumber”,99 to be replaced by a sui 
generis narrative.100 Recently, however, comparative lawyers have shown a new interest in 
European studies and have powerfully challenged the weak methodological assumptions of the sui 
generist scholarship.101 As Robert Schütze has convincingly argued, “there are serious problems 
with the sui generis argument.”102 Firstly, such an approach lacks explanatory value. Secondly, it is 
able to describe the European system only in negative terms. Thirdly, by being unable to provide 
any external standard, it fails to offer an adequate benchmark to appreciate the transformations of 
the European human rights architecture. From the empirical point of view, furthermore, 
comparative lawyers have persuasively explained that the sui generis argument is analytically 
unfounded, since the European architecture as a pluralist system characterized by the existence of 
overlapping sites of authorities – each endowed with institutions and practices for the protection of 
human rights – is in no way unique, special or exceptional and, rather, appears comparable with the 
constitutional structures of other polities, namely those governed by the principles of federalism.103 
Drawing on these important insights, I will now endeavour to advance a comparative-based analysis 
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3. The European multilevel system in comparative perspective: a “neo-federalist” narrative 
 
The idea that the constitutional architecture of Europe can be analyzed in a comparative perspective 
has a noble historical pedigree.104 It suffices to recall here the pioneering research coordinated by 
Mauro Cappelletti at the EUI in the early 1980s to appreciate how federal systems – and notably, 
the federal experience of the US – have traditionally been regarded as the most illuminating 
comparative examples for the study of Europe.105 As has been highlighted, the EU is a federal-like 
arrangement under many dimensions (a foundational, an institutional and a functional one) and can 
be usefully compared with other federal constitutional systems.106 By building on the illuminating 
contributions of these scholars, in this Section I will attempt to develop a comparison between the 
European multilevel human rights system and other federal arrangements for the protection of 
fundamental rights.107  
 In light of this comparative exercise, I will later frame the contours of a new narrative for the 
study of fundamental rights in Europe, which I call “neo-federalist”. The core claim of this narrative 
is that the European multilevel human rights architecture reflects the main features of other federal 
systems for the protection of fundamental rights and should be conceptualized as a “federal” model 
in order to be better analyzed. As I explain, however, the “federal” idea in Europe has traditionally 
been regarded as problematic in theory and unworkable in practice because of the statist ambiguities 
with which the European brand of “federalism” is fraught. In order to avoid this deadlock, I will 
therefore advance a “neo-federalist” vocabulary which, by rediscovering the US constitutional 
tradition, construes federalism as the organizing principle of pluralist, heterarchical constitutional 
arrangements. With these conceptual clarifications, “neo-federalism” will emerge as a powerful 
narrative to analyze the multilevel European human rights architecture. 
 In my comparative analysis I follow the “most similar cases logic of comparison”,108 and 
therefore select as comparator the federal constitutional system that shares more similarities with 
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the European multilevel architecture.109 In this regard, I argue that the most appropriate comparative 
example for the European multilevel architecture is precisely the federal system for the protection 
of fundamental rights of the US. As mentioned above, two structural features characterize the 
European multilevel system: 1) the plurality of constitutional sources, i.e. charters of rights at the 
state, EU and ECHR levels; and 2) the plurality of constitutional actors, i.e. institutions for the 
protection of rights. In Europe, this is ensured notably through several separate orders of 
jurisdictions (state courts, EU courts and the ECtHR), which are able to develop an autonomous 
conception of fundamental rights (since none of them is subject to appellate review by other courts 
on matters exclusively pertaining to its domestic jurisdiction) and which are mostly empowered to 
exercise judicial review.  
As a matter of fact, these pluralist features are lacking in the federal systems which 
originated in the framework of the British Commonwealth. In Australia, for instance, the federation 
(and many of the states) are not endowed with a Bill of Rights and although the federal judiciary 
has gradually developed a praetorian human rights jurisprudence, a single judicial system is in place 
in which the federal High Court acts simultaneously as the last instance court for both federal and 
state law.110 An analogous situation also exists in Canada: here, both the provinces and the federal 
government have Charters of Rights;111 however, the judicial system is largely centralized since the 
Federal Supreme Court operates as a last instance court also for provincial law (hence fully 
reviewing the decisions of provincial courts). In India, on the other hand, there are neither state 
constitutions nor state courts which have developed a local-based conception of rights.112  
A pluralist architecture for the protection of human rights exists instead in Switzerland, as 
the result of a series of historical developments that present many points of analogy with the 
European experience. The Swiss constitutional structure developed from the Middle Ages through a 
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series of covenantal networks among sovereign and independent cantons.113 During the 19th 
century, a more stable framework of cooperation was established with the adoption of the 1848 and 
1874 Constitutions. This latter text, however, did not contain a Bill of Rights, but only a number of 
scattered human rights provisions.114 Fundamental rights, therefore, were essentially protected on 
the basis of cantonal law and “the function of the federal government as guarantor of individual 
liberty was also subjected to the doctrine of ‘subsidiarity’: it was to be exercised as a last resort only 
and thus with caution.”115  
During the 20th century, the Swiss system for the protection of fundamental rights underwent 
several significant transformations.116 First, “the fundamental rights catalogue of the Swiss Federal 
Constitution was supplemented step by step by the case law of the Federal Supreme Court 
concerning the unwritten fundamental rights and the voluminous case law concerning the equal 
protection clause,”117 which anticipated the introduction of a detailed Bill of Rights in the new 
Swiss Constitution of 1999. Secondly, “Switzerland c[ould] not escape the influence of the 
international legal revolution.”118 Thus, in 1974, Switzerland became a party to the ECHR and, 
given the openness of its legal system vis-à-vis international human rights law,119 the ECHR has 
ever since been considered as directly binding in the federal and cantonal domains.120 As such, in 
Switzerland there are today “three levels of written fundamental rights”121, comprising cantonal 
laws, the Federal Constitution and the ECHR.122  
Nevertheless, mostly because of its civil law tradition,123 Switzerland is endowed with a 
unified judicial system, since cantonal courts are charged to enforce federal laws and the Federal 
Tribunal is empowered to hear appeals against decisions of the last instance courts of the Cantons124 
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for any issue concerning federal law, international law, or the constitutional law of the Cantons,125 
as well as appeals against any decision of cantonal authorities on any matter of federal 
constitutional law (so-called “subsidiary recourse”).126 In addition, because of its strong tradition of 
local participatory democracy,127 Switzerland has historically opposed the introduction of judicial 
review of legislation:128 even today, the Federal Tribunal can review cantonal laws but cannot set 
aside federal norms.129 As a consequence, it appears that Switzerland presents several relevant 
institutional differences from the pluralist judicial system existing in the European architecture 
which makes it a less apt example for comparison. 
From this point of view, the US emerges as the most similar case to be compared with the 
European multilevel architecture. In the US, as in Europe, the system for the protection of 
fundamental rights is characterized by a multiplicity of Bills of Rights (since the US states are 
endowed with their own human rights texts, just like the federal government)130 and by a plurality 
of jurisdictions (since the US states, like the federal government, are endowed with independent 
judicial institutions which can review legislation and whose decisions can only be appealed to the 
federal Supreme Court for compatibility with the federal Constitution).131 In the subsequent chapter 
of this thesis, therefore, I will use the US case as the comparative model for the study of Europe. 
Such a comparison is appropriate, otherwise, regardless of the state-like nature of the US 
constitutional system. From the point of view which is of interest for the comparison, in fact, the 
US is still empirically characterized by the existence of a federal, multilevel architecture for the 
protection of human rights, analogous to the European one. 
Also in the US, the emergence of a pluralist architecture for the protection of fundamental 
rights has been the result of a long historical evolution. The 1787 US Constitution, drafted after the 
unsuccessful experience of the 1781 Articles of Confederation, established for the thirteen 
independent American states a constitutional system in which power was institutionally divided 
both vertically132 – between several states and a federal authority – and horizontally133 – among the 
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various branches of the federal government (following a model that reproduced what was in force at 
that time in each of the several founding states and which would also later be reproduced in each of 
the new states).  
In its original structure,134 the US system was endowed with two strictly separate 
mechanisms for the protection of fundamental rights.135 Every state in the federation had its own 
constitutional text codifying fundamental rights and entrusting the state’s judiciary to enforce it. A 
federal Bill of Rights – drafted in 1791 and attached as the first ten amendments to the 1787 
Constitution (which itself included only few, minor human rights provisions) – then bound the 
action of the federal government in its spheres of competence. The federal Bill of Rights was, 
however, inapplicable in the states136 – some of which, in fact, even allowed slavery.137 
 After the Civil War, a major constitutional transformation occurred in the US with the 
adoption in 1868 of a new amendment to the federal Constitution.138 The Fourteenth Amendment – 
by stating that “no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws” – extended the application of the federal Bill of Rights to the states, 
empowering the three branches of the federal government to ascertain and remedy possible 
violations by the states of the fundamental rights recognized in the federal Constitution.139  
 The so-called “incorporation” of the federal standards of fundamental rights protection 
within the legal orders of the states was a gradual and contested process140 that took more than a 
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century and was mainly achieved, after WWII, through the jurisprudence of the US Supreme 
Court.141 Nonetheless, despite the increasing harmonization of the protection of fundamental rights 
in the US under the aegis of the federal government, the states maintained their own systems for the 
protection of fundamental rights.142 In addition, given the ample range of competences that were – 
and are – entrusted to the states, these remained – and still are largely today – relevant loci in which 
the protection of fundamental rights takes place.143 
 After WWII, the US was also closely involved in the process of constitutionalization of 
human rights at both the regional and the international level,144 although it then refused to bind 
itself to such agreements.145 Hence, at the regional level, the US has signed but not ratified the 
American Human Rights Convention, with the consequence that the Inter-American Human Rights 
Court (IACtHR) has no jurisdiction over claims against the US. The US has signed the American 
Declaration of the Rights of Men (ADRM) and – being a member of the Organization of the 
American States – can be sued before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACommHR).146 The ADRM-based review of the IACommHR is quite limited however, as it can 
only adopt non-binding recommendations which it is left to the state whether to enforce or not.147 
This short description shows how the US federal architecture for the protection of 
fundamental rights presents many structural similarities with the European multilevel system. Also 
the US system, in fact, is based on overlapping and intertwining layers of human rights norms and 
institutions.148 Having said this, of course, one should not ignore a relevant difference between the 
European and the US human rights systems. In the US, a “dual system of constitutional 
protections”149 is in force, with both states and federal courts and with state as well as federal bills 
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of rights. The US, instead, is not subject to a third layer of human rights protection comparable to 
the ECHR: while, in fact, the US is still bound by the weak ADRM, it has systematically refused to 
subject itself to the more pervasive external scrutiny of the IACtHR. Yet, the existence of this 
difference should not be taken as an insurmountable obstacle: Comparative analysis, indeed, does 
not require a total equivalence between the systems to be compared, and, as was explained above, 
the US system indeed appears as the most similar to the European one.150   
At the same time, there are also historical and normative reasons that render the US case 
enlightening to study the dynamics at play in Europe. From the historical point of view, the US 
federal system, like the European multilevel architecture, came into being through a constitutional 
process of “coming together” of pre-existing states, each endowed with its own mechanisms for the 
protection of fundamental rights. This explains why fundamental rights were largely absent in the 
original constitutional setting and emerged only subsequently, through a series of key constitutional 
transformations.  
Moreover, the US federal system and the European multilevel architecture appear to share a 
common normative identity characterized by “the [endemic] tension between uniformity and 
diversity”151 in the protection of fundamental rights. Kim Lane Scheppele has emphasized how the 
US federal arrangement “embodies a commitment to moral pluralism within a larger national arena, 
which must, as a result promote tolerance of such diversity for the nation to survive”152 and US 
scholars have attentively outlined how the US federal system combines competing centripetal and 
centrifugal forces in the field of fundamental rights.153 Indeed, each generation in the US has faced 
the question of where to draw the federal line between the search for uniformity and the need of 
diversity and how to combine self-rule and shared-rule.154  
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The same process, and the same challenges in striking the balance between centralization 
and decentralization, stand at the core of the European normative space.155 For the reasons that will 
be explained below, the tension between uniformity and diversity in the field of fundamental rights 
has not been historically conceptualized in Europe through the language of federalism. Yet, the 
European experience of combining homogeneity and heterogeneity is federalism in all but name.156 
As argued by Judge Pierre Pescatore, in fact, “federalism is a political and legal philosophy which 
adapts itself to all political contexts on both the municipal and the international level, wherever and 
whenever two basic prerequisites are fulfilled: the search for unity, combined with genuine respect 
for the autonomy and the legitimate interests of the participant entities.”157 
From the normative point of view, therefore, the US federal experience represents a 
particularly appropriate model to discuss the developments taking place in the European multilevel 
constitutional system. As it has been stated, “American federalism is a system of law and a structure 
of power”158 which, in the field of fundamental rights, is designed to promote diversity while 
safeguarding a degree of uniformity.159 Since the values of uniformity and diversity are also at the 
normative heart of the European multilevel human rights architecture, the US experience offers a 
paradigmatic example to appreciate how federal systems can blend in historically different forms 
the centripetal and centrifugal forces at play in the polity and how the never-ending tension between 
homogeneity and heterogeneity constitutes the essence of the federal method.160 
 
A comparison with other federal systems hence reveals that the European architecture is not 
a sui generis arrangement. Rather, the European multilevel human rights system shares many 
structural and normative similarities with the federal arrangement of the US. In light of this relevant 
methodological achievement, I claim that it is possible to develop a new narrative on the European 
system for the protection of fundamental rights, which – for labelling purposes – I will call “neo-
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federalist”. According to this narrative, the European human rights architecture can be 
conceptualized as a “federal” constitutional structure and compared with the US in order to be 
comprehensively and systematically analyzed.  
Why do I call my narrative “neo-federalist” rather than simply “federalist”? The notion of 
federalism deserves here some attention. European legal and political discourse has traditionally 
been alarmed by the use of the “F” word. The word “federalism” has been carefully avoided in the 
language of EU primary law and, with some remarkable exceptions, scholars addressing the EU 
constitutional structure have only reluctantly referred to it in their research.161 But what is the 
trouble with the concept of “federalism” in Europe and why is the debate around it so heated? As 
argued by Tim Koopmans some twenty years ago, much of the answer lies in the confusion that 
characterizes the debate about federalism in contemporary Europe.162 
The concept of federalism has evolved significantly over time, acquiring different meanings, 
from its appearance in the vocabulary of political philosophy in 16th-century Europe, through its re-
invention in 18th-century America, up to its revival in the modern and contemporary world.163 
Nevertheless, since the 19th century, European public lawyers (with the above-mentioned exception 
of the Swiss164) have considered “federalism” simply as a theory for the political organization of the 
sovereign state and as the technical device to decentralize competences within a single, hierarchical 
constitutional system.165 European federalist thought, in other words, has traditionally suffered from 
a “sovereigntist”, statist bias, since federalism has conventionally been equated with a purely 
national phenomenon.166 
This frame of mind has largely influenced those scholars who have pioneered a federalist 
vision of Europe – what I like to call the “classical federalists.”167 In the last 50 years, indeed, the 
acolytes of the “classical federalism” school have argued that Europe should strive to overcome the 
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differences between the member states and become a true federal state.168 This view, however, has 
been criticized in both “sovereigntist” and “pluralist” terms. Hence, several authors have questioned 
the wisdom of conceptualizing an EU federal state – let alone of realizing it;169 while others have 
advanced an even more compelling argument for rejecting the notion: because of its bias toward the 
state, classical federalist thinking falls into the same theoretical trap in which “sovereigntist” 
thought is caught, namely it is unable to understand or appreciate the advantages of a pluralist 
setting in which the statist features of sovereignty have been overcome.170 
The statist ambiguities imbued in the European tradition of “federalism” can explain the 
scepticism (or fear) with which the concept has been rejected at the analytical and normative level 
in Europe. However, one needs to be aware that this notion of “federalism” is not the only one. In 
the constitutional experiences of other systems – notably the US and Switzerland – federalism has 
traditionally represented something quite different, originally being conceived as a theory of 
governance for a union of states.171 In the view of the American founders in particular,172 federalism 
was conceived both as a tool and a theory for the creation of an institutional structure lying 
somewhere in between a purely national and international phenomenon.173 Needless to say, through 
a number of constitutional moments, the US (like Switzerland) has over time developed into a state-
like structure.174 Despite the significant centralizing trends, however, the federalist idea has 
survived in the US for the last two centuries175 and is still today reflected inter alia in the compound 
architecture for the protection of fundamental rights.176 
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In the US tradition, therefore, federalism has been regarded as a normative theory and as an 
institutional device that rejects a hierarchical and monist constitutional arrangement and divides and 
distributes sovereignty between competing levels of authority and institutions within it.177 Seen 
from this perspective, federalism embodies the constitutional values of freedom, pluralism and self-
governance178 and must be regarded as a “theory on levels of government activity generally […] 
dissociated from the notion of the State.”179 As has been convincingly demonstrated, indeed, “legal 
pluralism provides the conceptual background to all modern federal thought”180 and “federalism 
emphasizes constitutionalized pluralism and power sharing as the basis of a truly democratic 
government.”181 In light of the above, the US theory of federalism results as significantly akin to the 
European theory of constitutional pluralism.182 
It is thus apparent how the “neo-federalist” perspective embraced in this essay differs from 
the “classical federalism” that has conventionally dominated the European public discourse, since it 
rejects an automatic equation between federalism and the federal state.183 On the basis of a fuller 
awareness of the US federal experience,184 and by ideally linking this work to that tradition of 
federalism, I instead regard “neo-federalism” as a valuable conceptual framework to explain the 
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dynamics at play in the pluralist European constitutional architecture.185 In other words, by 
proposing a “neo-federalist” approach, this chapter aims to revive a neglected brand of federalism 
in Europe and to make it a powerful prism through which to assess the European multilevel system 
of human rights protection.186  
Given the similarities between the US tradition of federalism and the European theory of 
constitutional pluralism, however, one may ask what the added value of a “neo-federalist” 
perspective on the European multilevel system of fundamental rights protection is? The answer – I 
argue – is in the capacity of the “neo-federalist” approach to better explain the constitutional 
dynamics at play in the European human rights architecture through the use of comparative law. 
Contrary to a widespread assumption, the European multilevel architecture is not the only system 
which has “had to combine a respect for rights with the requirements of effective government and to 
apportion responsibility for defining and protecting rights between general and constituent 
governments.”187 Rather, Europe, as a pluralist system, is facing the same challenges as other 
federal systems and, “to a considerable extent, the problems these federal nations face in reconciling 
federalism and rights.”188 The complexities of a pluralist constitutional system of human rights 
protection are quite new in Europe:189 by contrast, other federal polities have dealt with these 
complexities for a much longer time, and still continue to deal with them today. From this point of 
view, comparative “federalism provides one of the few theories which makes the actual 
developments understandable”190 and it is therefore worthwhile exploring it. 
In conclusion, the “neo-federalist” narrative propounded in this thesis dialogues with the 
theoretical paradigm of constitutional pluralism but avoids the methodological weaknesses of a sui 
generist vision by offering a different – comparative-based – understanding of the European 
multilevel constitutional system for the protection of fundamental rights. By rediscovering a 
pluralist discourse of federalism and making a conscious and deliberate use of the comparative 
method, “neo-federalism” embodies a new perspective to appreciate the relevant implications of the 
European fundamental rights architecture, identify the challenges it currently faces, and envision its 
possible future developments. The following Section will be dedicated to this task. 
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4. The dynamics of the European multilevel architecture recast 
 
What are the consequences of the European system for the protection of fundamental rights? What 
dynamics are at play in a multilevel human rights arrangement such as the one described in Section 
1? In Section 2, I examined the “sovereigntist” narrative and questioned its theoretical capacity to 
provide a rationalization of the constitutional dynamics that spring from a multilevel human rights 
architecture. At the same time, I also underlined how the “pluralist” narrative lacks explanatory 
power, since in its sui generist mood, it does not offer any benchmark and framework of reference 
to analyze the phenomena at play in Europe. For this reason in Section 3 – after demonstrating that 
the European multilevel human rights architecture can be compared with the federal system of the 
US – I advanced a “neo-federalist” narrative, arguing that conceptualizing the European system as a 
federal arrangement can yield a more persuasive answer to the research question of this work. 
 A multilevel architecture for the protection of fundamental rights generates dynamics that 
are unknown in traditional European statist, hierarchical settings in which the task of protecting 
rights is clearly assigned to a single institution (be it the Parliament or a Supreme Court) and where 
a uniform, clear standard for the protection of fundamental rights is therefore in place. Rather, the 
dynamics produced by the overlap and interplay between different sets of norms and institutions in 
Europe are akin to those at play in other federal human right arrangements and can be better 
appreciated by employing a comparative approach, that is by analyzing the European architecture in 
light of the constitutional and historical experiences of the federal system for the protection of 
fundamental rights of the US.191 
 A “neo-federalist” perspective allows us to analyze the dynamics of the European multilevel 
human rights system under two dimensions: a synchronic and a diachronic one. According to the 
first dimension, it is possible to identify the challenges that arise in specific human rights sectors 
from the interaction between different state laws and transnational law (a term by which I generally 
refer to EU and ECHR law in Europe, and federal law in the US).192 According to the second 
dimension, it is possible to evaluate the transformations taking place in the European multilevel 
system and the capacity of these ongoing (and prospective) legal and judicial developments to 
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address the critical dynamics that can be identified in the functioning of the European human rights 
arrangement.  
In a multilevel human rights system, the protection of fundamental rights is synchronically 
ensured by a multiplicity of human rights charters and by a plurality of human rights institutions. 
The scope given to specific rights either in the several human rights charters or in the case law of 
the institutions adjudicating in the various layers of the multilevel architecture is often variable. 
Certainly, there are cases in which the standard for the protection of a specific right is exactly the 
same in each layer of the multilevel architecture. In Europe, for instance, the law of all the member 
states, the EUCFR and the ECHR converge in interpreting the protection of the right to life as 
implying a prohibition of the death penalty.193 The same example of the death penalty in the US, 
however, makes it clear that in federal human rights arrangements relevant differences can often 
exist both horizontally and vertically in the standard of protection given to a specific right.194 
At the horizontal level, states vary in the scope of protection they afford to specific rights. 
As Ann Althouse has clearly explained with reference to the US, in federal systems for the 
protection of fundamental rights, states are generally able to experiment and provide different 
degrees of protection to a given right.195 As such, for any specific fundamental rights issue, it is 
possible to classify states along a spectrum of positions and to identify vanguard states (i.e. states 
which ensure the most advanced degree of protection of the right at issue) and laggard states (i.e. 
states which lag behind, by protecting – if at all – the right de quo in only a very restrictive way). 
Needless to say, since rights do not exist in a vacuum but are rather the result of complex balancing 
between competing interests,196 “attempts to sort the states into these two categories will (and 
should) produce great disputes.”197 Nevertheless, classifying the states’ standards of protection 
along the continuum vanguard-laggard offers a very promising point of departure to explore the 
consequences of the interaction between state and transnational standards. 
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In federal, multilevel human rights architectures variations also occur at the vertical level 
since the standards for the protection of a given right often differ in state law and transnational 
law.198 Just as in the horizontal dimension, in fact, states and transnational laws may reflect 
different understandings of human rights and strike alternative balances between conflicting rights 
and public interests.199 As outlined in Section 1 with regard to the European system and in Section 3 
with reference to the US, the emergence of a transnational standard for the protection of 
fundamental rights in federal human rights systems came at a more recent historical stage of 
evolution of the constitutional system. As such, when a transnational human rights standard comes 
into being, it starts interacting with pre-existing state standards, bringing to light possible areas of 
divergence with the domestic standards already in force.  
The coexistence of a multiplicity of standards in multilevel human rights architectures such 
as the European one is at the origin of complex constitutional dynamics. When the state and 
transnational standards for the protection of a specific right differ, the interaction between state and 
transnational law generates possible tensions. Yet the nature of the constitutional dynamics that 
arise from the overlap and interplay between different human rights standards depends on two 
specific factors. First it depends on whether the transnational standard provides (i) more protection 
to a specific right than the relevant state standard or (ii) less protection than the relevant state 
standard. Second, it depends on whether the transnational standard for the protection of a given 
right operates (a) as a ceiling (i.e. as a maximum standard of protection that cannot be superseded 
by state law) or (b) as a floor (i.e. as a minimum standard of protection, that can well be integrated 
and enriched by state law).  
In a formalistic way, therefore, it would be possible to distinguish four different hypothetical 
dynamics. 1) If transnational law sets a floor of protection, which corresponds to the minimum 
existing state standard, no major complication seems to arise, since the existence of a transnational 
minimum leaves the states free to provide a more advanced degree of protection. 2) If transnational 
law, however, sets a floor of protection, which is higher than that provided by state law, this 
generates a more complicated dynamic. In this situation, in fact, transnational law puts pressure on 
the states to enhance their standard of protection at least up to the minimum degree provided at the 
transnational level. 3) If, instead, transnational law sets a ceiling of protection, which corresponds to 
the maximum existing state standard, no major complication emerges either since, in this situation, 
transnational law sets a maximum standard which is in any case as protective, or more protective, 
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than the existing state standard. 4) If transnational law, however, sets a ceiling of protection, which 
is lower than that provided by state law, this generates another critical situation. Here, in fact, 
transnational law puts pressure on the states, challenging their more advanced human rights 
standards.  
As a matter of fact, however, this classification does not entirely capture the reality of the 
European multilevel human rights system. Because of the already mentioned horizontal differences 
that exist between the states (with states providing vanguard and laggard protection for any given 
human right), in reality, the interaction between state and transnational law always simultaneously 
triggers more than one of the above-mentioned dynamics. When transnational law sets a floor for 
the protection of a given right, this standard may be lower than the standard provided by some 
vanguard countries but still exceed the standards existing in some other laggard states. And equally, 
when transnational law sets a ceiling for the protection of another right, this standard may be higher 
than the standard provided by some laggard countries but still be lower (and thus undermining) the 
standards in force in other vanguard states. As such, it seems possible to identify two major 
constitutional dynamics at play in the European multilevel system, which, for analytical purposes, I 
will label the challenge of inconsistency and the challenge of ineffectiveness. 
 A challenge of inconsistency emerges in the case of interaction between different state laws 
and transnational law, when the latter operates as a floor of protection. By setting up a minimum 
standard for the protection of a specific human right, transnational law challenges the less protective 
standards existing in some laggard states and pressures them to enhance their levels of protection at 
least up to the degree provided by transnational law. At the same time, by drawing only a minimum 
standard of protection, transnational law leaves free other vanguard states to go above the 
transnational floor by providing more advanced protection to the right de quo.  
 A challenge of ineffectiveness emerges instead in the case of interaction between different 
state laws and transnational law, when the latter operates as a ceiling of protection. By setting up a 
maximum standard for the protection of a specific human right, transnational law challenges the 
effectiveness of the more protective standards existing in the vanguard states, pressuring them 
towards the bottom-level protection provided by transnational law. At the same time, as long as it 
defines a maximum standard of protection, transnational law leaves unaffected the other pre-
existing state standards that do not exceed the transnational ceiling. 
 The graph below attempts to offer a visual description of the challenges of ineffectiveness 
and inconsistency described above. The vertical axis classifies along a maximum-minimum 
continuum the protection ensured to a given right (x) by three hypothetical states – state A, 
providing a laggard degree of protection, state C, providing a vanguard degree of protection and 
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state B, providing a median protection to right x. The horizontal axis, instead, sets the degree of 
protection that is ensured to right x by transnational law, at a level hypothetically equivalent to that 
provided by state B. On the left hand side of the graph, transnational law operates as a floor of 
protection for right x, thus creating a challenge of inconsistency for state A; on the right hand side 
of the graph, on the contrary, transnational law operates as a ceiling of protection for right x, thus 
creating a challenge of ineffectiveness for state C.  
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 The question whether the transnational standard for the protection of a given right operates 
as a floor rather than as a ceiling is difficult to answer in the abstract.200 The nature of a 
transnational standard seems to be the result of both the broader legal framework and of the specific 
human rights issue at hand. In Europe, generally, the ECHR functions as a floor of protection:201 
according to the principle of subsidiarity, which characterizes international human rights treaties, in 
fact, the ECHR only sets up a minimum standards of protection, above which states are totally free 
to go.202 EU law, on the contrary, reveals a more intricate picture. The EUCFR claims to function as 
a floor of protection, which leaves the more advanced standard existing at the international or state 
level unaffected.203 Yet, in the policy fields falling under the regulation of the EU, member states 
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are prevented from enforcing human rights standards which are higher than the EU standards and 
which possibly interfere with EU law.204 
 
While a synchronic assessment of the functioning of the European multilevel human rights 
architecture reveals the existence of several challenges due to the interplay between transnational 
law and different state laws, a “neo-federalist” assessment of the European system also sheds light 
on the diachronic transformations that are at play. The European human rights architecture, much 
like the other federal systems for the protection of rights, is a dynamic constitutional arrangement in 
which developments are constantly taking place both in the law in the books and the law in action. 
Contrary to hierarchical human rights architectures – which tend to be quite static because changes 
can only be triggered by the single institution in charge of defining the relevant human rights 
standard – pluralist human rights systems are subject to continuous readjustments, because of the 
mutual influences and spill-overs between state and transnational laws and actors.  
The dynamism of federal systems has been clearly emphasized in the literature.205 With 
specific regard to human rights, then, Aida Torres Pérez has explained that “the model of rights 
protection in federal compounds is always debated.”206 As outlined in the previous Section, in the 
US the protection of fundamental rights has been historically subject to continuous jurisprudential 
and institutional changes, often driven by the desire to enhance rights protection and address 
perceived shortcomings in the overall constitutional system.207 The US experience hence invites us, 
first, to consider whether analogous transformations are taking place in Europe; and, second, to 
think comparatively about what possible additional reforms may be advisable in the future to 
improve the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. 
Among the transformations currently taking place in the European multilevel architecture, 
two are especially worth our attention. A first transformation is taking place at the jurisprudential 
stage. As Marta Cartabia has extensively argued,208 state courts, the ECJ and the ECtHR are in 
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constant dialogue209 with each other and their mutual engagements are profoundly reshaping the 
contours of the protection of fundamental rights in Europe.210 In addition, a number of courts – 
notably the ECtHR – have developed an evolutive interpretation of the human rights texts upon 
which they base their rulings, constantly updating their meaning and scope of protection.211 The 
transformations in the case law of the European courts need to be closely monitored in their 
capacity to fill some of the gaps in the protection of rights at the EU level but also for the positive 
influences that they may have on the advancement of human rights in those member states which 
still lag behind in the protection of specific rights or liberties. 
A second transformation, however, is occurring at the institutional stage. A major force of 
change in the European context is, in fact, represented also by the political branches, both at the 
state and transnational level.212 In this regard, several key innovations are contained in the Lisbon 
Treaty.213 The Treaty, which itself is part of an almost fifteen-year long “semi-permanent Treaty 
revision process”214 at the EU level, now inter alia mandates the accession of the EU to the 
ECHR215 and, although the precise effects of accession are still uncertain,216 it is likely that once the 
EU joins the ECHR, this will have profound implications for the strengthening of the protection of 
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fundamental rights within the EU legal order.217 The possibility of bringing a case against the EU 
before the ECtHR should, in fact, provide incentives to the ECJ and the other EU institutions to 
raise the EU human rights standards where they lag behind the ECHR minima, enhancing the 
convergence between the two European transnational standards. 
Additional reforms may, however, be needed in the European system in the future. In this 
regard, the comparative method commended by the ‘neo-federalist’ perspective can again prove 
useful.218 Albeit with a number of important caveats, scholars might in fact draw lessons from the 
historical and constitutional stories of other federal systems which have a longer experience of a 
multilevel system for the protection of fundamental rights in order to advance proposals for (legal 
and policy) reforms de jure condendo aimed at increasing the effectiveness and consistency of the 
European human rights architecture, especially in those fields in which the current transformations 
do not yet seem to yield plainly satisfactory results.  
Moreover, as previously explained, the US federal system and the European multilevel 
architecture share a common normative identity since they strive to combine in the field of 
fundamental rights the need for unity with an accommodation for diversity. The solutions adopted 
in one system can therefore be taken into consideration to address comparable challenges in the 
other. When considering the experience of the US federal human rights system to inform our 
discussion about possible future reforms of the European human rights architecture, however, an 
important caveat is required. In the US, the architecture for the protection of fundamental rights has 
undergone a gradual evolution from an extremely decentralized compound, in which the function of 
rights protection at the central level was almost non-existent (as prior to the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, or even more clearly, prior to the enactment of the Bill of Rights) to a 
fairly centralized structure.219 Nevertheless, it is important to notice that this evolution was neither 
unavoidable nor irreversible. In the US, in fact, trends toward centralization and uniformity have 
historically been sided by trends toward decentralization and differentiation.220  
                                                 
217
 The negotiating process for the accession of the EU to the ECHR is currently at an advanced stage. A first Draft 
International Agreement on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR has been published on July 19, 2011, CDDH-
UE(2011)16 and, after a series of amendments, re-published on October 14, 2011 CDDH-UE(2011)009. For an updated 
analysis of the draft see Xavier Groussot et al, ‘Adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits 
de l’homme: analyse juridique du projet d’accord d’adhésion du 14 octobre 2011’ (Fondation Schuman Paper 2011)  
218
 On the ability of the comparative method to supply models for legal reforms, ie to recommend policy changes 
through law, see R. Sacco (n 89) 19; L. Pegoraro (n 88) 5. See also Martin Scheinin et al (eds), The Jurisprudence of 
Human Rights: A Comparative Interpretive Approach (Åbo Akademi 2000) 
219
 On the continuous importance that sub-national constitutional norms and institutions still play in the protection of 
fundamental rights in the US see however Talbot d’Alemberte, ‘Rights and Federalism: an Agenda to Advance the 
Vision of Justice Brennan’ in Ellis Katz and Alan Tarr (eds), Federalism and Rights (Rowman and Littlefield 1996) 123 
220
 See Céline Fercot, ‘Diversity of Constitutional Rights in Federal Systems’ (2008) 4 European Constitutional Law 
Review 302 
 46 
In other words, there is no inevitable teleology in federal human rights arrangements 
shaping the evolution of these systems toward centralization and homogenization. The already-
mentioned example of the death penalty in the US demonstrates how federalism can accommodate 
both increases and decreases of federal interventions in the field of human rights. The decision 
whether to ban the death penalty was traditionally a matter for the states.221 In 1972, the US 
Supreme Court held capital punishment was unconstitutional, arguing that the imposition of the 
death penalty violated the prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” of the federal Bill of 
Rights and it imposed a moratorium on state capital punishments.222 In 1976, however, the power to 
set the relevant “right to life” standard was handed back to the states, most of which have now 
reinstated the death sentence.223  
As a consequence, taking the US federal experience into account when discussing possible 
future prospects for the enhancement of the European multilevel fundamental rights system does 
not imply claiming that Europe should, or will, necessarily follow the US path toward a federal 
state. Rather, the point being made here is that the US offers a wide spectrum of models and anti-
models, which the European human rights system can consider in discussing how to address 
specific challenges. Looking at the lessons of other federal, multilevel human rights systems can 
therefore both raise the attention regarding the existence of adequate mechanisms for reform within 
the European multilevel architecture and suggest ways in which Europe may tackle (e.g., through 
treaty, legislative or judicial changes) the challenges of ineffectiveness and inconsistency left 
unaddressed by the current transformations. 
From this point of view, in conclusion, it appears that a “neo-federalist” perspective is not 
simply instrumental in shedding light on some of the critical implications emerging from the 
European pluralist human rights architecture. The same approach also explains how legal changes 
affect the functioning of the system and emphasizes how these transformations can create – so to 
speak – positive internal dynamics of checks and balances, functional to a more effective and 
consistent protection of fundamental rights. In other words, the assumption that drives a “neo-
federalist” assessment of the European human rights architecture is that, at the same time as the 
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5. Four case studies 
 
In the next chapters of this thesis I will consider four case studies to assess the extent to which the 
complex constitutional dynamics outlined above can be detected in practice in the European 
multilevel architecture. To prove the validity of my argument I select four different types of 
fundamental rights, each belonging to what scholars define as the several “generations” of rights:224 
a civil right (the right to due process for suspected terrorists), a political right (the right to vote for 
non-citizens), a social right (the right to strike) and a “new generation right”225 (the right to 
abortion). Two of these cases (the right to due process and the right to strike) exemplify the 
challenge of ineffectiveness; the other two (the right to vote for non-citizens and the right to 
abortion) instead provide evidence of the challenge of inconsistency.  
In each of these cases, I explain how the interaction between state and transnational law has 
revealed a challenge of either ineffectiveness or inconsistency in Europe. By adopting a 
comparative perspective I also highlight how analogous dynamics have emerged in the federal 
system for the protection of fundamental rights of the US. The challenges of ineffectiveness and 
inconsistency are, in fact, typical features of multilevel human rights arrangements characterized by 
horizontal and vertical differences in standards of protection. At the same time, I also underline how 
the example of the US proves that pluralist systems are endowed with the internal mechanisms to 
successfully face these challenges, and to enhance over time the protection of fundamental rights. In 
light of this, I explore the more recent jurisprudential and institutional transformations taking place 
in Europe and discuss what the future prospects for the protection of each of these specific rights 
could or should be in Europe.  
In selecting the case studies, I have attempted to choose four examples which address topics 
of particular relevance and which have, consequently, received special attention in contemporary 
legal debates. Moreover, selecting issues such as counter-terrorism law, migration and voting rights, 
strike law and abortion law has allowed me to consider a number of recent milestone rulings of the 
ECJ and the ECtHR such as, to name only a few, Kadi,226 Aruba,227 Viking,228 Laval,229 
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Bosphorus,230 Demir & Baykara231 and A.,B. & C.232 (not to mention, of course, important decisions 
taken by the national courts). At the same time, these topics have also given me the chance to take 
into account in comparative perspective key constitutional moments of US history, such as the 
Reconstruction, the New Deal, the Civil Rights Era as well as the most recent War on Terror.233 By 
selecting very different cases, I hope to provide the broadest empirical support for the arguments 
advanced in the thesis. Anticipating what will be the core of the next analytical chapters, I offer 
here a brief sketch of each of these four case studies.  
 The right of due process for suspected terrorists offers a first example of the challenge of 
ineffectiveness. In the aftermath of 9/11 counter-terrorism measures with serious consequences on 
the due process rights of the targeted individuals were adopted both by the EU member states and 
by the EU, under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The degree of due process 
ensured to suspected terrorists varied greatly, however, among the EU states, with countries like 
Germany providing a generally wide protection for due process rights,234 and countries like France 
and the UK striking a much more “security-sensitive” approach.235 In this context, the original 
decision of the CFI in the Kadi case236 to refuse to review the legality of the EU counter-terrorism 
measures for compatibility with EU due process rights, generated a major challenge of 
ineffectiveness: by setting a low-level due process standard (akin to that of the laggard member 
states), the EU opened a lacuna of protection in the EU constitutional system and at the same time 
prevented the member states which were willing to do so, from providing at the state level a more 
extensive review of the UN-based EU counter-terrorism measures. 
 This state of affairs parallels to some extent the situation that occurred in the US, where the 
post-9/11 federal counter-terrorism policies significantly lowered the due process standards that 
were traditionally in force in many state jurisdictions. Since under the “anti-commandeering” 
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doctrine state officials cannot be compelled to execute federal mandates,237 a number of state 
governments refused to cooperate in the Bush Administration War on Terror. Yet, by pre-empting 
the field of national security, the federal government was able to set aside the state standards and to 
replace them with a weaker federal standard. This challenge of ineffectiveness was slowly 
addressed by the US federal judiciary through a series of decisions that, step-by-step, enhanced the 
federal due process standard for suspected terrorists.238 Equally, in Europe, it was the ECJ’s 
decision in Kadi to overrule the CFI and to review the legality of the EU counter-terrorism 
measures that filled the gap in the protection of due process rights at the EU level.239 The decision, 
which anticipated some positive innovations delivered in the Lisbon Treaty, also triggered an 
increase in the standard of protection at the state level.240 
 The case of voting rights for non-citizens offers an interesting example of the challenge of 
inconsistency. Traditionally in Europe, the definition of the boundaries of the electorate was a 
prerogative of the member states, which were endowed with very diverse regulations – with some 
states (notably the UK and Ireland)241 expanding the franchise for selected classes of aliens even in 
national elections, and other states (e.g. Germany and Austria)242 following a very restrictive nation-
based conception of the polity. The establishing, with the EU Maastricht Treaty of 1992, of a right 
to vote at the local and supranational level for EU citizens residing in a EU member state of which 
they are not nationals (so-called “second-country nationals”), generated a major change in 
Europe:243 by requiring member states to open their polling stations to several groups of non-
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citizens, EU law placed the restrictive conceptions of voting rights that existed in some member 
states under pressure, while leaving other member states free to provide an even more advanced 
standard of protection in the field of electoral rights than that required by the minimum standard set 
in EU law. 
 The dynamics taking place in Europe closely reflect the experience of the US. In the original 
US constitutional system, the regulation of voting rights was exclusively in the hands of the states, 
which had very different regulations – with some states extending the franchise even to non-US 
citizens and other states depriving of the vote US citizens coming from other US states. Over time, 
however, this state of affairs proved to be unworkable since it produced serious discriminations 
throughout the US. Hence, with a series of constitutional amendments, legislative enactments and 
judicial rulings the federal government slowly set up a consistent standard for the regulation of 
voting rights, ensuring that US citizens moving from one US state to another could enjoy full voting 
rights both at the state and the federal level.244 In light of the US development, it is doubtful 
whether the recent decisions of the ECJ on the meaning of European citizenship can lead to an 
enhancement for the voting rights of second-country nationals.245 From this point of view, 
additional reforms in EU primary law would arguably be needed to allow EU citizens who reside in 
another EU member state to enjoy full voting rights there. 
  The case of the right to strike provides another example of the challenge of ineffectiveness.  
The right to collective action enjoys diverse degrees of protection in Europe. Some member states 
(e.g. Italy, France)246 recognize the strike as a constitutional right and other countries (e.g. Sweden, 
Finland)247 also widely protect collective labour rights. Nevertheless, in other member states (e.g. 
Germany, Poland)248 several limitations apply to the exercise of industrial action, through a 
requirement of ultima ratio – and in the UK the strike is not even regarded as a right but simply as a 
statutory immunity from common law rules.249 In Viking250 and Laval,251 the ECJ recognized the 
right to strike as an EU fundamental right. However, it also held that strikes can be exercised only 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a member state 
of which they are not nationals)  
244
 See eg Fifteenth Am. to the US Const. (right of US citizens to vote shall not be abridged by the US or by the states 
on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (declaring a state 
residency requirement to vote to be incompatible with the right to inter-state travel); Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. 89-100 
(1965), codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. par 1973 (enforcing federal voting rights in the states) 
245
 See eg Case C-300/04 Eman & Sevinger (Aruba) [2006] ECR I-8055 (holding a Dutch law which unreasonably 
disenfranchised Dutch citizens residing in the Dutch overseas territory of Aruba to be incompatible with EU law) 
246
 See eg Article 40, Const. It. (recognizing a constitutional right to strike), Preamble, Const. Fr. (same) 
247
 See eg Article 17, Const. Swed. (right to strike); Article 13, Const. Fin. (right to collective bargaining) 
248
 See eg Ustawa z dnia 23 maja 1991 r. o rozwiązywaniu sporów zbiorowych (Dz. U. z dnia 26 czerwca 1991 r.)(Pl.) 
(right to strike to be exercised only as a last resort measure) 
249
 See Trade Unions and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act of 1992, 40 Eliz. 2 c. 52 (Eng.) (strict procedures to be 
followed to enjoy statutory immunity from common law rules in case of strike) 
250
 Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779 
251
 Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767 
 51 
when industrial action is necessary and strictly proportional to the achievement of the desired end. 
This produced a great deal of tension in the European system. By setting a standard that is lower 
than that existing in many EU states (although equivalent to, or possibly even higher than, that 
provided in other EU countries), EU law challenged the effectiveness of the right to strike standard 
of vanguard states. Moreover, by setting a ceiling of protection, Viking and Laval prevented 
member states from going above this maximum whenever industrial action interferes with EU free 
movement rules. 
 A striking analogy with the current European situation derives from an analysis of US 
history. In the US too, the regulation of industrial action originally fell within the purview of the 
states, which had very different standards of protection for labour rights. In the early 20th century, 
however, action by trade unions increasingly came under the scrutiny of the federal courts because 
of interference with free market rules. While the US Supreme Court recognized a federal 
constitutional right to strike, it subjected it to significant limitations by embracing a laissez-faire 
doctrine which was instrumental to inter-state commerce.252 Nevertheless, during the New Deal, the 
federal government addressed the challenge of ensuring an effective protection of industrial action 
at the federal level through the enactment of an important piece of legislation (the Wagner Act),253 
which replaced the weak judge-made standard with a vanguard mechanism for the defence of labour 
rights. In light of the US experience, it is worth examining whether the EU might also enhance its 
standard, either under the external influence of the recent Demir & Baykara254 jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR or through an internal reform such as the enactment of an EU Wagner Act. 
  Another example of the challenge of inconsistency, finally, is provided by abortion rights. 
On the very sensitive issue of when a woman can autonomously choose to end her pregnancy, EU 
member states have developed different models of regulation over the last decades. Some member 
states (notably UK and France)255 are endowed with very “liberal” regimes, which leave women a 
broad freedom to choose. Other countries (e.g. Italy, Germany)256 instead adopt a more intermediate 
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stand, while a few (Poland, Ireland)257 have an almost absolute abortion ban, which allows women 
to terminate pregnancy only when this is necessary to save their lives. In the last two decades, 
however, a substantive body of law regulating abortion has emerged at the EU and ECHR level. In 
the Grogan case, 258 the ECJ recognized that abortion is a service under the scope of EU law, and, in 
a series of cases ending with A.,B. & C.,259 the ECtHR stated that the ECHR requires member states 
to make access to abortion services effective whenever national law recognizes a woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy in the books. As a result, the developments taking place at the transnational 
level in Europe have slowly increased the floor of protection for women’s right in the abortion field, 
placing the most restrictive state legislations under pressure to reform and recognize the woman’s 
right to chose. 
 Dynamics analogous to those at play in Europe have also characterized the US federal 
system. Until the early 1970s, the regulation of abortion was entirely in the hands of the states, 
which had very diverging regulations, with some states allowing abortion up to the sixth month and 
others prohibiting it tout court. In the well-known case of Roe v. Wade,260 however, the US 
Supreme Court recognized that a fundamental right to abortion was protected by the US 
Constitution and struck down state laws that were falling behind this federal minimum. The 
definition of a federal standard for the protection of the right to abortion did not prevent states from 
ensuring more advanced forms of protection and let states free to adopt regulations within the 
parameters set by Roe and its progeny.261 Needless to say, the issue of abortion still remains 
extremely controversial in the US today and a number of states continue to challenge the central 
premise of Roe. Yet, the experience of the US demonstrates that a plurality of regulatory 
frameworks can coexist with a transnational minimum, which ensures at least a core abortion right 
for women wanting to terminate their pregnancies. Given the US example, it would seem that 
additional protection of the right to abortion, mostly through the case law of the ECJ and the 
ECtHR, would be welcome in Europe in order to avoid any discriminatory effect. 
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 The short summary provided above had only the intent to briefly introduce the case studies, 
outlining the challenges that emerge in the protection of several fundamental rights in Europe, their 
causes and their future prospects. More detailed explanations for each case study are provided in the 
subsequent chapters where readers will be able to examine from a closer and more complete 
perspective the practical consequences that spring from the European multilevel human rights 
architecture in these four examples. At this point, however, it seems possible to draw several 
conclusions from the previous analysis and to identify a number of recurrent patterns in the 
functioning of the European human rights system. 
 A first pattern is what I term “variability”. From the analysis undertaken, it emerges that the 
ranking of EU member states in the protection of fundamental rights varies in different areas of the 
law. State laws may be at the vanguard or at the rearguard in different fields of fundamental rights. 
Hence, for instance, the UK has an advanced system for the protection of electoral rights and one of 
the most liberal abortion rights regimes Europe-wide. Yet, the UK performs pretty badly in the area 
of strike law and due process rights for suspected terrorists. Equally, Germany may be a model in 
national security law, but it does not shine in abortion law or collective labour rights and is a 
laggard in the area of voting rights. The same considerations can be made for each EU member 
state. There is no European state that is permanently lagging behind in the field of fundamental 
rights.262 At the same time, no state can claim to be the best in all fields of human rights. 
 The existence of significant variations in the human rights standards of the EU member 
states warns against over-evaluating the concept of “common constitutional traditions”.263 In the 
literature, it is often claimed that the development of human rights in the framework of the EU and 
the ECHR should be driven by respect for the “common constitutional traditions” of the member 
states: indeed, both the ECJ and the ECtHR are criticized when they do not do so.264 Nevertheless, 
although it is certainly true that, in general terms, a common culture of fundamental rights has been 
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gradually emerging in Europe,265 this should not obliterate the existence of important differences 
between the states on specific human rights issues. As such, when assessed from a “neo-federalist” 
perspective, the frequent pleas for the ECJ and the ECtHR to take the “common constitutional 
traditions” more seriously in their case law appear ingenuous.266 Given that traditions and human 
rights standards vary among the states, it is impossible for the transnational European courts to draw 
clear inspiration from them: in this context, a home-grown conception of rights at the EU and the 
ECHR level is often the most practical and unavoidable option for both the ECJ and the ECtHR. 
 A second pattern is that of “relativity”. The examples above reveal that the impact of 
transnational law on state law is relative, since the effects of EU and ECHR law changes on the 
basis of the underlying state law. In other words, transnational law may be good, bad or neutral for 
the protection of a specific fundamental right depending on the previous conditions of state law. 
Thus, the emergence of a transnational minimum standard for the protection of abortion rights may 
significantly challenge the legal systems of Ireland and Poland (because both are laggards in the 
field) but it leaves the regimes of, say, France or the UK largely unaffected. Similarly, the definition 
of a judge-made standard for the protection of strike action at the EU level may challenge the high-
level degree of protection of Italy and Finland, perhaps enhance the low-level standard of the UK 
and still be irrelevant for Germany and Poland (since both have standards based on proportionality 
analysis which are largely corresponding to those created by Viking and Laval).  
In the awareness of the relative effects that transnational law may have on state human rights 
standards we can assess with some scepticism the scholarly calls for a “race to the top” in the 
protection of human rights in Europe. In the literature, indeed, it has been sometimes claimed that 
goal of the European transnational courts should be the pursuit of the maximum human right 
standard (since a race to the top is the only way to avoid conflicts between state and transnational 
law).267 While the pursuit of a high level standard of human rights protection can be shared from a 
normative point of view,268 some caution is needed when addressing the issue from an analytical 
stand-point. As the “neo-federalist” perspective makes clear, a high standard at the transnational 
level can generate serious challenges in some states, and the higher the standard the greater these 
challenges. Bearing in mind the totality of dynamics at play in a multilevel system, it is realistic to 
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doubt whether systematically pursuing the maximum standard in the protection of human rights at 
the transnational level is the best way to avoid conflicts between state and transnational law.269 
Because the nature of the interaction between state and transnational law is relative, caution and 
modesty are required when designing guidelines for judicial action. 
 A third pattern, finally, can be labelled “reformability” or “dynamism”. The challenges that 
take place in the European multilevel architecture are different in nature and scope and, as the 
examples demonstrate, often require different solutions. A challenge of ineffectiveness such as the 
one created in the field of due process rights by the CFI in Kadi could well be addressed by the 
judicial revirement of the ECJ. A challenge of inconsistency such as that arising in the field of 
abortion rights may be handled by future judicial action. A challenge of ineffectiveness such as that 
produced by Viking and Laval instead requires legislative reforms at the EU level to enhance the 
standard of protection of the right to strike. A challenge of inconsistency like the one triggered by 
the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty in the field of electoral rights, finally, most likely requires a 
more substantive revision of the EU Treaty to ensure broader protection of voting rights for migrant 
EU citizens. Yet, the responses to these challenges always take place within the “federalist” 
framework. In other words, the functioning of the European multilevel human rights system can be 
reformed from within. 
 Understanding the dynamism of the European multilevel human rights system – i.e. its 
capacity to change and be reformed when this is necessary to address specific human rights 
challenges – reveals that the European system is neither a “crystallized” arrangement (as the 
“pluralist” narrative on fundamental rights would suggest) nor an “un-reformable”’ machinery (as 
the “sovereigntist” narrative would have it). Rather, the European system can be reformed and in 
some cases must be reformed. For better or for worse, there is nothing fixed in the current 
arrangement for the protection of fundamental rights. This means that, on the one hand, the 
unpleasant aspects of the systems can be revised for the better. On the other hand, it also implies 
that advanced human rights standards may tomorrow be changed for the worse. As Antonio 
Cassese, Andrew Clapham and Joseph H.H. Weiler remind us: “human rights protection is a 
question of constant vigilance.”270 And constant vigilance is certainly also needed in Europe to 
ensure that its human rights system continues to live up to its challenges.  
 
                                                 
269
 See Koen Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking Legal Orders in the European Union and Comparative Law’ (2003) 52 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 873, 906 (explaining how the ECJ, through the use of comparative law, 
often arrives at a “solution in the ‘middle-line’” which can be acceptable for many different legal systems) 
270
 Antonio Cassese et al ‘1992 – What are our rights? Agenda for a Human Rights Action Plan’, in Antonio Cassese et 
al (eds), European union - The Human Rights Challenge: Volume II. Human Rights and the European Community: 




The European architecture for the protection of fundamental rights has in the last two decades 
undergone a series of remarkable constitutional developments. Human rights have gained in 
importance and status at each level of what is now conventionally called the European multilevel 
system. Fundamental rights are now enshrined in states’ constitutional provisions, in a binding 
EUCFR, and in the ECHR. Moreover, they are secured by the overlapping activity of a plurality of 
institutions. In particular, state courts, the ECJ and the ECtHR provide a network of judicial fora in 
which human rights issues can be claimed and vindicated. As such, the European architecture has 
emerged as one of the most advanced systems for the protection of fundamental rights worldwide. 
Historical reasons, related to the tragic experiences of the European continent during the 20th 
century, explain the rationale for the appearance of a multilevel human rights system in Europe. 
Yet, the full implications of the European system do not appear to have been clearly understood in 
the legal literature so far. To a large extent, the European human rights architecture remains a 
puzzling object for scholars and practitioners. 
In the literature, two main narratives have to date been advanced to explain the 
consequences deriving from the European multilevel human rights system. According to a first, 
“sovereigntist” narrative, the rise of mechanisms for the protection of fundamental rights beyond 
the state has produced mainly negative effects, challenging the ability of the state (or its Parliament) 
to decide autonomously about the scope of the protection of fundamental rights. According to a 
second, “pluralist” narrative, the strengthening of human rights beyond the states and the creation of 
a common culture of fundamental rights can instead be praised as positive features of a new 
European pluralist constitutional arrangement. As I have attempted to explain, both the 
“sovereigntist” and the “pluralist” narratives capture some useful facets of the way in which the 
European architecture functions. Nevertheless, because of their methodological weaknesses, they 
offer only a partial view of the European reality. The “sovereigntist” narrative fails to undertake an 
internal comparison (assessing the diverse impact of transnational human rights law in the various 
EU member states), while the “pluralist” narrative fails to undertake an external comparison 
(between Europe and other federal systems). As a result, neither narrative is able to provide a 
convincing account of the complex set of dynamics that come into play in the European multilevel 
system. 
 The purpose of this chapter has been to advance a different, “neo-federalist” narrative. This 
narrative rejects the idea that the European multilevel system is a sui generis arrangement and 
claims that it is methodologically necessary to compare the European system with other federal 
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human rights systems in order to better explain it. To this end, I have undertaken a comparative 
analysis of other federal systems and underlined how, under a “most similar cases logic of 
comparison”, the European architecture presents several structural and normative analogies with the 
US federal system, which is also endowed with a multiplicity of constitutional sources and a 
plurality of constitutional actors for the protection of fundamental rights. In light of this 
comparison, I have argued that it is possible to reconceptualise the European system as a “neo-
federal” system and that this approach may yield essential analytical insights when exploring the 
dynamics at work in it. At the same time, to avoid conceptual ambiguities, I have explained how the 
notion of (neo-)federalism that I embrace is not the statist, hierarchical vision which has 
traditionally prevailed in European legal thought but rather the pluralist, heterarchical vision which 
is at the core of the US constitutional experience and I have maintained that this tradition should be 
rediscovered in contemporary Europe. 
 Through the lenses of a “neo-federalist” approach, I have then attempted to design an 
analytical framework to examine the complex constitutional phenomena at play in the European 
multilevel human rights system and identified several recurrent synchronic and diachronic 
dynamics. As I have explained, in a multi-layered human rights architecture such as the European 
one, the standards of protection of specific fundamental rights often differ at the horizontal level 
(between the EU member states) and at the vertical level (between the states, the EU and the 
ECHR). As such, the interaction between different state and transnational human rights standards 
creates several challenges. The nature of these challenges changes, however, depending on whether 
transnational law provides more or less protection than state law and whether transnational law 
operates as a ceiling (maximum) rather than as a floor (minimum) of protection. Taking into 
account the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the interplay between human rights standards, I 
have therefore recast the architectural dynamics at play in the European system, distinguishing 
between a challenge of ineffectiveness and a challenge of inconsistency. 
 As I argued, a challenge of ineffectiveness emerges when a transnational law setting a 
ceiling of protection for a specific human right interacts with state laws which ensure a more 
advanced standard of protection for that right, challenging the effectiveness of the vanguard states’ 
standard and pressuring it towards the less protective maximum set up at the transnational level 
(while leaving the standard in force in the laggard states unaffected). A challenge of inconsistency 
emerges instead when a transnational law setting a floor of protection for a specific human right 
interacts with state laws which ensure a less advanced standard of protection for that right, 
challenging the consistency of the laggard states’ standard and pressuring it toward the more 
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protective minimum set up at the transnational level (while leaving the standard in force in the 
vanguard states unaffected).  
 At the same time, I have explained how the European human rights architecture, like other 
federal systems, is subject to a permanent dynamic of diachronic transformations. Changes at the 
jurisprudential and institutional level are constantly in action and must be taken into account: these 
transformations, in fact, may provide responses to the challenges of ineffectiveness and 
inconsistency emerging from the interaction between state and transnational laws. Where this is not 
the case, however, additional reforms of the European systems should be advanced de jure 
condendo and, as I have underlined, here again a comparative approach can prove useful: with all 
due caveats, scholars may draw lessons from the historical experience of other federal systems for 
the protection of fundamental rights on how specific challenges in the protection of human rights 
can be addressed in Europe. An assessment of the temporal dimension of the dynamics at play in 
Europe, indeed, reveals that the challenges emerging in the European system are relative and can, 
over time, be reformed through the internal mechanisms of checks and balances with which the 
European pluralist architecture is endowed.  
 Finally, the chapter has briefly examined four case studies to highlight how the previously 
developed general conceptual framework could well be employed to analyze the empirical 
implications emerging from the European multilevel architecture in the field of due process rights 
for suspected terrorists, voting rights for non-citizens, the right to strike, and the right to abortion. 
Despite the relevant differences between the four examples, a summary overview has revealed that 
in all cases the interaction between different state laws and transnational law generated a challenge 
of either ineffectiveness or inconsistency. A comparative assessment, however, has shown that 
analogous dynamics were also at play historically in the US federal system, and a discussion of the 
most recent (or future) transformations taking place in Europe has shed light on the prospective 
improvements of the status quo. The four case studies were only sketched in this chapter since 
greater attention for each of them will be devoted in the next four chapters. Yet, the brief analysis 
exposed the existence of recurrent patterns in diverse sectors of human rights in Europe: my hope 
is, therefore, that the analytical framework developed in this study will encourage further research 
on the empirical implications that arise from a multilevel architecture in other fields of European 
human rights law. 
Chapter 2 
 
The Right to Due Process  










The right to due process – widely formulated as the right of an individual, whose liberty or property 
has been subjected to restrictive measures by a governmental authority, to: i) receive information on 
the reasons justifying the restrictive measures taken again him or her; ii) access an independent 
institution to obtain redress; and iii) be given a fair and just proceedings by which his or her claims 
can be impartially heard and adjudicated – is a defining feature of the tradition of liberal 
constitutionalism, rooted in the thought of John Locke1 and based on the idea that fundamental 
rights are natural and inalienable endowments of every individual that must be protected against the 
encroachment of the political power.2  
 It is well known, however, that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011 (9/11) and the 
reaction to it, have put under severe pressure the protection of due process rights in many countries 
world-wide. National governments as well as international institutions such as the United Nations 
(UN) have responded to 9/11 by adopting several restrictive counter-terrorism measures, ranging 
from assets freezing to preventive detention or even preventive strikes.3 These measures, however, 
have often significantly hampered the protection of fundamental rights – and primarily of due 
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process rights – and raised the question whether the judiciary should have the authority to step in 
the thorny field of national security to ensure an effective protection of human rights.4 
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the protection of due process rights for suspected 
terrorists after 9/11 in Europe. To this end, the chapter examines the stand adopted by several 
member states in the fight against terrorism and the increasing involvement of the European Union 
(EU) – formerly the European Community (EC) – in the field of national security during the last 
decade. The chapter argues that the implementation at the EU level of a restrictive anti-terrorism 
financing regime, originally designed by the UN, has initially created a major challenge to the 
effectiveness of due process guarantees in Europe. By setting a low-level ceiling for the protection 
of the due process rights of suspected terrorists, the EU institutions have precluded individuals and 
entities affected by UN counter-terrorism measures from obtaining justice in the EU judicial system 
and simultaneously prevented EU member states from enforcing vanguard standards of due process 
protection in their domestic legal systems. 
 Nevertheless, as the chapter claims, a similar dynamic has taken place in the United States 
of America (US). After 9/11 the federal government pre-empted the field of national security 
displacing the state standards for the protection of due process rights and replacing them with a low-
intensity federal standard. In this context, it has been up to the US federal judiciary to gradually 
enhance the federal standard of due process accorded to suspected terrorists. A comparable 
development, has arguably also occurred in Europe, where the EU courts have gradually improved 
the degree of protection of the right of due process and curbed the action of the political branches of 
government. In particular, with the milestone Kadi decision,5 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
has eventually restored a vanguard standard of due process protection in the EU, paving the way for 
the resolution of the challenge of ineffectiveness and anticipating several positive innovations 
linked to the entry into force of the EU Lisbon Treaty. 
 The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 maps the position of the EU member states 
after 9/11, outlining how in some countries courts have resisted pressures from political institutions 
and upheld vanguard human rights standards while in other EU states due process guarantees have 
been restricted in the name of national security. Section 2 examines the impact of EU counter-
terrorism law on EU member states and the dreadful implications of the decisions of the EU courts 
to withhold scrutiny on EU counter-terrorism measures implementing UN sanctions. Section 3 
introduces a comparative assessment and explains that also in the US the fight against terrorism has 
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produced a challenge of ineffectiveness and assesses how this challenge has been addressed by the 
US federal judiciary. Section 4, then, analyzes the most recent judicial developments in the EU 
system and their positive impact on the protection of due process rights. Section 5, finally, discusses 
the advantages of the entry into force of the EU Lisbon Treaty in preventing future weakening of 
the EU due process standards for suspected terrorists. 
 
 
1. Context: the protection of due process rights in the EU member states after 9/11 
 
De jure, the right to due process and to an effective judicial remedy are protected in each layer of 
the European multilevel architecture.6 The Constitutions of many EU countries enshrine a 
fundamental right to due process and access to courts.7 In the civil law countries, which recognize 
the principle ubi ius ibi remedium, access to justice has progressively emerged as an autonomous 
procedural rights whose purpose is to make all the other substantive rights effective.8 In the 
common law countries, because of the tradition of the forms of action, the existence of an effective 
remedy precedes the attribution of an individual right as only ibi ius ubi remedium.9 Both 
constitutional models acknowledge that human rights shall be effectively protected, be it through a 
general right of access to court or a specific remedy in front of an independent tribunal. In addition, 
with the constitutionalization of the European legal space, such principles have moved to the 
international and supranational systems, increasing the convergence between the two models.10 
At the international level, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
codifies a right to fair trial and Article 13 states that “everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
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notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”11 
In Golder,12 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), drawing from the concept of the “rule 
of law” in the preamble of the ECHR, interpreted Article 6 as not being “limited to guaranteeing in 
substance the right to a fair trial in legal proceedings which are already pending, [but also as] 
secur[ing] a right of access to the courts for every person wishing to commence an action in order to 
have his civil rights and obligations determined.”13 On the other hand, it is a fairly established 
statement of the ECtHR, that the ECHR “is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or 
illusory but rights that are practical and effective.”14 
At the supranational level, also the ECJ has recognized in its landmark Johnston decision15 
that “the requirement of judicial control […] reflects a general principle of law which underlies the 
constitutional traditions common to the member states. That principle is also laid down in Articles 6 
and 13 of the ECHR […] and as the Court has recognized in its decisions, the principles on which 
that Convention is based must be taken into consideration in EC Law.”16 By virtue of this judgment, 
therefore, “all persons have the right to obtain an effective remedy in a competent court against 
measures which they consider to be contrary to” their fundamental rights.17 By enshrining in Article 
6 of the EU Treaty (TEU) the principle that the EU “is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” the EU 
member states have furthermore reasserted the need for effective judicial review.18 
In addition, Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) clearly recognizes 
that “everyone whose rights and freedom guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the 
right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this 
article.” Article 41 CFR then recognizes a right to “good administration” defined as the “right of 
every person to be heard, before any individual measure which could affect him or her adversely is 
taken.”19 Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1st December 2009, the EU CFR (which 
had only been proclaimed in Nice in 2000 by the EU Parliament, Council and Commission) has 
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acquired legally binding value and constrains the EU institutions and the member states when they 
act within the scope of application of EU law.20 
De facto, however, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the due process 
guarantees existing in many European Constitutions, as well as at the transnational level in Europe, 
have come under pressure. The need to tackle the threat of insecurity produced by international 
terrorism pushed the political branches to enact sweeping counter-terrorism measures. These 
measures, whether adopted under a purely national agenda or under the aegis of international 
institutions such as the UN Security Council (SC), threatened the protection of core due process 
guarantees in the name of national security.21 Nevertheless, judicial reactions to the “war on terror” 
have been uneven in Europe, and it seems possible to contrast several vanguard states, in which 
courts have ensured a heightened standard of protection to due process rights of suspected terrorists, 
with a number of laggard states, in which reasons of security have often outweighed the duty to 
respect due process rights.22  
 Although it is not my intention to offer here a complete outline of the role of state courts in 
the field of national security after 9/11,23 it may be noticed that, for instance, in Germany, courts 
played a remarkably effective task in controlling the counter-terrorism policies of the political 
branches, mandating strict compliance with the high due process standards of the German Basic 
Law.24 Not only did the Bundesverfassungsgericht strike down prominent pieces of counter-
terrorism legislation of the German government for violation of human rights,25 but also the 
Bundesgerichsthof ensured to individuals indicted on terrorism charges a heightened standard of 
due process protection: in 2004, in the El Mottasadeq case,26 for example, the Bundesgerichsthof 
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annulled a lower court decision convicting a suspected terrorist, arguing that the impossibility for 
the accused to challenge the evidence against him (because it had been withheld by the German 
secret services) represented a violation of the right to fair trial.27   
A “human rights sensitive” position seems to have been adopted also by Belgian courts. In 
the well-known 2005 case of Sayadi & Vinck, two Belgian nationals who, under suspicion of 
terrorism financing, had been inserted in a UN “black-list” without any due process of law 
challenged the Belgian administrative measure which froze their assets in implementation of the 
UN order. The Burgerlijke Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg of Brussel ruled in favour of the applicants 
and ordered the Belgian state, under the penalty of a daily astreinte, to ensure their de-listing before 
the competent UN organs.28 Since the decision was not appealed, it became final. Nevertheless the 
Belgian court proved unable to ensure an effective remedy to the applicants: despite the court’s 
ruling, the two applicant did not re-obtain their financial assets (until the UNSC approved their de-
listing in 2009) and for this reason in 2008 Belgium was eventually found to be in violation of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.29  
A mixed picture emerges, then, when assessing the role of courts in the United Kingdom 
(UK) after 9/11.30 Although the House of Lords (HL) delivered several outstanding decisions in the 
field of national security,31 courts initially demonstrated some reluctance in scrutinizing the action 
of the political branches, especially if mandated by the UNSC. In Al-Jedda,32 for instance, the 
UKHL affirmed that an act authorized by a UNSC resolution would escape judicial review of its 
conformity with the human rights principles recognized by the ECHR.33 Here the case concerned 
the legality of the detention of a British citizen by the UK military during the Iraq war. The 
detention, however, was allegedly authorized by a UNSC resolution34. The UKHL thus rejected the 
applicant’s claim, ruling that the UN Charter (and the resolutions adopted by the UNSC) enjoyed 
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supremacy even over the ECHR, since this was “necessary for imperative reasons of security”35 and 
entirely displacing the protection of human rights in the case.  
Also in France, ordinary courts manifested a “security-sensitive” approach in reviewing 
counter-terrorism measures.36 For example, the French Conseil d’Etat in its judgment in the 
Association Secours Mondial case37 found itself competent to review an administrative act freezing 
the funds of an entity allegedly involved in the financing of terrorism.38 In exercising its review, 
however, the Conseil d’Etat employed as a standard the manifest error of appreciation scrutiny39 
and concluded as follows: “considering […] that […] some days after the publication on the official 
Journal of the French Republic of the decree which is now challenged, the applicant entity was 
inserted on the  list drafted and periodically revised by the Committee created by resolution 1267 of 
the [UNSC] and that with regulation EC n° 1893/2002 of October 23, 2002, the Commission of the 
[EC] had equally listed the [entity] on the list of natural and legal persons against whom the [EU] 
Council has adopted financially restrictive measures, it does not emerge from the facts of the case 
that the Minister has, in these circumstances, made any error of appreciation.”40 
 
Hence, as this short overview highlights, although the protection of due process rights is 
clearly part of the constitutional traditions of the member states (and now also of the EU and of the 
ECHR), the post-9/11 “war on terror” has produced a significant threat to the protection of due 
process rights in many European jurisdictions. Although several domestic courts have exercised a 
closed human rights scrutiny of restrictive counter-terrorism measures enacted by the political 
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branches, courts in other countries have come very close to the adoption of the “political question” 
or “act de gouvernement” doctrine,41 showing their incapacity to ensure an effective protection to 
the fundamental rights of persons targeted by restrictive anti-terrorism measures enacted by national 
governments or UN institutions. The protection of due process rights of suspected terrorists, 
however, has been increasingly affected also by the action of the EU. 
 
 
2. Challenge: the impact of EU counter-terrorism law on due process rights 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the EU has significantly increased its involvement in the field of counter-
terrorism.42 In particular, the EU has assumed a leading role in implementing the “smart sanctions” 
established by resolutions of the UNSC.43 Since the late 1990s, in fact, the UNSC, considering that 
terrorist financing represented a threat to the stability of the international community, began to 
enact economic sanctions targeting specific individuals or entities suspected of being involved in 
the financing of terrorism.44 To this end, the UNSC established an auxiliary Committee (where all 
the members of the UNSC are represented) and endowed it of the power to draw a “black-list” of 
natural and legal persons suspected of being involved in terrorist activities.45 In the auxiliary 
committee, the diplomatic representatives of the members of UNSC directly identify the persons 
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who are to be targeted by the smart sanctions. The listing procedure is essentially informal, 
governed by consensus and based on the often limited and confidential information gathered by the 
security services of the member states of the UNSC.46  
 Once an individual or an entity is inserted in the UN “black-list”, all UN member states are 
then required to give effect to the determinations of the auxiliary committee in their domestic legal 
system, materially freezing the assets of the individuals and entities identified by the UN. Indeed, 
since the counter-terrorism framework established by the UNSC is based on Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, which grants the UNSC the power to take all measures necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security,47 its resolutions are binding on all the UN member states and shall 
be faithfully executed in their domestic legal systems.48 Because of the economic implications of 
the UN sanctions, however, EU member states decided to implement UN sanctions through 
legislative measures adopted in the EU framework.49 
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the legal regime for the implementation of 
UN sanctions was as follows. To begin with, a common position listing the individual and entities 
targeted by the counter-terrorism measures was adopted by the EU member states in the so-called II 
pillar of the EU – the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).50 Subsequently, a regulation 
was enacted under the so-called I pillar of the EU – the EC – on the joint basis of Articles 60, 301 
and 308 of the EC Treaty (TEC).51 The regulation ordered the freezing of the assets of all natural 
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and legal persons reported in the Annex to the regulation, and empowered the EC Commission to 
update the Annex.52 Finally, the EU member states gave effect to the regulation at the national 
level, with administrative acts that materially froze the financial assets of the blacklisted individuals 
and entities.53 
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty this legal framework has largely remained 
unchanged, although new legal basis have been inserted in EU primary law to sustain the action of 
the EU institutions. Article 215 of the (renamed) Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 
provides that the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal of the EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and the Commission can adopt – in the context of the CFSP – 
restrictive measures “against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities.”54 Article 75 
TFUE then provides that the EU Parliament and Council may enact, following the ordinary 
legislative procedure, a regulation providing for the “freezing of funds, financial assets or economic 
gains belonging to, or owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities.”55 
Regulations are then applied in all member states. Therefore, even in the post-Lisbon regime, a 
series of legal measures of identical content (CFSP acts, regulations and national administrative 
measures) continue to be utilized to give effect in Europe to the UN counter-terrorism sanctions. 
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 Smart sanctions have a significant impact on the fundamental due process rights of targeted 
individuals and entities.56 As highlighted in the previous Section, a right to due process is well 
acknowledged in each layer of the European multilevel architecture and would require, at the 
minimum, that before the adoption of the sanctions or in its immediate aftermath, interested persons 
be informed of the reasons that justify the restrictive measure taken against them and have the right 
to defend their position by accessing a neutral and independent decision-maker. Wide consensus 
exists nonetheless among scholars about the deficiencies of the procedure by which the auxiliary 
Committee of the UNSC identifies the persons whose funds ought to be frozen: because of the 
political and diplomatic mechanism by which the listing takes place, significant violations of 
fundamental rights have been claimed.57 
In light of the serious consequences produced by the economic sanctions, black-listed 
individuals and entities soon began to challenge the lawfulness of these UN counter-terrorism 
measures. As a matter of fact, however, no court was initially available to review the compatibility 
of targeted sanctions with fundamental rights.58 As it is well-known, no judicial institutions has ever 
been established at the UN level before which individuals can activate legal proceedings.59 Even 
supposing that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) could have been competent to review the acts 
of the UNSC – a possibility, nonetheless, which is far from being certain60 – the individuals and 
entities targeted by the UNSC counter-terrorism sanctions “lacked locus standi before the ICJ, 
traditionally conceived as a judge between states.”61  
Also in the EU legal framework, however, it was initially impossible for blacklisted 
individuals and entities to obtain redress.62 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,63 the 
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TEU excluded the jurisdiction of the ECJ over acts adopted by the EU Council in the framework of 
CFSP. According to former Article 46(1)(d) TEU the jurisdiction of the ECJ in the 
intergovernmental pillars was limited to what was specified by former Article 35, which 
acknowledged a limited role for the ECJ only in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). A 
preliminary reference could be submitted (by the judiciaries of the EU member states that had 
accepted the jurisdiction of the ECJ)64 on the validity and interpretations of decisions and 
framework decisions and on the interpretation of conventions. Actions for annulment of decisions 
and framework decisions could then be brought by the member states or the Commission.65 
Common positions instead were not contemplated among the acts that could be subjected to review 
before the ECJ.66  
The jurisdiction of the ECJ over the measures adopted in the EC pillar, was formally 
recognized in the TEC. The validity of EC acts could be challenged ex Article 230 – the action for 
annulment67 – and ex Article 234 – the preliminary reference procedure.68 In the Yusuf69 and Kadi70 
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decisions of 2005, however, the CFI denied moto proprio the power to review the compatibility 
with human rights principles of an EC regulation implementing in the EU legal space the counter-
terrorism sanctions established by the UNSC. The Kadi case originated from an individual action 
for annulment. The applicant, a Saudi national with substantial funds in the EU who had been 
black-listed by the UNSC Sanction Committee, alleged that the EC regulation71 implementing the 
UNSC resolution72 violated his EU constitutional rights – in particular, the right of due process – 
and asked the CFI to strike down the act insofar as it applied to him. 
In order to answer the question raised by the petitioner, the CFI found it appropriate “to 
consider, in the first place, the relationship between the international legal order under the UN and 
the domestic or Community legal order.”73 In the CFI’s view, the Charter of the UN enjoyed 
supremacy “over every other obligation of domestic law and international treaty law,”74 including 
the TEC and the same primacy extended to the resolutions adopted by the UNSC.75 Furthermore, 
the EC should “be considered to be bound by the obligations under the UN Charter in the same way 
as its Member States”76 by virtue of the assumption of powers “previously exercised by Member 
States in the area governed by the UN Charter.”77 The CFI concluded that the UN Charter (and the 
acts adopted under it) prevailed even over EC constitutional rules.78 
The CFI therefore took the view that “a limitation of [its] jurisdiction [wa]s necessary”79 
here, since “any review of the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation, especially having 
regard to the provisions or general principles of EC law relating to the protection of fundamental 
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rights, would […] imply that the court is to consider, indirectly, the lawfulness of”80 a superior 
UNSC resolution. However, to avoid a full “judicial abdication”81 which would have produced a 
complete “deficiency in the protection of fundamental rights”82 the CFI found itself “empowered to 
check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolution of the SC in question with regard to jus cogens, 
understood as a body of higher rules of public international law binding on all subjects of 
international law, including the bodies of the UN, and from which no derogation is possible.”83  
Nonetheless, the review on the basis of jus cogens of the alleged violations of the 
fundamental rights of the petitioner, turned out to be extremely limited.84 The CFI excluded that it 
had the power to “verify that there has been no error of assessment of the facts and evidence relied 
on by the SC in support of the measure it had taken.”85 It instead affirmed, leaving a wide margin of 
appreciation to the UNSC, that “the question whether an individual or organisation poses a threat to 
international peace and security, like the question of what measures must be adopted vis à vis the 
person concerned in order to frustrate the threats, entails a political assessment and value judgment 
which in principle falls within the exclusive competence of the authority to which the international 
community has entrusted primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.”86 
In sum, the CFI decided that none of the applicant’s arguments alleging breach of 
fundamental due process right was well founded and it upheld the EC regulation, an instrument 
necessary “as the world now stands”87 to fight international terrorism. By limiting the scope of its 
judicial review,88 the first decision of the CFI dealing with the legality of EU counter-terrorism 
measures, however, “raised several perplexities, since it ended sacrificing entirely the needs of the 
protection of fundamental rights,”89 giving “a carte blache to the member states”90 to disregard the 
rule of law in implementing resolutions of the UNSC. The EU constitutional principles were in fact 
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“outweigh[ed by] the essential public interest in the maintenance of international peace and 
security”91 pursued by the political branches of the EU. 
The rulings of the CFI in Yusuf and Kadi created a major gap in the protection of due 
process rights for suspected terrorists at the EU level.92 By refusing to review the compatibility with 
EU fundamental rights of the EU counter-terrorism measures implementing the UNSC resolutions, 
the CFI deprived individuals and entities suspected of financing terrorism of any meaningful 
opportunity to invoke their due process rights at EU level.93 At the same time, however, by 
clarifying that due process standards could not hamper the implementation of an act mandated by 
the UN, the CFI also introduced an EU-wide ceiling for the protection of the right to due process 
with detrimental effects for judicial review at the state level. As has already been mentioned, the EU 
counter-terrorism sanctions are materially enforced by state administrations.94 As Daniel 
Halberstam has attentively explained, in fact, a major feature of the EU system of governance is 
that, generally speaking, the policies of the EU are indirectly implemented by the member states.95 
In the absence of a powerful centralized administration, the EU relies on state officials in carrying 
out its policies including in the field of counter-terrorism. 
Under the law of all EU member states, actions of administrative officials can be challenged 
before state courts for compatibility with fundamental rights. State officials implementing an EU 
counter-terrorism sanction could therefore be sued before state courts if their action was in violation 
of due process rights. Yet, state courts cannot review state administrative measures mandated by EU 
legislation under a more restrictive standard than the one established by EU courts.96 As state 
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officials have a duty to loyally execute EU law, state courts can not prevent them from doing so if 
their action is regarded as legitimate by EU courts. According to the Foto-Frost doctrine97 national 
courts do not have the power to invalidate an EC act on their own but must refer the matter to the 
ECJ.98 By setting an extremely low due process standard for the review of EU counter-terrorism 
measures – a standard of protection to some extent akin to that adopted by courts in the laggard 
member states – the CFI prevented those member states courts which might have been willing to 
provide more extensive protection of due process rights, to suspected terrorists from doing so.  
This state of affairs can be described as a challenge of ineffectiveness. As I explained in the 
first chapter of this thesis, a case of ineffectiveness emerges when supranational law establishes a 
ceiling for the protection of a given right, thus preventing more extensive protection at the state 
level for the right de quo. This supranational ceiling puts pressure on those vanguard states which 
are endowed with higher levels of protection and threatens their more advanced human rights 
standards (while leaving unchallenged, the standards in force in the laggard states). In the case at 
hand, the Yusuf and Kadi decisions of the CFI produced a challenge of ineffectiveness: not only 
they deprived Mr. Kadi of the chance to obtain a remedy before an EU court, but they also made 
impossible for him to seek more protection against the EU counter-terrorism measure before 
domestic courts. As was mentioned, after 9/11 most state courts were anything but willing to secure 
a robust protection of due process rights. But some other state courts had proven much more 
resilient in protecting rights even in times of emergency. Yet, no state court could have provided 
Mr. Kadi with more due process rights than those provided by the CFI (unless willing to violate 
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3. Comparative assessment: due process and counter-terrorism in the US constitutional 
experience 
 
The previous Section has highlighted the existence of complex dynamics in the protection of due 
process rights in the EU. The purpose of this Section is to explore to what extent comparable 
dynamics can be found also in other federal systems. In this regard, the US represent a natural 
comparative example. To begin with, the US has been at the forefront of the fight against terrorism. 
As it is well known, in reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the US Administration began what it 
called – inappropriately – a “war on terror.”100 The federal government authorized a series of 
sweeping counter-terrorism measures,101 and important anti-terrorism tools were enacted also by 
most of the US states (which, in the US federal system of government, exercise a primary role in the 
areas of police and security).102 These far-reaching counter-terrorism policies, however, put under 
challenge the protection of core constitutional liberties enshrined both at the federal and the state 
level in the US, revealing the existence of tensions between the states and the federal 
government.103 
 In the US, like in the EU, moreover, a matter of particular judicial concern has been the 
protection of the right to due process for suspected terrorists. Whereas, as explained above, courts in 
the EU have mainly dealt with the legality of the economic sanctions imposed without due process 
over suspected terrorists listed by the UN,104 the issue of assets freezing has not played such a 
prominent role in the US.105 Most of the activity of US courts has focused on the legality of the 
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detention without due process of individuals suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. 
Nevertheless, the decisions of the US courts on the legality of detention without trial and those of 
the EU courts on the legality of the freezing of financial assets show a common ground which well 
supports their comparability. They both deal with the limitation of fundamental individual rights, 
without due process of law: a limitation of liberty without due process in the first case; a limitation 
(mainly) of property without due process in the latter.106   
 A comparison between the US and the EU, otherwise, seems possible despite the existence 
of an important structural difference between the two systems of governance. As mentioned in the 
previous Section, the EU carries out most its policies through the member states and EU counter-
terrorism sanctions are materially executed by state officials.107 In the US, on the contrary, the 
federal government does not resort to the states’ authorities to execute its policies. In fact, under the 
Printz doctrine108 of the US Supreme Court, the federal government is constitutionally prohibited 
from “commandeering” state officials, i.e. compelling them to carry out federal mandates.109 As 
Ann Althouse has thoroughly explained, the anti-commandeering doctrine has played a vigorous 
role in the US after 9/11.110 On the awareness that the counter-terrorism policies adopted by the 
federal government could undermine the effectiveness of the protection of core civil liberties at the 
local level, a number “of municipalities, as well as a few states, have passed resolutions directing 
their officials to refuse to participate in the anti-terrorism efforts of the federal government.”111 
Although standards of procedural justice greatly vary among the US states, under the shield of the 
anti-commandeering doctrine, the states and local governments endowed with vanguard forms of 
due process protection “decline[d] to provide any aid to federal authorities in investigations and 
enforcement actions that might jeopardize civil liberties.”112 
 Despite the operation of the anti-commandeering doctrine, however, the action of the federal 
government in the field of national security still challenged the operation of states’ vanguard due 
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process standards.113 Indeed, whereas the federal government cannot commandeer state officials, it 
can directly carry out its policies trough federal officials and if the federal government occupies a 
given field, state action may be tout court excluded under the doctrine of pre-emption.114 After 9/11 
the field of national security was regarded as being pre-empted by federal law, with the 
consequence that state standards for the protection constitutional rights were entirely displaced.115 
The federal pre-emption of the field of national security deprived the states of the power to enforce 
their (possibly more advanced) due process standards in the fight against terrorism, and replaced the 
state standards with a very weak federal standard. As a result, a challenge of ineffectiveness 
comparable to that experienced in the EU materialized also in the US, with the federal government 
enforcing a ceiling of protection for the right of due process for suspected terrorist, undermining the 
standards in force in many vanguard US states.  
 In this context, it was up to the federal judiciary, to respond to the due process challenge 
posed by the action of the federal government and to raise the standard for the protection of 
fundamental rights in the field of counter terrorism. Yet, the reaction of the US Supreme Court was 
gradual and, as I have explained elsewhere, three distinct phases can be distinguished.116 In an 
initial phase, the Supreme Court exercised a deferential approach, with a minimal review of the acts 
of the political branches of government. In a second intermediate phase, the Supreme Court started 
limiting the effects of its precedents and acknowledged for itself the power to scrutinize more 
extensively the policies of the other branches. In a last phase, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
institutional position in the balances of governance and strongly enhanced the protection of due 
process standards for suspected terrorists. 
 In the first case dealing with the legality of counter-terrorism measures, the Supreme Court 
adopted a deferential approach toward the determination of the political branches of government, 
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limiting to a minimum or excluding tout court judicial review over the policies adopted to fight 
terrorism. In Hamdi,117 the Supreme Court was called to review for the first time the detention 
policy adopted by the US Administration in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
Hamdi, a US citizen, had been captured by the US military forces in the course of the hostilities in 
Afghanistan in 2001, classified as an “enemy combatant”118 by an order of the US President and 
since then detained on US soil, without the guarantees of due process. Through an action for habeas 
corpus,119 he challenged the lawfulness of his indefinite detention without trial, essentially asking 
the Court to answer the following legal questions: 1) does the executive power have the authority to 
detain a US citizen, captured on the battlefield, as “enemy combatant”, without trial, for the 
indefinite duration of the conflict? 2) What process is due to a US citizen who disputes his enemy 
combatant status? 
In its first serious confrontation with a question raising such severe constitutional concerns, 
especially with regard to due process, the Supreme Coirt “responded with a cacophony of 
opinions,”120 leaving to Justice O’Connor the task to write the controlling opinion only for a four-
judge plurality. On the first question, the Court was clever in avoiding to address the argument of 
the Administration, which maintained that “no explicit congressional authorization [was] required, 
because the executive possesse[d] plenary authorization to detain pursuant to Article II of the 
Constitution.”121  The Court, however, held that “the detention of individuals […] for the duration 
of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to 
war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the 
President to use.”122  
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Subsequently, the plurality moved on to answer the second question, about the process due 
to a citizen who disputes his enemy combatant status, emphasizing “the tension that exists between 
the autonomy that the Government asserts is necessary in order to pursue effectively a particular 
goal and the process that a citizen contends he is due before he is deprived of a constitutional 
right.”123 Prima facie, the Supreme Court decided to balance “the most elemental of liberty interests 
– the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government,”124 with, on the other 
hand, the “sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the 
enemy during a war do not return to battle against the US,”125 rejecting both the “unilateralism”126 
of the Administration as well as the “civil libertarian maximalism”127 of the petitioner. 
In the practical weighing of competing interests, however, the Supreme Court adopted a 
“minimalist approach.”128 Thus, even if the plurality affirmed quite emphatically that “it is during 
our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most 
severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the 
principles for which we fight abroad,”129 the result of the “calculus”130 was an indulgent yielding to 
the executive.131 The Court simply concluded that a citizen “seeking to challenge his classification 
as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair 
opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.”132 
In addition, the Court acknowledged that “enemy combatants’ proceedings may be tailored 
to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive”133 in times of emergency, and, in the 
end, even acknowledged that “the standards […] articulated could be met by an appropriately 
authorized and properly constituted military tribunal.”134 Hence, “although the popular press has 
haled Hamdi for reining in presidential power, […] a much dimmer view”135 seems necessary. 
“When one considers where the balance was struck, the departure from [executive] unilateralism 
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was limited. From the standpoint of judicial balancing itself, the plurality accorded too little weight 
to the serious deprivation of liberty associated with the designation as an enemy combatant and too 
much weights on security concerns relating to the war on terrorism.”136 
In a second decision of 2006, however, the Supreme Court began to abandon its previous 
self-restraint and, through a strict interpretation of the relevant legislative provisions, made the first 
step in the direction of restoring the rule of law and granting adequate protection of fundamental 
rights. In Hamdan,137 the Supreme Court dealt with the case of a Yemeni national held as an enemy 
combatant in the US prison of Guantanamo, on suspicion of being the former driver of the AlQaida-
leader, Bin Laden. After his capture in Afghanistan in 2001, Hamdan had been detained without 
trial for four years. The US President, however, in 2004 charged him with the crime of conspiracy 
to commit terrorism and found him eligible for trial before a war crime military commission, 
established ad hoc by executive order.138 Through habeas corpus proceedings Hamdan asked the 
Court to assert: 1) whether the US President had the authority to establish military commissions to 
try enemy aliens for war crimes; and 2) whether the procedure governing trials before the military 
commissions complied with the basic tenets of military and international law. 
While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, a legislative provision was enacted 
depriving US federal courts of jurisdiction to hear application for habeas corpus filed by aliens 
detained in Guantanamo.139 In the view of the political branches of government a new 
administrative procedure had to be established to review the legality of the detention, without all the 
burdensome safeguards of a trial before the federal courts.140 The Administration therefore urged 
the Court to decide the case on procedural grounds, dismissing the suit for lack of jurisdictional 
competence. A five-justice majority (led by Justice Stevens), however, construed the statute 
narrowly, and stated that “ordinary principles of statutory construction suffice to rebut the 
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Government’s theory”141 since both the language and the history of the statute excluded its 
retroactive application to pending cases. 
 Moreover, rejecting its previous deferential approach toward the arguments of the executive 
branch,142 the Court underlined that “the Government has identified no other ‘important 
countervailing interest’ that would permit federal courts to depart from their general ‘duty to 
exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred on them by Congress’”143 and addressed the claims of the 
petitioner on the merit. With regard to the first claim, concerning the authority of the President to 
try enemy combatants for crimes against the law of war by military tribunals instituted with 
executive order, the Court ruled that no act of Congress “expand[ed] the President’s authority to 
convene military commissions”144 and that the statutory requirement of an express congressional 
authorization for the establishment of ad hoc tribunals had been violated.145 
 With regard to the second claim, concerning the legality of the procedures governing the 
trial by military commission, the Supreme Court highlighted that, according to the rules set forth by 
the executive, the accused was “precluded from ever learning what evidence was presented”146 
against him and that “striking[ly] any evidence […including] testimonial hearsay and evidence 
obtained through coercion”147 was admitted in front of the decision-makers. The majority decided 
that these procedures violated the standard of US military justice as well as the provision of the 
Geneva Convention granting minimal due process rights148 to the aliens detained in the course of a 
“conflict not of an international character:”149 indeed, those “requirement are general ones, crafted 
to accommodate a wide variety of [situations]. But requirements they are nonetheless.”150 
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 The Supreme Court in Hamdan took the first steps to assure adequate protection of 
fundamental right in the fight against terrorism by making it clear that “the Executive is bound to 
comply with the Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.”151 The Court departed from its 
previous deferential position,152 favouring an intermediate, “process-based institutional 
approach”153 that relies on a form of checks and balances between the legislative and executive 
branches. At the same time, however, the Court did not engage directly with the relevant 
constitutional arguments at stake, and “the true novelty of the Supreme Court decision, in fact, is 
not a new interference in the activities of the war-making branches of government, but rather the 
acknowledgment of a relevant role for the Congress in times of emergency.”154 
In a third milestone decision, finally, the Supreme Court adopted a bold stand vis à vis the 
political branches of government, showing greater confidence about its indispensable constitutional 
role in a contemporary liberal democracy. By submitting to a full and strict review the US counter-
terrorism measures, the Court assured an effective protection of the procedural guarantees enshrined 
in the US Constitution. In Boumediene155 the Supreme Court was presented with a “question not 
resolved by [its] earlier cases relating to the detention of aliens [i.e.] whether they have the 
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus.”156 In response to Hamdan, Congress enacted a new 
provision stripping US federal courts of the jurisdiction to hear claims by enemy combatants held in 
US custody in Guantanamo explicitly extending its application to the pending cases.157 The Court 
was thus forced to acknowledge that Congress had “deprive[d] the federal courts of jurisdiction to 
entertain the habeas corpus actions.”158 This, nonetheless, allowed it to address the “constitutional 
issue”159 of whether also the enemy aliens in Guantanamo were entitled to a constitutional right to 
contest the legality of their detention before an independent and regularly constituted tribunal.160 
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With its pleas, Boumediene, an Algerian national detained since 2001 in the prison of 
Guantanamo, asked the Court to decide: 1) whether “the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a 
privilege not to be withdrawn except in conformance with the Suspension Clause, Article I, §9, 
cl.2”161 applied abroad in Guantanamo; and, as a consequence, 2) whether the statutory provision 
depriving federal courts to hear habeas corpus claims was constitutional. Writing for a five-judge 
majority, Justice Kennedy began the opinion of the Court restating that the purpose of the 
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus in the common law tradition had always been to ensure 
“that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the 
writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.”162 
On the extraterritorial application of the constitutional habeas provision, Justice Kennedy 
rejected the formalistic arguments of the Government and adopted a “functional approach,”163 based 
on “objective factors and practical concerns.”164 Since “the US have maintained complete and 
uninterrupted control of [Guantanamo] for over 100 years,”165 the Supreme Court argued that 
excluding the application of the privilege of habeas corpus there would mean granting “the political 
branches […] the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will,”166 “permit[ting] a striking 
anomaly in [the US] tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress and the 
President, not this Court, say ‘what the law is’.”167 Hence, answering the first question, the Court 
ruled “that Article I, par 9, cl.2 of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo.”168 
“In the light of this holding, the question [turned on] whether the statute stripping 
jurisdiction to issue the writ [was constitutional] because Congress ha[d] provided for adequate 
substitute procedure for habeas corpus.”169 According to the Court, the “easily identified attributes 
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of any constitutionally adequate”170 substitute for habeas corpus proceedings included giving the 
prisoner a meaningful opportunity to rebut the reasons that legitimize his detention and the power of 
the court to order the release of an individual unlawfully detained. Since these minimal requisites 
were lacking in the alternative procedure set up by the legislature (granting the power to try the 
enemy aliens held in Guantanamo to ad hoc combatant status review tribunals), the Court 
concluded that the contested statute “effect[ed] an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.”171 
Boumediene hence reasserted the prominent constitutional role of the US judiciary in the 
balance of governance and in the protection of fundamental rights in times of emergency.172 
Contrary to the minimalist or moderate stand adopted in its previous rulings concerning the legality 
of US counter-terrorism measures, the Supreme Court here showed great confidence, exercised a 
full review and “for the first time in history found it necessary to strike down a statute as violating 
the Suspension Clause, rather than construe it to avoid invalidity.”173 Striking a more appropriate 
balance between competing interests, the Court clearly stated that “security subsists, too, in fidelity 
to freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary detention and unlawful 
restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers.”174 
 To summarize: a comparative assessment of the protection of due process rights in the US 
after 9/11 reveals the existence of a challenge analogous to the one that can be found in the EU. The 
US example is illuminating not only because the US has been at the forefront of the fight against 
terrorism, but also because the US is a federal system in which police powers are prevailingly 
exercised by the states. Although the US government cannot commandeer state officials, after 9/11 
the Bush Administration pre-empted the field of national security, displacing state due process 
guarantees and replacing them with an extremely low-intensity standard of protection for suspected 
terrorists. In this situation, it was up to the US Supreme Court to address the challenge of 
ineffectiveness created by restrictive federal anti-terrorism policies. Through decisions like Hamdi, 
Hamdan and Boumediene the US Supreme Court gradually enhanced the human rights guarantees 
applied in the filed of anti-terrorism, leading to a greater protection of due process rights.175 
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4. Recent developments: the case law of the European Court of Justice 
 
As the previous Section makes clear, the challenge of ineffectiveness generated by the enforcement 
of a low-level federal ceiling of protection for the due process rights of suspected terrorists, was 
slowly addressed in the US by the US Supreme Court. Recent developments in the EU judicial 
system highlight an analogous pattern. After the 2005 Kadi decision, EU courts have gradually 
abandoned their self-restraint and, step by step, they have strengthened the degree of due process 
protection ensured to “black listed” individuals and entities at EU level. In the OMPI decision of 
2006,176 the CFI, moved to limit the effects of its previous ruling and, by distinguishing the case 
from Kadi, it ensured greater protection of due process rights. It has been however the ECJ, in 
reviewing on appeal the Kadi case in 2008,177 that has taken the most important step toward the 
resolution of the challenge of ineffectiveness in the field of due process rights for suspected 
terrorists in Europe, opening the way for important developments in the national security case law 
of both EU lower courts and state supreme courts. 
 The issue before the CFI in OMPI was the same as that already at stake in Kadi. With an 
action for annulment, the applicant, an Iranian organization based in Britain challenged the legality 
of an EC regulation178 listing it among the entities suspected of financing terrorism and freezing its 
assets without due process of law. Whereas the defendant urged the CFI to comply with its 
precedents denying the power of the EU judiciary to review a contested EC measure implementing 
a UNSC resolution in the light of the fundamental principles of EU law, the CFI found it 
appropriate to “distinguish the present case.”179 Contrary to Kadi, the challenged EC regulation, this 
time, implemented a UNSC resolution180 that did “not specify individually the persons, groups and 
entities who [we]re to be the subjects of”181 the financial freezing measures. 
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The identification of the exact “persons, groups and entities whose funds [we]re to be frozen 
pursuant to the [UN] resolution”182 had occurred first within the framework of the II pillar of the 
EU,183 and later transposed into the EC regulation. Therefore, “the adoption of those acts [by the 
EU Council] f[ell…] within the ambit of the exercise of [a] broad discretion.”184  As a consequence, 
the CFI recognized that “the EC institutions concerned, in this case the Council, are in principle 
bound to observe [the fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order] when they act with a 
view to giving effect to [a UNSC] resolution.”185 According to the CFI, there was no jurisdictional 
immunity186 that could shield the challenged EC regulation and “the present dispute c[ould] be 
resolved solely on the basis of a judicial review of the lawfulness of the contested decision.”187 
The CFI engaged in an effective review188 of the measure adopted by the EU political 
institutions with regard to the right of due process of the petitioner,189 taking care to ensure “that a 
fair balance is struck between the need to combat international terrorism and the protection of 
fundamental rights.”190 On the merits, the CFI found that all the claims of the petitioner concerning 
violations of the right to a fair hearing, of the obligation to state reasons and of the right to effective 
judicial protection, were well founded.191 The CFI ruled that “the contested decision d[id] not 
contain a sufficient statement of reasons and that it was adopted in the course of a procedure during 
which the applicants rights to a fair hearing was not observed [and that] furthermore the CFI was 
not [itself…] in a position to review the lawfulness of the decision.”192 
 The CFI annulled the EC regulation insofar as it concerned the plaintiff, reaching the result 
that was rejected in Kadi.193 Per contra, the CFI made it clear that the review it was exercising was 
a form of “manifest error scrutiny,”194 a review “restricted to checking that the rules governing 
procedure and the statements of reasons have been complied with, that the facts are materially 
accurate and that there has been no manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of 
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powers.”195 Hence, while reaffirming the “imperative”196 nature of its review, the EU judiciary 
carved for itself a “limited,”197 intermediate space, acknowledging that “that the Council enjoys 
broad discretion in its assessment of the matters to be taken into consideration for the purpose of 
adopting economic and financial sanctions.”198 
 The OMPI case represented a step ahead from the first decisions on the legality of the EU 
counter-terrorism policies since it “br[ought] a measure of rule of law into a field which seems to 
have been tarnished by the arbitrary.”199 As it has been argued, “the EU judiciary experimented here 
its capacity of being rigorous in the protection of rights in one of the most thorny fields, given the 
fact that the seriousness of the international situation tends to attenuate the sensitiveness toward the 
rights of the suspected terrorist and produces a stronger propensity toward the demand for security 
rather than towards that for liberty and justice.”200 At the same time, the CFI took the explicit 
position of adopting a middle review scrutiny, falling short of affirming an extended constitutional 
power to ensure the primacy of EU fundamental principles.201 
 A full-blown holding that EU fundamental due process rights cannot be sacrificed in the 
name of national security came however from the ECJ in the Kadi decision of 2008. The Kadi 
decision of the CFI was in fact later appealed and the ECJ was called to decide in last instance 
about the legality of an EC regulation implementing a UNSC resolution listing individuals and 
entities suspected of being terrorists and freezing their assets without due process of law. In contrast 
to the CFI,202 the Grand Chamber of the ECJ began its reasoning by emphasizing that “the EC is 
based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid 
conformity of their acts with the basic constitutional charter, the EC Treaty.”203  According to the 
ECJ, it followed from “those considerations that the obligations imposed by an international 
agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, 
which include the principle that all EC acts must respect fundamental rights.”204 
On this premise, the ECJ left aside the argument of the CFI concerning the relationship 
between the UN and EU legal orders, and, while not denying the binding nature of the UNSC 
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resolutions and their “supremacy in […] international law”205 (stemming from the UN Charter), 
reaffirmed within the EU legal system206 the supremacy of primary EU constitutional law, “in 
particular the general principles of which fundamental rights form part.”207 As a consequence, the 
ECJ excluded that a EC regulation implementing a UN resolution could be immune from judicial 
review, arguing instead that “the review of the Court of the validity of any Community measure in 
the light of fundamental rights must be considered to be the expression, in a community based on 
the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal 
system which is not to be prejudiced by an international agreement.”208 
The ECJ clearly ruled that “the EC judicature must, in accordance with the powers conferred 
on it by the EC Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all EC 
acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the general principles of EC 
law, including review of EC measures which, like the contested regulation, are designed to give 
effect to the resolutions adopted by the SC.”209 Hence, it engaged directly in a strict and attentive 
scrutiny of the contested regulation,210 following the influential advice of Advocate General (AG) 
Maduro, according to which “in situations where the Community’s fundamental value are in the 
balance, the Court may be required to reassess and possibly annul, measures adopted by the 
Community institutions, even when those measures reflect the wishes of the SC.”211 
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On the merit of the fundamental rights’ claim raised by the appellant, the ECJ displayed 
“distrust toward any invasion of due process”212 and held that “in the light of the actual 
circumstances surrounding the inclusion of the appellants’ names in the list of persons and entities 
covered by the restrictive measures […] the right of defence, in particular the right to be heard, and 
the right to effective judicial review were patently not respected.”213 In addition, according to the 
ECJ, also the freezing of assets deriving from inclusion on the list “constituted an unjustified 
restriction of [the] right to propriety.”214 As a result, confirming that “in the EU’s flawed system of 
governance, democracy finds solace in judicial review,”215 the ECJ declared the appeal to be well 
founded and annulled the contested EC regulation in so far as it concerned the applicants.216  
In Kadi, the ECJ rejected the deferential stand of the CFI and followed the suggestions of 
AG Maduro to take seriously its role as the “constitutional court of the municipal order that is the 
EC”217 and its duty to preserve the rule of law. The ECJ reasserted also the role of the judiciary in 
times of emergency by simply excluding that a “regulation [could] escape all review by the EC 
judicature once it ha[d] been claimed that the act […] concern[ed] national security and 
terrorism.”218 As indeed the AG had again correctly pointed out, “especially in matters of public 
security, the political process is liable to become overly responsive to immediate popular concern, 
leading the authorities to allay the anxiety of the many at the expenses of the rights of the few. This 
is precisely when courts ought to get involved,”219 with “constitutional confidence.”220 
In sum, the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ has ensured an effective review of UN counter-
terrorism sanctions against individuals and entities, thus strengthening the protection of due process 
rights in the EU system. The enforcement of an advanced standard of protection at the EU level also 
reduced the tensions with states endowed with vanguard due process guarantees, as reflected in the 
E & F case.221 Kadi, otherwise, has had relevant implications at the state level, pushing many state 
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courts to improve their human rights standards, as evidenced by the decision of the UK Supreme 
Court in Jabar Ahmed.222 As the follow up to the Kadi case demonstrates, however, the struggle for 
the definition of the appropriate standards of treatment for individuals suspected of being involved 
in terrorism financing is far from being over.223 As requested by the ECJ, in fact, Kadi was provided 
by the EU institutions with a short statement of reasons justifying his black-listing and, on the basis 
of these few information, he was re-inserted in the EU assets freezing regime.224 Kadi, however, 
claimed that the process followed by the EU institutions to re-list him was still incompatible with 
the EU due process standards and challenged the new regulation before the CFI (which, in the 
meanwhile, had been renamed General Court (GC) by the Lisbon Treaty). 
In September 2010, the GC delivered its Kadi II judgment,225 holding that also the new 
regulation was in violation of EU fundamental rights. The GC surprisingly affirmed that it was “not 
bound under Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice by the points of law decided by the 
[ECJ] in its judgment in Kadi.”226 In addition, with an unprecedented step for a lower court, the GC 
remarked that “certain doubts may have been voiced in legal circles as to whether the judgment of 
the [ECJ] in Kadi is wholly consistent with, on the one hand, international law and, more 
particularly, Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter of the [UN] and, on the other hand, the EC and EU 
Treaties”227 and, indicating rulings of UK228 and Swiss229 courts in support, stated “that those 
criticisms are not entirely without foundation.”230 However, the GC recognized that “the appellate 
principle itself and the hierarchical judicial structure which is its corollary generally advise[d] 
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against the [GC] revisiting points of law which have been decided by the [ECJ]”231 and set out to 
apply a “strict review”232 of the contested regulation. 
On the merit, the GC underlined how the EU counter-terrorism sanctions were “particularly 
draconian for those who are subject to them. All the applicant’s funds and other assets have been 
indefinitely frozen for nearly 10 years now and he cannot gain access to them without first 
obtaining an exemption from the [UN] Sanctions Committee.”233 On the procedure that had been 
followed to re-list Kadi, otherwise, the GC remarked how “the applicant’s rights of defence ha[d] 
been ‘observed’ only in the most formal and superficial sense.”234 As the GC made clear, in fact, 
“the procedure followed by the Commission, in response to the applicant’s request, did not grant 
him even the most minimal access to the evidence against him. In actual fact, […] no balance was 
struck between his interests, on the one hand, and the need to protect the confidential nature of the 
information in question, on the other.”235 As a consequence, the GC itself was “not able to 
undertake a review of the lawfulness of the contested regulation”236 as would have been required by 
the applicant’s fundamental right to effective judicial review. 
The GC, in addition, held that “the imposition on the applicant of the restrictive measures 
[…] constitute[d] an unjustified restriction of [the applicant’s] right to property”237 and entailed also 
a violation of the principle of proportionality. The GC, thus, annulled the regulation in so far as it 
concerned the applicant. Nevertheless, the decision of the GC was appealed before the ECJ238 and, 
as Armin Cuyvers has stated, the judgment of the GC now “puts the [ECJ] in a predicament, with 
very few easy or cost-free exits.”239 On the one hand, it would not be easy for the ECJ to give up the 
powerful “human-rights friendly” stand it embraced in Kadi. On the other hand, the ECJ is certainly 
aware of the political implications of its future ruling, both on the capacity of the EU institutions to 
cope with the threat of international terrorism and on the need for the EU member state to comply 
with their UN obligations. In this light it will be interesting to follow closely the future case law of 
the ECJ to see whether new challenges of ineffectiveness might emerge in the fabric of the EU 
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constitutional architecture as well as to think about what other legal checks may be put in place to 




5. Future prospects: beyond the Lisbon Treaty 
 
As explained in the previous Section, gradual developments in the case law of the EU court, 
culminating in the milestone ruling of the ECJ in Kadi, have contributed to enhance the standard of 
due process protection in the EU. As such, the challenge of ineffectiveness triggered by the CFI’s 
decision in Kadi seems to have been largely overcome. Nevertheless, the follow up of the Kadi II 
case, has raised several worries about the possibility to maintain a vanguard model of protection for 
suspected terrorists in the EU. It is therefore worth exploring to what extent other institutional 
transformations taking place in the EU system may provide safeguards against a possible future 
weakening of the EU due process standard. In this regard, a development of major significance is 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1st December 2009. By bringing about a significant 
overhaul of the EU constitutional architecture, the Lisbon Treaty has expanded the substantive and 
institutional tools for the protection of fundamental rights, including due process rights for 
individuals and entities subjected to counter-terrorism sanctions.  
 To begin with, at a very general level, the Lisbon Treaty reasserts the importance of the 
protection of fundamental rights in the EU by granting valeur juridique to the EU CFR.240 The 
Lisbon Treaty, in addition, abolishes the pillar structure of the EU extending the méthode 
communautaire (including the full jurisdiction of the ECJ) also to the area of JHA.241 The CFSP 
indeed maintains several ad hoc rules,242 but according to the new Article 275 TFEU, “the ECJ shall 
have jurisdiction to […] rule on proceedings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down 
in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU [ex Article 230 TEC], reviewing the legality of 
decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council 
on the basis of [the CFSP]”. Combined with the recent Kadi doctrine, this new clause effectively 
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allows the ECJ to review even a common position listing persons suspected of financing terrorism, 
as well as, of course, its implementing regulation.243 
 More importantly, the Lisbon Treaty now mandates the formal accession of the EU to the 
ECHR.244 Although the issue of the accession of the EU (or the EC) to the ECHR had been on the 
political agenda of the EU for the last twenty years, no step had been taken so far in this regard.245 
Pursuant to the new Article 6(2) TEU (as well as to the new Article 59(2) ECHR, as recently 
modified by the 14th Additional Protocol to the ECHR, which entered into force in June 2010), the 
negotiating process for the accession of the EU to the ECHR is currently underway and may soon 
conclude with a formal accession document.246 The precise effects of the accession of the EU to the 
ECHR are difficult to predict. Yet it seems likely that the core achievement of the accession will be 
to subject the action of the EU institutions to judicial review before the ECtHR.247 
 Since so far neither the EC nor the EU was a party to the ECHR, the ECtHR has declared 
inadmissible all challenges against the EC or the EU.248 The ECtHR can review the compatibility 
with the ECHR of measures adopted by the Contracting Parties after the exhaustion of all the 
available domestic remedies. In Matthews v. UK249 the ECtHR also acknowledged its power to 
review acts of the EU member states amending EU primary law. In that case (which will be further 
analyzed in the next chapter of this thesis) the ECtHR restated that “EC as such cannot be 
challenged before the Court because the EC is not a Contracting Party”250 but retained jurisdiction. 
The decision to review the application, however, was largely due to the fact that the contested UK 
act could “not be challenged before the [ECJ] for the very reason that it [was] not a ‘normal’ act of 
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the Community, but [it was] a treaty within the Community legal order”251 and that therefore the 
UK held responsibility ratione materiae for the consequences of that Treaty.252 
On the other hand, instead, the ECtHR has repeatedly held that it will not review state acts 
which implement secondary law of the EC/EU, since in these case a general presumption of legality 
applies.253 The contours of this jurisprudence have been spelled out by the ECtHR in a case which 
presents many analogies with the Kadi-saga: the Bosphorus case.254 Bosphorus, a Turkish air carrier 
had leased an aircraft from the Yugoslavian national airline, just before the beginning of the 
Yugoslav civil war. While present in Ireland, the aircraft was impounded by the Irish authorities on 
the basis of an EC regulation255 implementing a UNSC resolution256 imposing sanctions on 
Yugoslavia. After the exhaustion of the national remedies and a preliminary ruling of the ECJ on 
the interpretation of the relevant EC regulation,257 Bosphorus started proceedings in front of the 
ECtHR claiming a violation of its right to property. 
The ECtHR found itself competent to review the decision of the Irish authorities even if they 
were simply giving effect to an EC regulation. The ECtHR acknowledged that Ireland was 
complying “with its obligation flowing from EC law.”258 On the other hand, it reasserted that “a 
Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 ECHR for all acts or omissions of its organs.”259 
After balancing the EU member states’ obligations to comply with EC law with their duty to ensure 
the effectiveness of the ECHR, however, the ECtHR affirmed that it would not undertake any 
review of a national measure implementing a EC/EU act as long as the EC/EU ensures a level of 
human rights protection, “as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanism 
controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to”260 the one 
guaranteed by the ECHR.  
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The decision of the ECtHR has been compared to the Solange doctrine of the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht:261 according to the ECtHR, in fact, review of EC measures through the 
national implementing acts is to be undertaken as an extrema ratio, only if the overall EC/EU 
system of human rights protection suddenly falls below the ECHR standard262 and if “in the 
circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of ECHR rights was [at the 
EU level] manifestly deficient.”263 Under this test, Annalisa Ciampi has plausibly argued that cases 
like Kadi (as decided by the CFI) would not obtain a remedy before the ECtHR.264 After the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR, however, there would be no reason for the ECtHR to preserve 
this minimalist approach. Rather, it seems likely that the ECtHR will adopt vis-à-vis the EU the 
same full standard of review it employs vis-à-vis the other Contracting Parties to the ECHR. As a 
consequence, a possible lowering of the standard of protection in the EU legal order (like in Kadi) 
may come under the scrutiny of the ECtHR. 
A cursory review of the case law of the ECtHR in the field of national security also reveals 
that the ECtHR has increasingly become a bulwark for the protection of fundamental rights in times 
of emergency, regardless of the requirement of complying with UN obligations. In some early 
decisions, indeed, the ECtHR had come close to non-justiciability arguments. For instance, in the 
Behrami and Saramati judgment,265 the ECtHR refused to review the conduct of military operations 
by several EU countries during the Kossovo War, since their action had been authorized by the 
UNSC.266 More recently, however, the ECtHR clearly proved to be able to face the challenge of 
protecting rights in times of emergency.267 Hence, for example, in the Al-Jedda case268 (on appeal 
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from the UKHL), the ECtHR hold that the action of the British military in Iraq, fall under the scope 
of application of the ECHR, irrespective of a UN mandate, and found that the UK had violated the 
ECHR.269  
From this point of view, in conclusion, the accession of the EU to the ECHR may represent 
an important development for the protection of due process rights in the EU. Whereas, so far, no 
external scrutiny of EU standards of protection was in place, once the accession will be 
accomplished, EU institutions, including its courts, will be required to comply with the floor of 
protection set by the ECtHR. The gap of protection generated in the EU by the low-level standard of 
protection crafted by the CFI in Kadi would most likely not be tolerated by the ECtHR. As such, the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR can be a powerful incentive for the ECJ, in reviewing on appeal 
the Kadi II decision of the GC, not to bow toward a “security-sensitive” position. In a way, the 
existence of a prospective control by the ECtHR on the action of the EU institutions should 
persuade the ECJ to maintain the high due process standard it framed in its Kadi ruling, preventing 






This chapter has analyzed the protection of due process rights for suspected terrorists after 9/11 in 
Europe. Its goal has been to explore the complex dynamics that have emerged due to the interaction 
between state and EU law and to argue that a major challenge to the effectiveness of the protection 
of due process rights for suspected terrorist has occurred because of the enforcement of a restrictive 
ceiling of protection at the EU level. The right to due process is well-established in the European 
multilevel constitutional system. The events of 9/11, however, have triggered the enactment of 
sweeping counter-terrorism measures significantly threatening due process rights, both at the state 
and at the transnational level in Europe. A brief review of the jurisprudence of national courts 
revealed that relevant horizontal differences arose in the capacity of state courts to uphold 
fundamental rights in times of emergency: whereas some jurisdictions have ensured vanguard due 
process standards even after 9/11, others have adopted a much more “security-sensitive” approach, 
which sacrificed core due process guarantees in the name of national security. 
 As international terrorism was perceived as a threat requiring transnational solutions, 
however, the EU has progressively stepped in the field of national security. In particular, the EU 
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assumed a leading role in implementing the UN legal framework for the fight against terrorism 
financing. The due process deficiencies of this sanctions regime – coupled with the initial 
unwillingness of EU lower courts to ensure judicial review of counter-terrorism measures – created 
however a major challenge of ineffectiveness. In Kadi and Yusuf, with the intent to ensure the full 
application of UN resolutions in the EU, the CFI designed a low-intensity standard for the review of 
due process rights of blacklisted individuals and entities, thus depriving them of the possibility to 
invoke their due process rights at the EU level. Simultaneously, the CFI set up a ceiling of due 
process protection to be accorded to suspected terrorists, thus depriving state courts, especially 
those with vanguard standards of due process, of the possibility to go above this maximum and 
ensure more protection to blacklisted persons. 
 Yet, as the chapter has endeavoured to explain, the dynamics that took place in the European 
system are not sui generis. A comparative assessment of the experience of the US reveals 
comparable patterns. The US case is not only interesting because the US has been at the forefront of 
the fight against terrorism. The US is a federal system in which police enforcement is mainly 
ensured by the states, each of which is endowed with its own standards of procedural justice. After 
9/11, however, the federal government entirely pre-empted the field of national security, and, by 
enforcing a weak due process standard in the field of counter-terrorism, displaced the more 
advanced state standards. In this context, it was up to the US Supreme Court to address the 
challenge of ineffective protection of due process rights by heightening the relevant federal 
standard. Hence, through a gradual, three-step, jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has limited the 
room for manoeuvre of political branches in the field of national security and ensured a more 
effective protection of the procedural rights of suspected terrorists in the US. 
 The transformations that have taken place in the US system, otherwise, mirror those which 
later occurred in Europe. After their initial debacle, in fact, EU courts engaged in a serious effort to 
improve the due process guarantees accorded to suspected terrorists. In the Kadi case, in particular, 
the ECJ powerfully claimed that the protection of core constitutional guarantees cannot be 
suspended for reasons of national security and struck down a EU counter-terrorism measures 
(implementing a UN resolution) freezing the assets of blacklisted persons for violation of EU due 
process rights. The decision of the ECJ had a remarkable impact both at the EU and at the state 
level. Kadi neutralized possible tensions with state courts endowed with vanguard due process 
standards and also invited state courts with laggard procedural guarantees to raise their levels of 
human rights protection. In the follow up of the case, in Kadi II, the GC obeyed the ECJ and again 
found the EU anti-terrorism sanctions to be unlawful.  
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The decision of the GC in Kadi II, however, has now been appealed to the ECJ. Whereas it 
is difficult to predict the stand that the ECJ will adopt in this new case, several other institutional 
transformations taking place in the EU system could prove important in persuading the ECJ to 
maintain a high standard of due process protection for suspected terrorists. After the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is required to accede the ECHR. The most likely consequence of the 
accession will be the possibility to challenge the actions of EU institutions before the ECtHR. As 
the ECtHR has increasingly flexed its muscles in protecting rights in times of emergency, it seems 
clear that any new judicial decision akin to the CFI’s ruling in Kadi, would not pass muster before 
the ECtHR. In light of its precedent and of the prospective accession of the EU to the ECHR, one 
may only hope that the ECJ will avoid a new challenge of ineffectiveness and continue to ensure 
that “in countries where liberty is most esteemed, there [be no] laws by which a single person is 
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The right to vote and to participate in political life is an essential component of any democracy.1 As 
Thomas Jefferson famously wrote in the 1776 Declaration of Independence, “governments are 
instituted among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”2 Who ought to 
be considered as “the governed”, has nonetheless remained a largely unsettled question in legal 
practice and political theory ever since.3 Historically, the boundaries of the franchise have been the 
object of contestation in almost any constitutional system and it is only through slow and uneven 
developments that disenfranchised groups such as poor, women, minorities and the young have 
obtained the right to participate in the body politic.4 
This chapter analyzes the regulation of voting rights for non-citizens in the European 
multilevel constitutional system. The pluralist arrangement that exists in Europe due to the overlap 
of the legal orders of the member states, of the European Union (EU) and of the European 
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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is increasingly described by scholars as a “multilevel 
constitutional architecture.”5 A widespread assumption among constitutional lawyers is that the 
European system is a sui generis arrangement. Nevertheless, as I have explained in the first chapter 
of this thesis, the European multilevel architecture can be meaningfully compared with other federal 
systems and that, if compared, it can also be better understood. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to study the European electoral rights regime for 
non-citizens and the implications emerging from a multilevel constitutional architecture, in a 
comparative perspective with the federal experience of the United States of America (US). To 
clarify the terminology, with the term “non-citizens” (or “aliens” of “foreigners”) I refer here both 
to citizens of a member state of the EU or the US who reside in another member state of the EU or 
the US (i.e. – according to the European legal jargon – “second-country nationals”) and to citizens 
of a non-member country who permanently reside within a member state of the EU or the US (i.e. 
“third-country nationals”). 
The chapter argues that the complex interplay among national and transnational law in the 
European multilevel architecture has created new challenges and tensions in the field of electoral 
rights for non-citizens. A challenge of inconsistency, in particular, seems to emerge from the 
interaction between states’ electoral laws and the voting rights regime developing at the EU level 
setting a minimum floor of protection for electoral rights Europe-wide. At the same time, however, 
the chapter claims that the dynamics at play in Europe are not unique. Rather, the experience of the 
US in the field of alien suffrage and citizenship underlines how the interplay between state and 
federal law have historically produced phenomena in the US that are akin to the ones existing in 
Europe. 
To this end, the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 begins by examining the 
legislation regulating electoral rights for non-citizens in the EU member states and explores the 
increasing impact that supranational law exercises within domestic legal systems. Section 2 then 
analyzes the tensions and challenges that this overlap generates. Section 3 introduces a comparative 
assessment to argue that analogous dynamics have characterized the constitutional experience of the 
US. Finally Section 4 evaluates the most recent transformations brought about by the case law of 
the European courts and EU Lisbon Treaty and Section 5 discusses whether,, and what kind of 
further reforms would be advisable to address some of the remaining inconsistencies in the 
European electoral rights regime. 
 
                                                 
5
 See Ingolf Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union’ (2002) 27 European Law Review 511; 
Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in Neil Walker (ed), 
Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2003) 501 
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1. Context: Electoral rights for non-citizens in Europe 
 
Since the end of World War II Europe has experienced a progressive expansion of political rights.6 
A fundamental right to vote for citizens, regardless of sex, wealth and social conditions, has been 
enshrined in the fundamental laws of most member states and recognized under the ECHR. 
Developments at the level of the EU, otherwise, have further increased the mechanisms of 
democratic representation.7 Despite this trend toward the extension of the franchise, however, 
significant variations exist on how the question of voting rights for non-citizens is dealt with in each 
layer of the European multilevel system.8 The enfranchisement of aliens is indeed a reflection of 
traditions of political and social inclusion,9 and relevant differences exist in the vision of the polity 
embedded in national, EU and ECHR law. 
 At the state level a plurality of statutory frameworks can be detected. By resorting to the 
analytical distinction formulated by Ann Althouse between vanguard and laggard states,10 it seems 
possible to classify the positions of the EU member states on the issue of voting rights for non-
citizens in four regulatory models. These models can be ideally placed in a continuum ranging from 
legal systems which are rather open toward the extension of the franchise, even in national 
elections, to the benefit of qualified non-citizens to legal systems which are, instead, extremely 
restrictive in limiting the right to democratic participation only to nationals, in the name of an 
ethnic, identity-based, conception of the people.11  
At one extreme of the spectrum lie the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland which grant 
voting rights to selected classes of resident aliens not only at the local level but also in national 
elections.12 In the UK – pursuing to a tradition dating to the time of the British Empire and codified 
                                                 
6
 In his celebrated sociological theory of citizenship Thomas Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (CUP 1950) argued 
that political rights (i.e. voting rights) were the second wave of entitlements that the people obtained vis-à-vis the state 
in the course of the 19th century, after the acquisition of civil rights in the 18th century liberal revolutions and before the 
conquest of social rights during the 20th century 
7
 See Editorial, ‘Thinking About Elections and About Democratic Representation’ (2011) 7 European Constitutional 
Law Review 1 
8
 See Virginie Giraudon, ‘Citizenship Rights for Non-Citizens’ in Christian Joppke (ed), Challenge to the Nation-State 
(OUP 1998) 272 and Christian Joppke, ‘The Evolution of Alien Rights in the United States, Germany and the European 
Union’ in Alexander Aleinikoff  and Douglas Klusmeyer (eds), Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2001) 36 
9
 See Ulrich Preuß et al, ‘Traditions of Citizenship in the European Union’ (2003) 7 Citizenship Studies 3, 8 and Linda 
Bosniak, ‘Constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of Alienage’ (2002) 63 Ohio State Law Journal 1285 
10
 See Ann Althouse, ‘Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights’ (2003-2004) 152 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1745 (speaking about “vanguard” and “laggard” states to distinguish between 
the most-protective and the least-protective regimes for the protection of fundamental rights at the state level in the US 
federal system of government) 
11
 For an assessment of the legislation of the member states on alien suffrage in the broader context of the process of 
European integration see Jo Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union: Electoral Rights and the 
Restructuring of the Political Space (CUP 2007) 76 ff 
12
 See Heather Lardy, ‘Citizenship and the Right to Vote’ (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 75, 77-78 
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in the Representation of the People Act13 – participation in national parliamentary elections is 
ensured to anybody who “is either a Commonwealth citizen or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland” 
and permanently resides in the UK.14 To reciprocate, Ireland enacted in 1984 a constitutional 
amendment15 which, by overruling a contrary opinion of the Supreme Court,16 allowed UK citizens 
residing in Ireland to cast their votes for the Irish legislative assembly.17 
A growing number of other EU member states, instead have adopted since the 1970s laws 
enabling foreigners to participate in the democratic process but have restricted the franchise for 
permanent resident aliens at the local level.18 Hence, the Netherlands introduced in 1985 the right to 
vote in municipal councils for foreigners who “have been resident in the Netherlands for an 
uninterrupted period of at least five years immediately prior to nomination day and have residence 
rights”19 and a similar piece of legislation was enacted in 2004, after a lengthy parliamentary 
debate, by Belgium.20 Since 1991, then, two years of permanent residency suffice to aliens for 
obtaining voting rights at the local level in Finland and this right has now been enshrined even in 
the text of the Constitution of 2000.21       
On the other hand, a third group of EU states currently do not extend voting rights to non-
citizens at the local level but nothing would prevent them from doing so by enacting appropriate 
legislation. This seems to be, for example, the case of Italy.22 In a series of rulings, in fact, the Corte 
Costituzionale23 declared as purely programmatic (i.e. deprived of any legally binding force) the 
statutes of several regions extending voting rights at the local level to non-citizens arguing that the 
                                                 
13
 Representation of the People Act (RPA) 1983, 31 Eliz. 2, c. 2 (consolidated version) (Eng.) 
14
 RPA Section 2(1)(c) (UK) 
15
 Ninth Am., Ir. Const., codified as Article 16(1)(2) stating that “(i) All citizens, and (ii) such other persons in the State 
as may be determined by law, without distinction of sex who have reached the age of eighteen years who are not 
disqualified by law and comply with the provisions of the law relating to the election of members of the House of 
Representatives, shall have the right to vote at an election for members of the House of Representatives” (Ir.). The 
constitutional provision was implemented through the adoption of Electoral (Amendment) Act 1985 (Act No. 13/1985) 
(Ir.) whose Section 2 expressly extended voting rights for Parliamentary elections to “British citizen[s].” 
16
 In the Matter of Article 26 of the Constitution and in the Matter of the Electoral (Amendment) Bill 1983 [1984] 1 I.R. 
268 (Irish Supreme Court declaring unconstitutional a legislative bill extending voting rights to non-citizens) 
17
 See Ko-Chih Tung, ‘Voting Rights for Alien Residents: Who Wants it?’ (1985) 19 International Migration Review 
451 
18
 Currently, among the 27 member states of the EU 15 extend the franchise at the local level to (at least some classes 
of) non-EU citizens: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. For a detailed examination of the issue cf. 
Giovanna Zincone and Simona Ardovino, ‘I diritti elettorali dei migranti nello spazio politico e giuridico europeo’ 
[2004] Le Istituzioni del Federalismo 741 
19
 Article B 3(2) Kieswet, 28.09.1989 (Ne.)(consolidated version of the electoral Act)  
20
 Loi du 19 mars 2004 visant à octroyer le droit de vote aux élections communales à des étrangers, F. 2004-1386 (Be.) 
21
 Article 14(2) Const. Fin.. See also Article 26, Kuntalaki, 17.3.1995/365 (Fin.)(consolidated version of the electoral 
Act) 
22
 The issue, however, is contested. Compare Paolo Bonetti, ‘Ammissione all’elettorato e acquisto della cittadinanza: 
due vie dell’integrazione politica degli stranieri’ [2003] Federalismi.it 11 (arguing that “nothing prohibits the extension 
by ordinary law to non-citizens of the subjective rights granted by the Constitution to citizens”) with Tommaso 
Giupponi, ‘Stranieri extracomunitari e diritti politici. Problemi costituzionali dell’estensione del diritto di voto in 
ambito locale’ (Forum Costituzionale Paper, 2006) 6  
23
 C.Cost sent. 372/2004 (statute of region Tuscany); C.Cost sent. 379/2004 (statute of region Emilia-Romagna)  
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Constitution expressly reserves the exclusive competence in the field of electoral law to the national 
legislature. The clause of the Constitution which recognizes that all citizens have the right to vote,24 
however, has not been interpreted by the Corte Costituzionale as prohibiting the national Parliament 
from enacting a bill enfranchising third-country nationals at the local level. 
In a last group of member states, on the contrary, voting rights are constitutionally restricted 
to nationals and any expansion of the franchise to non-citizens requires the burdensome process of 
constitutional amendment. In Germany, for instance, the attempt of two Länder to extend voting 
rights to foreign residents in local (and Land) elections was declared unconstitutional by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht which, in two joint 1990 decisions,25 affirmed that the constitutional 
concept of the “Volk” ought to be interpreted as restricting electoral rights only to German nationals 
and made clear that any expansion of the franchise to non-citizens required a constitutional 
change.26 A similar stand was recently adopted also by the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof, which 
in 2004 declared a Land bill allowing third-country nationals to participate in local elections 
unconstitutional for violation of the principle of homogeneity of the electoral body.27  
 The issue of electoral rights for non-citizens is instead addressed in an open-ended way in 
the framework of the ECHR. Given its importance for the establishment of a well functioning 
democracy, Article 3 of the 1st additional Protocol to the ECHR codifies a fundamental right to 
vote28 stating that the Contracting Parties shall organize free elections “at reasonable intervals, by 
secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in 
the choice of the legislature.” The provision, otherwise, talks about the right to vote of “the people” 
without explicitly imposing any limitation of the franchise to “the citizens.” Nevertheless, Article 
16 of the ECHR expressly allows for the restriction of the political activities of aliens29 and 
traditionally a wide margin of appreciation has been acknowledged by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) to the Contracting Parties on voting rights issues.30 
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 Article 48, par 1, Const. It.   
25
 BVerfGE 63, 37 (1990) (statute of Land Schleswig-Holstein); BVerfGE 63,60 (1990) (statute of Land Hamburg)  
26
 See Gerald Neuman, ‘“We Are the People”: Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective’ (1992) 13 
Michigan  Journal of International Law 259 and Ruth Rubio Marin, ‘Equal Citizenship and the Difference that 
Residence Makes’ in Massimo La Torre (ed), European Citizenship: an Institutional Challenge (Kluwer 1998) 201, 210 
ff 
27
 VfSlg 17.264/2004 [2004] 
28
 Cf. Susan Marks, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and its “Democratic Society”’ [1995] British 
Yearbook of International Law 209 and Hans-Martien ten Napel, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Political 
Rights: the Need for More Guidance’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 464 
29
 Cf. Federico Casolari, ‘La partecipazione dello straniero alla vita pubblica locale’ in Marcello Di Filippo et al (eds), 
Diritto europeo dell’immigrazione (Cedam 2010) 2 
30
 See Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, ECHR [1987], Application No. 9267/81 (GC); Sante Santoro v. Italy, 
ECHR [2004], Application No. 36681/97; Py v. France, ECHR [2005], Application 66289/01. For a structural analysis 
of the case law of the ECtHR on Article 3, 1st additional Protocol see M. Napel (n 28) 468 
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In 1992, however, a separate Convention was negotiated within the Council of Europe with 
the aim of improving the integration of foreign residents into the local community “by enhancing 
the possibilities for them to participate in local public affairs.”31 Article 6 of the Convention on the 
Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local Level (CPFPL) requires Contracting Parties 
to grant aliens who have been resident in a state for 5 years the right to vote and to stand in local 
government elections.32 Although the CPFPL “contains the first unambiguous statement in 
international law upholding the rights of non-nationals residents to vote in local elections,”33 
however, only a few EU countries have ratified the treaty so far and some have even adopted 
reservations and derogations on Article 6, hence depriving the CPFPL of its most significant 
clause.34 
Voting rights for non-citizens have been recognized at the EU level as well.35 Whereas the 
citizens of the EU member states have de facto been endowed with new rights of political 
representation since the introduction of direct elections by universal suffrage to the EU Parliament 
in 1979,36 it is only with the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 that electoral rights for 
non-citizens have experienced a novel expansion under the concept of EU citizenship.37 Article 17 
of the European Community Treaty (TEC) affirmed that “every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State [should] be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union [should] complement and 
not replace national citizenship.” And today, with a similar but somewhat innovative language,38 
Article 9 EU Treaty (TEU) – inserted by the Lisbon Treaty – states that “every national of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to 
national citizenship and shall not replace it.” 
Among the privileges attached to the possession of EU citizenship electoral rights feature 
prominently, together with the right of free movement.39 Citizens of EU member states, in 
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 Preamble (Recital 6), CPFPL 
32
 See F. Casolari  (n 29) 5 
33
 J. Shaw  (n 11) 66 
34
 Currently only 8 States have duly ratified the CPFPL (5 of which are member states of the EU): Albania, Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. See G. Zincone and S. Ardovino (n 18) 743 
35
 See H. Lardy, ‘The Political Rights of Union Citizenship’ (1996) 2 European Public Law Review  611; Maria Fraile 
Ortiz, ‘Citizenship in Europe – Consequences of Citizenship’ (2007) 19 European Review of Public Law 125 
36
 Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to 
Decision 76/787/EEC, OJ 1976 L 278/5. The Decision did not introduce voting rights for the EU Parliament elections 
for citizens of a EU member state residing in another member state. Some EU countries (such as Italy), however, 
autonomously extended to all residents holding the nationality of another EU member state the right to stand in 
elections for the EU Parliament. See Legge 18 gennaio 1989 n. 9 (G.U. 23 gennaio 1989, n. 18)(It.) 
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 See Flora Goudappel, ‘From National Citizenship to European Union Citizenship: the Re-Invention of Citizenship?’ 
(2007) 19 European Review Public Law 21; Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’ 
(2007) 13 European Law Journal 623 
38
 See infra n 204 
39
 See George Bermann, ‘European Citizenship at Center-Stage: Introduction’ (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European 
Law 165; Siofra O’Leary, ‘The Relationship Between Community Citizenship and the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights in Community Law’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 519. The literature on free movement rights of EU 
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particular, have the right to vote and stand as candidates at both municipal elections and EU 
Parliament elections in their member state of residence, when this differs from their member state of 
nationality.40 According to Article 22(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) (ex 
Article 19(1) TEC) “every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a 
national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the 
Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State.” Article 
22(2) TFEU (ex Article 19(2) TEC) then restates the very same rule with regard to EU Parliament 
elections. 
The detailed arrangements and derogations for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand 
as a candidate in EU Parliament and local elections for EU citizens residing in a member state of 
which they are not nationals are contained in Directives 93/10941 and 94/8042 adopted unanimously 
by the Council after consulting the EU Parliament, as specified by Article 19 TEC (now Article 22 
TFEU). As the recitals of the two directives acknowledge, electoral rights are part of the EU’s task 
to “organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the peoples of 
the Member States”43 and are “a corollary of the right to move and reside freely enshrined in [the 
TEC].”44 The aim of these provisions “is essentially to abolish the nationality requirement to which 
most Member States currently make the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate 
subject.”45 Their operation, however, is without prejudice “for the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in the Member State of which the citizen is a national.”46 
On technical grounds,47 the two directives specify that EU citizens can exercise the right to 
vote in the member state of residence if they have expressed the wish to do so simply by producing 
a formal declaration. Appropriate measures can be adopted by the member states to prevent the 
individual concerned from voting twice and to ensure that he has not been deprived of the right to 
vote in his home state. Applications to stand as a candidate, then, are subject to the same conditions 
applying to nationals candidates. To address the specific concerns of some EU countries, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
citizens is very broad. See among many Norbert Reich, ‘The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free 
Movement in an Enlarged Union’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 675; Siofra O’Leary, ‘Developing an Ever Closer 
Union Between the Peoples of Europe? A Reappraisal of the Case Law of the Court of Justice on the Free Movement of 
Persons and EU Citizenship’ (2008) 27 Yearbook of European Law 167 
40
 See Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship Between 
Status and Rights’ (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 169, 197 ff 
41
 Council Directive 93/109/EC OJ 1993 L 329/34 
42
 Council Directive 94/80/EC OJ 1994 L 368/38 
43
 Recital 1, Directive 93/109; Recital 1, Directive 94/80 
44
 Recital 3, Directive 93/109; Recital 3, Directive 94/80 
45
 Recital 4, Directive 94/80. See also with a similar language recital 4, Directive 93/109 
46
 Recital 7, Directive 93/109; Recital 6, Directive 94/80 
47
 For a detailed analysis and critical assessment of the content of the two directives cf. Marta Cartabia, ‘Cittadinanza 
europea’ in Enciclopedia Giuridica (Treccani 1995) vol. 6 ad vocem 8 ff and Epaminondas Marias, ‘European 
Citizenship in Action: From Maastricht to the Intergovernmental Conference’ in Massimo La Torre (ed), European 
Citizenship: an Institutional Challenge (Kluwer 1998) 293 
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nonetheless, the directives recognize that the right to stand for the head of the local government unit 
can be restricted to nationals only.48 Voting rights both in local and EU elections may be subject, 
moreover, to specific residency requirements in those states in which the proportion of non-national 
citizens of the EU of voting age exceeds 1/5 of the electoral population.49 
Therefore, as EU primary and secondary legislation makes clear, the progressive steps taken 
to enhance European political integration have had relevant consequences on the issue of voting 
rights for non-citizens.50 By being awarded the status of EU citizens, the nationals of the EU 
member states have acquired a supplementary voice in the electoral process. Although the EU 
provisions dealing with voting rights in municipal and EU Parliament elections are technically 
framed as non-discrimination clauses, their effect is to endow second-country nationals with the 
right to vote and to stand for elections at the local as well as supranational level in their country of 
residence.51 Moreover, unlike the provisions of the CPFPL, these rights are directly effective in all 
member states (subject to the arrangements and the derogations set out in the directives mentioned 
above) and prevail over contrasting national law, including constitutional law. 
 
 In the end, as this short outline illustrates, the picture of voting rights for non-citizens in the 
European multilevel architecture is quite intricate. The legislation of EU countries differs greatly on 
the matter and whereas some vanguard states enfranchise aliens even for national elections, other 
laggard states deem any extension of the suffrage beyond the citizenry unconstitutional. The 
international human rights norms provide only limited guidance on this issue: on the one hand, the 
exclusion of foreigners from the political process is regarded as acceptable by the ECHR; on the 
other, the CPFPL “offers a template of incremental steps towards enhancing the political 
participation rights of non-nationals.”52 The EU, however, adds a new layer of complexity53 to the 
picture by recognizing that citizens of each of the EU member states may vote and stand for local 
and EU Parliament elections in their country of residence (even) when this is not their country of 
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 See Article 5, Directive 94/80. This provision was specifically adopted to address the concerns of France. Cf. Bertand 
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2. Challenges: the impact of supranational law on states’ electoral laws 
 
The incremental expansion of the regulation of electoral rights at the supranational level has 
produced major consequences. In particular, the development in the EU framework of a substantive 
body of law enfranchising EU citizens who reside in a EU member state of which they are not 
nationals has significantly increased the protection of the right to vote for non-citizens (second-
country nationals) in the European legal space. A new Europe-wide minimum floor for the 
protection of electoral rights for non-citizens is now in place thanks to EU law. At the same time, by 
recognizing that each EU member state must open its electoral process to individuals who do not 
hold its nationality, EU law “has given rise to some inconsistencies and disruptions in national 
franchise systems.”54 The open conception of the franchise premised in the grant of electoral rights 
at the EU level, challenges and puts under pressure restrictive national laws and practices in the 
field of electoral rights. 
 The new tensions generated by the rising impact of supranational law on the states’ electoral 
regimes emerge chiefly in two areas. On the one hand, EU law calls into question the domestic 
arrangements that either produce asymmetries in the electoral entitlements of second-country 
national or place constraints on the freedom of EU citizens to take full advantage of the voting 
rights benefits stemming from EU law. On the other hand, EU law calls into question the domestic 
arrangements that either fragment the treatment of third-country nationals permanently residing in 
the EU or persistently exclude them from the franchise, even at the local level. To describe these 
dynamics I will hereafter resort to the idea of “inconsistency” I introduced in the first chapter of this 
thesis. The interaction between different legal standards in the European multilevel constitutional 
architecture has in fact created pressures in several states to enhance their level of protection of 
voting rights, and this dynamic can well be conceptualized as a challenge of inconsistency.  
 The interplay between supranational and domestic law generates several inconsistencies 
with regard to the electoral rights of second-country nationals.55 As was mentioned in the previous 
Section, EU citizens who reside in a EU state of which they are not nationals are granted in the 
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 Anja Lansbergen and Jo Shaw, ‘National Membership Models in a Multilevel Europe’ (2010) 8 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 50, 62  
55
 See Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Free Movement and Participation in the Parliamentary Elections in the Member State of 
Nationality: an Ignored Link?’ (2009) 16 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 197 
 108
member state of residence “the right to participate in politics by way of elections (both actively and 
passively) at two of at least three vital levels of political representation.”56 By putting flesh on the 
bones of EU citizenship57 and creating a common core of fundamental privileges for the nationals 
of the EU member states everywhere they reside within the EU,58 EU law has empowered second-
country nationals to vote in municipal and supranational elections – but not national elections – in 
their member state of residence, regardless of nationality.59 
 A first complication arises however because, “in the absence of a universal Community law 
definition of ‘municipal’, the practical application of Article 19(1) TEC [now Article 22(1) TFEU] 
de facto results in numerous inconsistencies, since what some Member States view as ‘municipal’ 
can easily fall within the meaning of ‘national’ in others.”60 Whereas the UK allows citizens from 
other EU states to cast a ballot even for the devolved legislatures of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland61 Germany and Austria restrict the right to vote in Länder elections to nationals, thus 
depriving EU citizens of electoral rights in their municipalities which are also Länder.62 It has been 
affirmed that these differences between national rules result “in notable discrepancies between the 
rights enjoyed by European citizens in different Member States, harming the idea of equality among 
citizens.”63 Indeed, it seems that the status of EU citizen does not carry equal electoral rights in 
every member state: rather, its content varies depending from the national law in force.64 
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 A second major difficulty, then, is produced by the absence of an EU right to vote in general 
elections in the member state of residence when coupled with national provisions denying 
expatriate voting. As indicated, the national level of political representation in the member state of 
residence is currently left uncovered by EU law.65 At the same time, it was already highlighted that 
the ECHR leaves to the states the discretion whether to extend political rights to non-citizens.66 
Hence, while some European countries (notably, the UK and Ireland) have decided autonomously 
to go beyond the transnational minimum and enfranchise some classes of foreigners even for 
parliamentary elections, the vast majority of EU states restrict voting rights for aliens at the local 
level or exclude them tout court.67 
 As long as EU member states allow for expatriate voting, the lack of EU provisions 
establishing a right to vote in national elections in the member state of residency for the individuals 
who reside abroad is compensated by the possibility for them to take part in the choice of the 
legislature in their member state of nationality.68 With the aim of emphasizing the link which should 
exist between an individual and the community mainly affecting his interests, it has been 
persuasively claimed that “the country of residence [should be] primarily responsible for the 
inclusion of its resident population [and that] the country of origin should arguably not bear the 
obligation to make up for it by allowing emigrants […] to decide the political future of those who 
stayed behind.”69 As unsatisfactory as it may be, nonetheless, the possibility to cast an absentee vote 
allows the persons concerned to express a voice at least in the election of one national legislature.70 
 A problem arises, on the contrary, for those EU member states which disenfranchise voters 
who no longer reside in the state or who have ceased to be a resident for a number of consecutive 
years.71 Certainly, the decision of states to withhold the right to vote from their citizens who live 
abroad is closely linked to the history and the political culture of the given state.72 Countries which 
have traditionally been a place of emigration, or with large minority groups dislocated outside the 
national borders, tend to be more favourable to preserving ties with the overseas communities than 
states of immigration.73 Hence, for instance, although Italy does not recognize voting rights for 
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foreign residents even at the local level, the Constitution has recently been amended to ensure 
greater representation in both chambers of Parliament of the “Italians leaving abroad.”74 The 
opposite rule exists instead in the UK where citizens lose their voting rights after 15 years of 
continuous residence outside British territory.75 
The legal or factual impossibility of casting an absentee vote in several EU member states, 
however, generates an unsatisfactory situation: EU citizens who move to reside in a host member 
state, while gaining the right to vote at the municipal and supranational level in that state, are 
disenfranchised for national elections.76 This situation seems inconsistent under a plurality of 
approaches. From an internal market perspective, individuals should not be forced to trade away 
their right to political representation at the state level in order to exercise free movement rights and 
participate, their alienage notwithstanding, in the local political life of another member state. 
Indeed, as it has been written, “instead of benefiting from both free-movement and national political 
representation rights, [EU citizens] are facing an impossible choice.”77 
Also from a constitutionalist perspective, however, this state of affairs is problematic as the 
national disenfranchisement of EU citizens expatriated in another EU member state is in tension 
with the new supranational normative arrangement and “the creation of a new form of citizenship 
under the auspices of the [EU].”78 Since the purpose of EU electoral rights is to allow EU citizens to 
participate in political life and express their voice in elections even when they reside outside their 
country of nationality in Europe, the impossibility to cast a vote in general elections “highlights the 
[…] tension between national constitutional models and the models of democratic inclusion 
required by the goal of European citizenship.”79 
The interaction between supranational and domestic law, furthermore, generates a number of 
inconsistencies also with regard to the electoral rights of third-country nationals permanently 
residing within the EU. It was highlighted in the previous Section that while some EU countries 
have adopted legislations or ratified international agreements (such as the CPFPL) that enfranchise 
non-citizens in local elections, many EU member states still restrict suffrage to citizens.80 The 
arguments advanced in these countries to disenfranchise aliens – either based on an ethnic concept 
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of “people”81 or on a republican ideal of citizenship82 – nevertheless, lose much of their strength 
and become difficult to justify in light of the impact of EU law.83 Indeed, “once a Member State has 
opened its polling stations to Union citizens who lack its legal citizenship, what principled ground 
can it advance for refusing to consider the claims of other non-[]citizens to be admitted?”84 
It is true that the provisions granting voting rights to EU citizens in their country of 
residence introduced by the Maastricht Treaty were of such significance that constitutional 
amendments were required in a number of member states to ratify the pact.85 Hence, for example, 
Germany expressly introduced a clause allowing EU citizens to vote in local elections in its Basic 
Law86 and France did the same in Article 88-3 of its Constitution (where specific arrangements 
were also made to ensure that foreigners would neither be allowed to “exercise the role of major or 
deputy nor to participate in the designation of the senatorial electors or to the election of 
senators”).87 Still, logically speaking, by extending the franchise to certain non-citizens (second-
country nationals), these countries have compromised the claims in favour of the purity of the 
electoral body and opened the door for the extension of the suffrage to other classes of non-
citizens.88 
In addition, on the basis of the provisions of former Title V TEC, Directive 2003/109 on the 
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents was adopted in 2003.89 This 
framework legislation extends to third-country nationals many of the rights enjoyed by EU citizens 
(although with some exceptions, including voting rights),90 on the assumptions that “both 
experience similar forms of dislocation when they reside in a State where they lack the 
nationality.”91 Even though the directive sets only a minimum standard that can be overcome by 
more favourable national provisions, “the principle underpinning this [act] is that domicile 
generates entitlements both in the forms of equalization of the treatment of third country nationals 
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with nationals of the host Member State in socio-economic life and enhanced protection against 
expulsion as well as rights of mobility within the EU.”92  
In light of these developments at EU level, therefore, the disenfranchisements of permanent 
resident third-country nationals in some EU member states generates asymmetries across Europe:93 
Citizens of non-EU countries who reside for 5 years in a EU member state are automatically entitled 
to obtain long-term residence status; they enjoy a common core of rights; but, they can vote in local 
elections only if they happen to reside in a EU state which accords such a right.94 Although 
certainly EU law only sets a minimum standard for the treatment of aliens, it appears that greater 
coordination among member states would diminish the constitutional tensions that emerge from this 
account.95 As of today, however, it has to be regretted “that there is no common approach in all EU 
Member States to this issue.”96 
Otherwise, with the purpose of emphasizing the link between citizenship and voting rights, 
several authors have argued that instead of stressing the need for alien suffrage, citizenship should 
be made more easily available to third-country nationals permanently residing within the EU.97 
However, the EU currently has no power to directly grant EU citizenship to third-country 
nationals,98 and, since “each State’s law is simultaneously based on juridical traditions, nation-State 
building, international influences and the role played by migration”99 EU countries differ 
significantly in the specification of the criteria necessary to acquire national citizenship (and, iure 
tracto, EU citizenship).100 A tenet of international law is, after all, that the states are the sole 
authorities allowed to decide on what basis to grant their nationality.101 EU law, then, is mute on the 
matter and the ECJ has confirmed that the member states enjoy wide autonomy in the field.102 
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Generally, “citizenship can be acquired in any one of fours ways: by descent (jus sanguinis), 
by birthplace (jus soli), by naturalisation or by registration.”103 A detailed analysis of the legislation 
of the EU member states is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter:104 it may however be stressed 
that while the jus soli principle is predominant in the UK105 and Ireland and operates, in certain 
cases, in France106 and Germany,107 the jus sanguinis rule still prevails in continental Europe and 
Scandinavia.108 Naturalization is available in all member states but the number of years of residence 
required and the additional conditions (e.g. knowledge of history or language, loyalty oath, good 
character and renunciation of prior nationality) vary considerably between the EU countries.109 As a 
consequence, for third-country nationals, the acquisition of citizenship can turn out to be extremely 
difficult in several EU member states while being more straightforward in others. 
The variations among the laws of member states, however, is not without effects. On the 
contrary, it may generate unexpected externalities:110 once, in fact, a third-country national is able 
to acquire (relatively more easily) the citizenship of one of the EU member states (which, e.g. 
automatically grants citizenship to legal residents after a fixed and limited number of years, or on 
the basis of birth,111 or trough the amnesty of illegal immigrants) he obtains the rights attached to 
EU citizenship, including the rights to free movement and to some political participation also in 
other EU member states.112 “Granting national citizenship no longer concerns only one country, but 
also affects other members of the [EU].”113 Because of the interdependence of the states in the EU 
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legal framework, either some steps are taken to manage complex phenomena such as citizenship 
and voting rights or this incongruence will remain.114 
 
 To sum up, a number of tensions and challenges have emerged in the field of electoral rights 
for non-citizens in Europe because of the overlap and interplay between national and supranational 
law.115 Whereas, historically, the European states were sovereign in deciding the boundaries of their 
electorates, the development at the supranational level of a substantive body of laws extending 
voting rights to EU citizens residing outside their country of nationality has placed new limits on 
the autonomy of the member states.116 The establishment of a floor of protection of voting rights for 
non-citizens at the transnational level in Europe, has put under pressures those national laws and 
practices which constrain the electoral entitlements of second-country nationals and tout court 
exclude from the franchise third-country nationals, generating what I call a challenge of 
inconsistency. Are the dynamics arising in the European multilevel system from the interaction 




3. Comparative assessment: electoral rights for non-citizens in the US federal system 
 
The complex dynamics that have emerged in Europe because of the overlap and interplay between 
different states and transnational norms on citizenship and voting rights, while certainly peculiar in 
some respect, are not unique.117 Rather, comparable features seem to characterize the “federal 
experiences of countries […] founded in their respective beginnings on a voluntary association of 
their Member States.”118 In a comparative perspective, it is possible to argue, albeit with several 
caveats, that the tensions and challenges arising in the field of electoral rights for non-citizens in the 
European multilevel architecture are analogous to the dynamics at play in those federal systems in 
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which the competence over electoral rights and the power to define the boundaries of the polity 
have been the object of continuous contestation between the federation and its constituent states.119 
 This appears to be especially the case of the US.120 In the US federal experience, in fact, the 
scope of electoral rights for non-citizens has been historically conditioned by the interplay between 
state and federal rules and by the competition between a local and a transnational vision of 
citizenship and the polity. Whereas in the early phase of the federation, the constituent states were 
largely independent in defining who their peoples were and in regulating access to the franchise 
(both for state and federal elections), over time the federal government was granted increasing 
powers in the field of electoral rights to remedy perceived shortcomings in the regulation of the 
right to vote and to ensure greater consistency, especially in the electoral entitlements for citizens of 
the US moving from one state to the other of the federation. 
 From the methodological point of view,121 therefore, a comparison of the constitutional 
experience of the US federal system may be particularly useful in order to understand the dynamics 
and the developments at play in the field of citizenship and voting rights in Europe.122 Before 
undertaking this assessment, however, it is worth clarifying as a caveat that a comparison of the 
regulation of electoral rights for non-citizens in the European multilevel and the US federal systems 
neither implies that the two systems are identical nor suggests that they will inevitably evolve in the 
same way.123 As scholars of comparative federalism have correctly pointed out, “a comparison does 
not have to be based on the assumption of a complete identity of development. Its task is not to 
predict the future but to enlighten the present.”124 
 At the same time the US federal system and the European multilevel architecture share an 
important structural analogy: as I clarified in the opening chapter of this thesis, both systems feature 
a pluralist, heterarchical constitutional arrangement for the protection of fundamental rights, with 
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rights being simultaneously recognized at the state and federal or supranational levels and 
adjudicated by a plurality of institutions operating in these multiple layers.125 Hence, assessing in a 
comparative perspective how the issue of voting rights for non-citizens has historically been dealt 
with in the US constitutional system raises useful insights to understand the current European 
challenges and provides some cautionary tales to appreciate the possible scenarios that might open 
up in the future in the European multilevel human rights system.126 
 The US Constitution of 1787 “originally left voting rights, even in federal elections, in the 
hands of the states.”127 Consistent with the idea of a republican compound of states and peoples,128 
the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention rejected the hypothesis of establishing uniform electoral 
rules at the federal level,129 specifying instead in Article I, §2, cl.1 of the US Constitution that the 
members of the House of Representatives would be chosen by the “people of the several states, and 
the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous 
branch of the state legislature.” Since the Senate, until the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment 
in 1913, was also elected directly by the state legislatures, for all purposes this arrangement meant 
that it was for the states to decide who should be enfranchised, and that those eligible to vote at the 
state level were also able to cast ballots for the federal government.130 
Furthermore – whereas the Constitution made possession of US citizenship a condition to 
hold office in Congress and as US President131 and Article I, §8, cl 2 empowered Congress to make 
“a uniform rule of naturalization” – the original pact “contained no definition of national 
citizenship.”132 In this context, it was up to each of the constituent states to define the boundaries of 
its citizenry (and, by implication, of the federal polity) and to accord to its members a series of local 
entitlements, such as political rights. Article IV, §2, cl.1, however – rescuing a provision formerly 
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codified in the Articles of Confederation133 – affirmed that “the citizens of each state shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states,” with the purpose of 
ensuring that “the citizens of the states ceased to be foreigners for the other states of the new Union 
without becoming their citizens.”134 
The fact that for almost three-quarters of a century since the foundation of the US federation 
the states had almost total control on the rights of political participation, meant that the 
enfranchisement of non-citizens varied significantly across the US.135 On the one hand, several 
states introduced strict residency requirements aiming at preventing citizens of other US states 
(analogous to those called “second-country nationals” in EU parlance) who had recently moved in 
the state from participating in elections there.136 On the other hand, in other states voting rights were 
even extended to resident aliens (“third-country nationals”),137 including through judicial means.138 
As Jamin Raskin argued, “as a chapter in the history of American federalism, the period of alien 
suffrage reflected a conception of states as sovereign political entities. The states with alien suffrage 
allowed non-US citizens to participate in voting at all levels of American government, thereby 
turning them, explicitly, into ‘citizens’ of the state itself.”139 
The original US constitutional arrangement, began to reveal its limitations by the half of the 
19th century in connection with the thorny question of slavery. Since the 1770s a number of 
Northern states had granted state citizenship and voting rights to freed slaves,140 and it had remained 
largely unsettled whether the slave-states could challenge the “privileges and immunities” granted 
to freed slaves by free-states.141 In its infamous Dred Scott decision,142 however, the US Supreme 
Court destroyed this fragile compromise by stating that “negro[es] of African descent, […] who 
were brought into this country and sold as slaves”143 could never be part of the US polity. The 
decision of the Court contributed to the explosion of the Civil War, which eventually – after the 
victory of the Union – led to the abolition of slavery and to the adoption of two constitutional 
                                                 
133
 See V. Lippolis (n 119) 76 
134
 See Schönberger (n 118) 68 
135
 See Jamin Raskin, ‘Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: the Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien 
Suffrage’ (1993) 141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1391, 1395 
136
 See David Cocanower and David Rich, ‘Residency Requirement for Voting’ (1970) 12 Arizona Law Review 477, 
484 
137
 See V. Harper-Ho (n 130) 273; E. Brozovich (n 130) 408 
138
 See e.g. Stewart v. Foster, 2 Binn. 110 (Pa. 1809) 25 (Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding that resident aliens are 
entitled to vote as a matter of state law); Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 377, 408 (1840) (Illinois Supreme Court 
affirming that state constitution extended “the right of suffrage to those who, having by habitation and residence, 
identified their interests and feelings with the citizenry […] although they may be neither native nor adopted citizens”) 
139
 J. Raskin (n 135) 1397 
140
 See Pamela Karlan, ‘Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote’ (2003) 71 University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 1343, 1348 
141
 See V. Lippolis (n 119) 80 
142
 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 U.S. (How.) 393 (1857). For a detailed analysis of the facts preceding the case, the ruling, 
and its effects see Paul Finkelman, Dred Scott v. Sandford. A Brief History with Documents (Bedford 1997)  
143
 Dred Scott, at 404 
 118
amendments that profoundly reshaped the relationship between the states and the federal 
government in the field of citizenship and electoral rights.144 
The Fourteenth Amendment – by establishing that “all persons born or naturalized in the US 
[…] are citizens of the US and of the state wherein they reside” and by prohibiting the states from 
abridging the privilege and immunities of the citizens of the US or depriving them from the due 
process and the equal protection of the laws – “made state citizenship a matter of federal 
constitutional law, defining it simply as residence in a state”145 and simultaneously mandated the 
application of a federal standard of fundamental rights protection throughout the US.146 The 
Fifteenth Amendment – by barring the States from denying or abridging the right to vote of US 
citizens on “account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude” and by granting to 
Congress the power to enforce the provision by appropriate legislation – “marked the first time 
since the constitutional Convention in Philadelphia that the national government of the US grappled 
directly and extensively with the issues of voting rights.”147 
Yet, if the Reconstruction amendments sanctioned the involvement of the federal 
government in the field of electoral rights, they did not effectively prevent many states from 
continuing to disenfranchise large parts of their population throughout the Jim Crow era.148 At the 
same time, in the 1904 case Pope v. Williams149, the US Supreme Court confirmed that the states 
still enjoyed autonomy in regulating the suffrage of “second-country nationals”, since “the privilege 
to vote in a state is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be exercised as the state may direct 
and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made 
between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution.”150 States, moreover, also retained the 
power to enfranchise non-US citizens for local purposes and the Supreme Court upheld this practice 
in Minor v. Happerset:151 by the 1920s, however, the tradition virtually disappeared.152  
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The tilt “toward the nationalization of the right to vote”153 only occurred in the US during 
the 20th century. The Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments to the US 
Constitution successively forbade the states from denying or abridging the right to vote of US 
citizens by reason of sex, failure to pay poll taxes or age.154 Moreover, finally relying on the 
enforcement powers set by the Fifteenth Amendment, in the 1950s Congress started to enact a series 
of Voting Rights Acts aiming at ensuring effective participation at the polls to all US citizens.155 
The federal judiciary then played a “central role”156 in authorizing and supporting “what amounted 
to a federal takeover of state voting laws:”157 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Voting Rights legislation158 and subjected to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment all restrictive voting qualifications set up by the states. 159 
The assumption by the federal government of “full responsibility”160 in guaranteeing voting 
rights had major consequences for the enfranchisement of US citizens residing in another state of 
US. In Dunn v. Blumstein161 the US Supreme Court struck down a Tennessee law, requiring 
residency in the state for one year as a prerequisite for voting, for violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause and the right to interstate travel.162 According to the Court, 
indeed, the state’s durational residency requirements “impermissibly condition[ed] and penalize[d] 
the right to travel by imposing their prohibitions on only those [US citizens] who have recently 
exercised that right [and…] forc[ing] a person who wishes to travel and change residence to choose 
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between travel and the basic right to vote.”163 Denying that the states could have a compelling 
interest in preserving “the purity of the ballot box”164 the Court made clear that the right of 
participation in the democratic process ought to be guaranteed to US citizens anywhere they moved 
in the US. 
On the contrary, the expansion of federal competences in the field of electoral law did not 
directly benefit aliens (“third-country nationals”) as the power to enfranchise non-US citizens has 
remained within the purview of the US states.165 Nevertheless, although recent trends have 
highlighted a renewed interest for immigrant suffrage at the local level,166 the issue of voting rights 
for non-US citizens was mainly dealt with indirectly through the adoption by Congress of uniform 
federal naturalization rules that facilitate the acquisition of US citizenship – and with it of electoral 
rights.167 Whereas citizenship has always been ensured in the US to second-generation immigrants 
by the application of unconditional jus soli,168 since 1952 requirements for naturalization have been 
eased and made non-discriminatory for all permanent resident aliens.169 
 
In sum, a short assessment of the regulation of electoral rights for non-citizens in the US 
federal system reveals an evolving pattern. Whereas the US states were originally sovereign in 
deciding the boundaries of the suffrage, and were endowed with quite diversified laws on the 
matter, a series of constitutional transformations establishing the primacy of federal citizenship over 
state citizenship170 and constraining states’ autonomy in the field of electoral rights171 have step by 
step expanded the competence of the federal government in the regulation of the franchise. As a 
result, some of the tensions that had characterized the US regime of electoral rights for non-citizens 
have been solved. Today, especially, US citizens can move from one US state to another and 
participate in all state and federal elections held in their state of residency under conditions of 
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equality.172 No federal standard, instead, provides for the enfranchisement of non-US citizens, but 
alien residents can easily acquire US citizenship through a uniform federal procedure and thus 
become part of the US electorate.173  
 
 
4. Recent developments: the case law of the European Court of Justice 
 
A comparative assessment of the US federal experience reveals several similarities in the 
constitutional dynamics at play in the US and Europe. Firstly, both in the US and in Europe the 
regulation of electoral rights for non-citizens has been characterized by tensions and challenges: in 
the US, the interplay between different state and federal rules historically produced contestations 
over the conception of the polity and the meaning of the right to vote analogous to those 
experienced in contemporary Europe. Secondly, both in the US and Europe, electoral right regimes 
appear to evolve incrementally, with inconsistencies surfacing and being addressed over a long time 
span and through the concerted action of a plurality of institutions. Hence, in the US, despite the 
enactment of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the 1860s, it was only in the 1960s that 
Congress and the federal courts took the decisive step to ensure that the right to vote for US citizens 
would not be jeopardized when they travelled from one state to another of the US.174 
At the same time, however, major differences remain. Beside the peculiar link that in the US 
exists between electoral reforms and the struggle for African-Americans enfranchisement,175 there 
are structural diversities between the US and the European systems that can hardly be minimized. 
For instance, whereas as previously mentioned in Section 2 in Europe member states are still 
sovereign in defining their nationality laws, the US Constitution – as the basic text of a new-
founded community made of immigrants – originally gave Congress the power to adopt a uniform 
naturalization rule, significantly changing the framework in which the demands for alien suffrage 
took place.176 In addition, a series of subsequent developments have transformed the US voting 
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rights system in a way still unknown to Europe. Constitutional amendments, legal reforms and a 
stronger political awareness of the need to address the challenge of voting rights as a single national 
democratic problem, eventually led to the establishment of a more consistent political rights regime 
in the US.177  
It is difficult to predict whether Europe will experience a comparable development. A 
number of legal changes have recently taken place in Europe, mainly as a result of the 
jurisprudential and legal transformations occurring in the EU legal order. On the one hand, the EU 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and the ECtHR have expanded their case law in the field of electoral rights 
for non-citizens. On the other, the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty has introduced some 
discrete innovations in the discipline of EU citizenship which could prospectively affect the 
regulation of voting rights for EU citizens. Despite their potential future relevance, nevertheless, 
these transformations do not yet evidence an evolutionary trend in Europe akin to that experienced 
in the US. From this point of view, additional transformations in EU law would appear to be 
required to address the main challenges and inconsistencies that afflict the regulation of voting 
rights for non-citizens in the European multilevel architecture.  
The issue of the disenfranchisement of EU citizens was at the heart of several decisions of 
both the ECtHR and the ECJ.178 Already in Matthews179 the ECtHR had to decide whether the UK 
Act for the election of the EU Parliament, by depriving a British citizen residing in Gibraltar of the 
right to vote, violated Article 3 of the 1st additional Protocol of the ECHR.180 The ECtHR declared 
the case admissible, arguing that the UK was responsible under the ECHR “for securing the rights 
guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in Gibraltar regardless of whether the elections were 
purely domestic or European.”181 On the merit, it found that the EU Parliament contributed to the 
achievement of the principle of “effective political democracy”182 protected by the ECHR and that it 
was therefore for the ECtHR “to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Protocol 
No. 1 ha[d] been complied with.”183 While recognizing that “the State enjoys a wide margin of 
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appreciation”184 on electoral issues, then, the ECtHR ruled that “in the circumstances of the present 
case, the very essence of the applicant’s right to vote […] was denied.”185 
Similarly, in Aruba,186 the ECJ subjected to strict scrutiny a Dutch law disenfranchising 
Dutch nationals residing in the Dutch overseas territory of Aruba from the elections for the EU 
Parliament.187 Since the petitioners could “rely on the rights conferred on citizens of the EU,”188 the 
ECJ addressed the question whether “a citizen of the EU resident or living in an overseas territory 
has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the EU Parliament,”189 with the 
understanding that “the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to stand for election falls 
within the competence of each Member State [but] in compliance with Community law.”190 Given 
that the Dutch law unreasonably withheld voting rights for Dutch nationals residing in Aruba while 
allowing expatriate citizens residing in other non-member countries to vote for the EU Parliament, 
however, the ECJ concluded that the Netherlands had unduly violated the general “principle of 
equal treatment or non-discrimination.”191 
At the same time, in Gibraltar192 (a case decided on the same day of Aruba and that had 
originated as a follow up to Matthews)193 the ECJ upheld the decision of a member state to extend 
the franchise for the EU Parliament to third-country nationals.194 Whereas Spain complained that 
the UK – in amending its electoral Act to comply with Matthews – had violated EU law by 
extending the franchise for the EU Parliament to non-EU citizens, i.e. qualified Commonwealth 
citizens, resident in Gibraltar, the ECJ rejected the argument that EU primary law excluded “a 
person who is not a citizen of the EU, such as a qualified Commonwealth citizen resident in 
Gibraltar, from being entitled to the right to vote and stand for election”195 to the EU Parliament. 
The ECJ, on the contrary, affirmed that the electoral “rights recognised by the Treaty are [not 
necessarily] limited to citizens of the EU.”196 
Taken together these decisions evidence a rising role of the ECJ and the ECtHR in the field 
of voting rights and demonstrate how “the creation of a Europe-wide personal status of citizen of 
the EU can result in a quite substantial intrusion into the national electoral sovereignty of the 
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Member States.”197 While Gibraltar (like Minor v. Happerset in the US context) affirmed the 
autonomy of the member states in expanding the franchise to third-country nationals, Aruba and 
Matthews asserted the authority of the ECJ and of the ECtHR in reviewing the reasonableness of the 
states’ disenfranchisement of EU citizens residing abroad.198 These precedents could therefore plant 
the seeds for future developments in judicial review of national laws and practices restricting the 
suffrage of EU citizens. At the same time, one needs to be aware that all cases dealt with the reach 
of voting rights for the EU Parliament and concerned quite specific issue (linked to the peculiar 
status of the overseas territories of Gibraltar and Aruba). It is uncertain therefore whether these 
decisions will produce long-term effects in the regulation of electoral rights at the EU level. 
Similar cautions must surround the appreciation of the innovations introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty. The entry into force of the new EU pact on 1st December 2009 has not brought about path-
breaking reforms to the substance of EU citizens’ rights.199 Despite bringing human rights at the 
core of the European integration project (by attributing binding value to the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and requiring the accession of the EU to the ECHR),200 the Lisbon Treaty 
leaves unmodified the voting rights clauses originally codified in the TEC and does not grant 
additional competences to the EU in the field of electoral law.201 Nevertheless, following the case 
law of the ECJ – which began around 10 years ago to state that EU citizenship “is destined to be the 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States”202 – the Lisbon Treaty has maintained an 
amendment to the definition of EU citizenship originally proposed during the Constitutional 
Convention.203  
As already mentioned,204 Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU (replacing former Article 17 TEC) 
now state that EU citizenship “shall be additional to […] national citizenship” – with the wording 
“shall be additional to” replacing “shall complement”. “This seems a very small and cosmetic 
amendment. It was however done for a reason and it is submitted that this modification supports a 
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move towards a more independent Union citizenship.”205 Whereas a complementary EU citizenship 
cannot exist in the absence of a national citizenship,206 “if EU citizenship is additional to national 
citizenship, then there might one day be EU citizenship without national citizenship.”207 This 
innovation has a potential relevance on the regulation of electoral rights for EU citizens as an 
expanded conception of EU citizenship could be the basis for future decisions by the ECJ aimed at 
increasing the degree of protection of voting rights for EU citizens who reside in another member 
state. 
A number of very recent judicial pronouncements, reveal that the ECJ appears willing to 
make use of the concept of EU citizenship in order to expand fundamental rights standards 
protected under EU law even to situations traditionally regarded as falling within the exclusive 
purview of the member states. The Zambrano208 case is a recent and well-known evidence in this 
regard.209 In the case, the ECJ had to confront a challenge against a Belgian order of expulsion of a 
non-EU national, father of a child holding Belgian nationality (and thus EU citizenship) who had 
never exercised his free movement rights.210 In the case, Advocate General (AG) Sharpston 
provided a very detailed and sophisticated motivation to conclude that the rights connected to the 
EU citizenship status had to be recognized even to individuals who had not exercised their free 
movement rights.211 And the ECJ found in favour of the applicant, squarely concluding that Article 
20 TFEU “precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of 
the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of 
the Union.”212   
Emphasizing the central role of EU citizenship in an enlarged Europe, therefore, Dimitry 
Kochenov has argued that the ECJ should review national electoral laws denying expatriate voting: 
these legal measures, by disenfranchising from national elections EU citizens who have moved to 
another EU state, “discourage[] EU citizens from moving from their Member States of nationality 
to other Member States”213 and unduly burden their right to free movement214 (i.e. the EU 
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equivalent of the right to interstate travel in the US). An indirect support for this position has been 
provided by the First Section of the ECtHR, which, in its 2010 decision in Sitaropulos & 
Giakoumopoulos v. Greece,215 held that the impossibility for Greek citizens living abroad to 
exercise their right to vote in the Greek parliamentary elections amounted to a violation of Article 3 
of the 1st additional Protocol to the ECHR. The case had been brought by Greek officials of the 
Council of Europe, who were complaining “that in order to exercise their right to vote, [they] would 
have to incur substantial travelling expenses and that considerable disruption could be caused to 
their family.”216 In ruling in favour of the applicants, the ECtHR put major stress on the fact that the 
Greek Constitution did include a provision to extend voting rights to expatriate citizens, but that this 
requirement had remained, without justification, unimplemented for “approximately thirty-five 
years.”217 
Nevertheless, the decision of the First Section was recently overruled by the Grand Chamber 
of the ECtHR in a March 2012 judgment.218 In this decision, the ECtHR remarked how “there are 
numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, 
in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each 
Contracting State to mould into its own democratic vision.”219 The ECtHR hence approached the 
question “whether Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 places States under an obligation to introduce a 
system enabling expatriate citizens to exercise their voting rights from abroad”220 by considering 
“the relevant international and comparative law […and] the domestic law of the country 
concerned.”221 After a deep survey of these transnational sources, however, the ECtHR affirmed 
that “none of the legal instruments examined […] forms a basis for concluding that, as the law 
currently stands, States are under an obligation to enable citizens living abroad to exercise the right 
to vote.”222 In addition, the ECtHR exercised a form of judicial restraint, underlying how it was not 
“its task to indicate to the [Greek] authorities at what time and in what manner they should give 
                                                                                                                                                                  
214
 Among the ECJ’s decisions reviewing states’ measures which burden the EU citizens’ freedom of movement see 
Case C-192/95 Tas-Hagen en Tas [2006] ECR I-10451 (declaring contrary to EU free movement rights a Dutch law 
which granted a pension to Dutch civilian war victims only if they reside in the Netherlands); Joined Cases C-11 and C-
12/06 Morgan [2007] ECR I-9161 (declaring contrary to EU free movement rights a German law which set as a 
condition for the obtainment of an educational grant for studying in another member state that the studies are 
continuation of the educational activity pursued for at least one year in the home member state)  
215
 Sitaropulos & Giakoumopoulos v. Greece, ECHR [2010], Application No. 42202/07 
216
 Ibid par 39 
217
 Ibid par 41 
218
 Sitaropulos & Giakoumopoulos v. Greece (No. 2), ECHR [2012], Application No. 42202/07 (GC) 
219
 Ibid par 66 
220
 Ibid par 70 
221
 Ibid par 71 
222
 Ibid par 75. The ECtHR however mentions the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1459 (2005) 
par 3 (encouraging states to give “due regard […] to the voting of citizens living abroad.”) 
 127 
effect to [the provision on voting rights for expatriates of the state] Constitution.”223 Hence, despite 
remarking that “the presumption that non-resident citizens are less directly or less continually 
concerned with the country’s day-to-day problems and have less knowledge of them […] does not 
[…] apply in the instant case”224 the Grand Chamber concluded that “there ha[d] been no breach of 
[the ECHR].”225 
Given the restraint exercised by the ECtHR, it is therefore difficult to predict whether the 
ECJ will be willing to swiftly expand its oversight over states franchise laws to ensure greater 
protection for the voting rights of EU citizens (as second-country nationals). As the example of the 
US cautions, the Supreme Court for almost a century refused to scrutinize states’ electoral laws, 
despite the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment had clearly established the supremacy of federal 
over states’ citizenship. As the recent Rottmann226 decision of the ECJ makes clear, otherwise, the 
EU judiciary is far from establishing in a praetorian way the primacy and autonomy of EU 
citizenship over national citizenship, absent an amendment to the EU treaties.227 While the 
petitioner in the case had challenged the compatibility of a national administrative decision 
depriving him of German citizenship (and thus of EU citizenship) because it has acquired it with 
fraud,228 the ECJ found “the legitimacy, in principle, of a decision withdrawing naturalisation on 
account of deception […even] when the consequence of that withdrawal is that the person in 
question loses, in addition to the nationality of the Member State of naturalisation, citizenship of the 
Union.”229 
Moreover, it can be questioned whether the action of the ECJ in reviewing state electoral 
laws as suggested in the literature230 might achieve truly satisfactory results: were the ECJ to review 
under its free movement jurisprudence the states’ laws disenfranchising EU citizens moving in 
another EU state, in fact, its decision could only force member states to introduce provisions for 
expatriate voting. Yet, this effect is the opposite of that achieved by the US Supreme Court in its 
Dunn v. Blumstein decision and seems to go against the logic – which was mentioned also by the 
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Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Sitaropulos & Giakoumopoulos v. Greece through a reference to 
the writings of Jürgen Habermas – that residence on a territory should be the decisive (albeit not the 
only one) criterion for the attribution of voting rights.231 Whereas, in fact, the Supreme Court forced 
the state of residence to enfranchise all resident US citizens, a review by the ECJ of state franchise 
laws under the freedom of movement provisions of the EU Treaty, would only compel the state of 
nationality to grant absentee ballots to its expatriate citizens without, however, empowering them to 
vote in their new EU state of residence. 
 
As a consequence, it seems that only additional developments within the European 
multilevel architecture would be capable of providing a satisfactory answer to the inconsistencies 
emerging in the field of electoral rights for non-citizens. The transformations brought about by the 
recent jurisprudence of the ECJ and the ECtHR and by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
have opened several interesting scenarios concerning the protection of electoral rights for non-
citizens. Yet these developments reveal that the European electoral rights regime is still afflicted by 
a number of unresolved tensions and inconsistencies. As the US experience in the field of electoral 
rights for non-citizens demonstrates, however, constitutional change in a complex federal system is 
an ever-ongoing process, subject to incremental developments rather than revolutionary breaks.232  
 
 
5. Future prospects: beyond the Lisbon Treaty 
 
From the investigation undertaken in the previous Section it appears that only additional 
transformations in EU law would be capable of providing a satisfactory answer to the challenge of 
inconsistency emerging in the field of electoral rights for non-citizens in Europe. De jure condendo, 
it might be advisable for the member states and the EU institutions to tackle the democratic 
challenge posed by the enfranchisement of non-citizens by devising further changes in the structure 
of European law.233 This Section will attempt to advance, on the basis of a comparative institutional 
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analysis,234 several proposals that may be appreciated as a useful step to increase the consistency of 
the European electoral rights regime.  
In particular, the following two proposals will be advanced. First, to address the challenge 
generated by the overlap of the EU provisions enfranchising EU citizens (only) in local and EU 
elections and the national rules denying expatriate voting, it will be argued that residence should 
become the basis for the exercise of electoral rights at the national level: a citizen of one EU 
member state who resides in another EU member state should have the right to vote (also) for the 
general elections in the member state of residence.  
Second, to address the challenge posed by the right to vote of third-country nationals 
permanently residing in the EU, it will be maintained that either a minimum harmonization of the 
national laws on local elections should be undertaken or the power to make laws on naturalization 
should be shifted to the EU: a third-country national should either benefit from voting rights (at 
least) at the local level in any EU member state or have the chance to acquire EU citizenship 
through a uniform EU-governed process.  
 These proposals draw cautionary tales from the US constitutional experience. Indeed, it was 
highlighted in Section 3 that in the US, step by step, residence has become the basis for the exercise 
of electoral rights for state and federal elections.235 Whereas originally state citizenship was the 
condition for the exercise of the franchise, the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause236 and 
the increasing nationalization of electoral rights through the activities of the federal government237 
made voting rights a pure incident of habitation, so that today any individual who holds US federal 
citizenship can participate in all elections in the state in which he resides. Otherwise, on the issue of 
alien suffrage, US history shows that while for a long time states autonomously decided whether to 
extend the franchise to immigrants,238 in the last century the main avenue pursued in this respect has 
been the attribution of national citizenship through a uniform naturalization rule set by Congress.239 
The analysis of the US experience also offers some insightful indications as to which level 
of government, and which institutions in it, can best be trusted to realize successful reforms in the 
field of voting rights and citizenship. Hence, in the US, over time it became “abundantly clear to 
both Congress and the courts that universal suffrage would not be achieved by the decentralized 
actions of the fifty states, each with its own historical legacy, its own political conflicts, its own 
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minorities, and special issues. If the polity was going to be democratized, it would require action by 
the national government.”240 Indeed it was through the adoption of a series of revisions to the 1787 
Constitution241 and through the incremental involvement of the federal government in those 
domains—citizenship and electoral law—that were originally believed to be state’s prerogatives242 
that the problems of voting rights were historically addressed in the US. 
On the other hand, within the federal government—notwithstanding the central role that 
courts have played, especially since the 1950s, in ensuring the effectiveness of the right to vote243 
—it has been the political branches of government who have led the efforts in the promotion of 
electoral rights.244 As already argued, for long periods of US history “the voteless fared much better 
appealing to the people and to the legislative, as opposed to the judicial, process. The Supreme 
Court gave us Dred Scott […] but Congress and two-thirds of the states gave us the Fifteenth 
amendment and women’s suffrage.”245 Today, the responsiveness of the federal judiciary to 
electoral rights’ claims has increased steadily and “the Supreme Court’s view ran remarkably 
parallel to those of Congress.”246 Still, the elected branches keep the leading position in the policy 
areas of voting rights as well as of citizenship and migration.247 
Correspondingly, in designing proposals for a reform of the European multilevel system, the 
emphasis will be placed on the potential role of the supranational institutions: the nature of the 
problems of inconsistency emerging in the field of electoral law for non-citizens and the fragmented 
answers of the member states show that coherent action can be taken only at the EU level.248 
Otherwise, although the role of the ECJ should not be diminished, it will be claimed that the EU 
pouvoir constituant should be directly at the forefront of the reform efforts, through amendments to 
the EU treaties.249 
Indeed, as it was highlighted in the previous Section, the ECJ has played in the last few 
years a remarkable role in enhancing the meaning and reach of EU citizenship250 and electoral 
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rights,251 and the possibility of further involvement of the European judiciary in the field should not 
be underestimated. Nevertheless, as indicated above, judicial remedies also have some important 
drawbacks as they seem to be capable of achieving only second-best solutions that do not solve the 
problems of inconsistency entirely. More fundamentally, though, it is the inherent democratic 
dimension of the issue of electoral rights which requires democratic institutions (before unelected 
courts) to take on the burden of appropriately addressing the democratic challenges that the right to 
vote for non-citizens poses.252 
Beyond the institutional issue, it is argued that the proposals advanced here can offer a 
satisfactory solution to the challenge of inconsistency that were identified in Section 2. As 
previously highlighted, a first major tension arises in the European multilevel system because, as 
the law now stands, citizens of a EU member state may vote only for municipal and supranational 
elections when they reside in a member state of which they are not citizens. EU law, however, does 
not define what municipal election means. Moreover, EU law does not grant EU citizens electoral 
rights at the national level in their country of residence and, if their country of nationality denies 
expatriate voting, they inevitably become disenfranchised. A first proposal for reform, therefore, 
would be to amend the EU treaties in order to substantially increase the floor of protection currently 
ensured to non-citizens voting by EU law, extending electoral rights also for general elections to 
non-citizens holding the nationality of another EU member states and permanently residing in the 
EU country concerned.253 
This proposal would address the inconsistencies that emerge in the regulation of electoral 
rights for second-country nationals by making residence the core condition for the exercise of 
voting rights.254 This is also the case in the US, where “the terms citizens and residents are 
considered essentially interchangeable”255 since the adoption of the Fourteenth amendment. The 
Supreme Court has confirmed that states have almost no discretion on this issue by striking down in 
Dunn v. Blumstein a state provision that required residency in the state for one year as a prerequisite 
for voting.256 If this proposal were enforced, the current contradictions affecting voting rights for 
EU citizens expatriated in another EU country would be overcome. EU citizens residing in another 
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EU member state would not risk being deprived of the opportunity to express their voices in the 
choice of a national legislature where their home country denies expatriate voting: instead, they 
would be entitled to full political participation anywhere in the EU, no matter what their national 
origin is.257 
A second tension in the European multi-tiered electoral architecture is generated because, as 
the law now stands, third-country nationals legally residing in the EU enjoy a set of fundamental 
rights that is common to all EU member states on the basis of Directive 2003/109 but their 
enfranchisement (even for local elections) varies depending on the legislation or the international 
agreements adopted by the country in which they happen to reside since no real transnational 
minimum standard is currently in force Europe-wide. To address this situation, two alternative 
proposals can be envisaged: On the one hand, the EU institutions could enact legislation to ensure 
voting rights at the local level for all permanent-resident third-country nationals;258 on the other – 
more structurally – the member states could empower the EU to enact a uniform naturalization law 
by which aliens could acquire directly EU citizenship and rights.259 
These set of proposals would address the inconsistencies that emerge in the regulation of 
electoral rights for third-country nationals. The first alternative would secure alien suffrage at the 
local level throughout Europe,260 and could be reached either by expanding the scope of Directive 
2003/109 or by requiring EU states to sign the CPFPL. An EU-led harmonization of member states’ 
provisions on foreigners’ suffrage would indeed repeal the unreasonable asymmetries that currently 
exist. The second alternative would allow third-country nationals to acquire EU citizenship 
following a EU-based naturalization process and, thereafter, exercise electoral rights. This solution 
would mirror the original US one,261 where electoral rights are now conditioned by the possession 
of US citizenship, but the latter automatically stems from birth on US soil or can be acquired by 
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right at the conditions set by the federal naturalization Act.262 If such a proposal were enforced, the 
current incoherencies plaguing voting rights for third-country nationals would be resolved by 
indirectly integrating them in the EU electorate.263 
Needless to say, these proposals are simple scholarly suggestions on possible ways to 
address the challenges posed by voting rights in a multilevel constitutional architecture. The issue 
of the expansion of voting rights for second-country and third-country nationals in the EU seems to 
have recently returned at the center of the attention of scholars and policy-makers, and this chapter 
hopes to contribute to this new debate.264 Nevertheless, it is submitted that a consensus among the 
European institutional actors would be required to translate any proposal from academic exercise to 
actual policy reforms and I am well aware that no agreement seems to exist on these issues at the 
moment.265 Otherwise, it is clear that any future discussion about the legal tools to overcome the 
tensions of the European electoral rights regime will have to address also the broader question of 
the nature of the European political community.266 Indeed, there are at least two competing visions 
about the purpose of the European integration project and the choice between them will determine 
which path the EU voting rights regime might follow.267  
One vision considers the European project exclusively as an international arrangement of 
limited scope. For those who agree with this view, there are valuable arguments to sacrifice further 
consistency in the regulation of electoral rights for non-citizens on the shrine of national 
sovereignty. Another vision, on the contrary, conceives the ultimate goal of European experiment to 
be the creation of a borderless polity in which EU citizens can enjoy equal constitutional rights. 
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Those who support this alternative idea, hence, regard, e.g., as “arguably wholly inconsistent for the 
EU and the Member States to [enfranchise, EU citizens] in relation to local and European 
[elections] whilst ignoring the impact upon democratic participation in national elections.”268 In this 
view, in fact, “eligibility to vote and stand as candidates at the national elections in the Member 
State of residence […] should logically be the ultimate goal of the development of European 
citizenship.”269 Since these visions are based on conflicting understandings of the finality of 
European integration, the remedies that they advance to address the challenges of citizenship and 
electoral rights shape opposite prospects for the future political identity of Europe and the 
legitimacy of its transnational democracy. 
 
In conclusion, there are several possible responses to the challenge of inconsistency that 
affect the picture of voting rights in the European multilevel system of human rights protection. By 
analyzing the US experience and its developments, one may advance some proposals to reform the 
law. It appears that the EU is in a relatively more adequate position to manage the inconsistency 
appropriately. Similarly, although measures could perhaps be adopted at the jurisprudential level, it 
seems that the most effective transformations would take place through constitutional reforms rather 
than through the activity of the courts. To this end, a proposal would be to amend EU law in order 
to extend to national elections the right to vote of EU citizens residing in another EU member state 
and to enfranchise in local elections third-country nationals who have a long-term residence permit 
in the EU. Whether a similar agreement could be reached by the relevant institutional actor is 
difficult to predict. The success of any future reform of the EU electoral rights regime, however, 





This chapter has analyzed the regulation of electoral rights for non-citizens in the European 
multilevel constitutional architecture. Its purpose has been to examine the constitutional dynamics 
that emerge in the field of electoral rights for non-citizens from the complex interaction between 
national and transnational law in Europe, in a comparative perspective with the US federal 
experience. The chapter has argued that the overlap and the interplay between domestic and 
supranational law has produced new challenges and pressures in the field of electoral rights for non-
citizens. In particular, it has been maintained that the development of a substantive body of laws 
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regulating voting rights beyond the states has placed under strain those domestic laws and practices 
constraining the electoral entitlements of second-country nationals or tout court disenfranchising 
third-country nationals. 
A summary review of national legislation regulating voting rights for non-citizens has 
revealed the existence of significant horizontal differences among the EU member states on the 
issue of alien suffrage. Whereas there are countries which have adopted a broad conception of the 
franchise, extending voting rights to non-citizens even in national elections, in other member states 
an extremely restrictive approach has traditionally prevailed, preventing any extension of the 
suffrage to aliens. Despite these variations among the EU countries, however, since the 1990s 
member states have lost their full sovereignty on the issue of electoral rights for non-citizens as a 
consequence of the growing impact of supranational law. While the CPFPL has enhanced the right 
of political participation for third-country nationals at the local level, the EU Treaty has established 
a right for second-country nationals who permanently reside in another EU member state to cast a 
ballot in local and EU elections in their member state of residence.  
This complex overlap of domestic and supranational laws has created new tensions and 
inconsistencies in the picture of electoral rights for non-citizens in Europe. EU law, in particular, 
has put under pressure restrictive domestic electoral laws, bringing to light cases of asymmetries 
and discriminations in the electoral entitlements of second and third country nationals. As I have 
claimed, however, this challenge of inconsistency is not sui generis: rather, it is reflected in the US 
federal experience. In the original US constitutional arrangement, competence on electoral rights for 
non-citizens was reserved to the states, which had widely diverging laws. Through a series of 
constitutional, legislative and judicial reforms, however, the federal government step by step 
intervened in the regulation of the electoral rights of non-citizens, especially in order to ensure that 
US citizens could enjoy voting rights for all elections in any state in which they resided. The power 
to extend voting rights to third-country nationals, instead, still today belongs the states, but the 
federation has been empowered since its foundation to enact a general naturalization Act that allows 
aliens to become US citizens, and acquire electoral rights, by following a uniform procedure. 
In light of the US example, the developments triggered in Europe by the recent case law of 
the ECJ and the ECtHR and by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty seem to open possible 
interesting scenarios for the future but do not entirely address the existing challenges in the field of 
electoral rights for non-citizens. From this point of view, additional reforms of EU law might be 
advisable but remain inextricably linked to what vision of the European political project will prevail 
in the future. As an early observer of the US constitutional system noticed, “there is no more 
invariable rule in the history of society: the further electoral rights are extended the greater is the 
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need for extending them: for after each concession the strength of democracy increases and its 
demands increases with its strength.”270 Whether Europe will follow this pattern as well remains a 
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In a celebrated chapter of the Integration Through Law series, the late EUI Professor Mauro 
Cappelletti explained how, both in the United States (US) and in the (then) European Communities 
(EC) – now the European Union (EU) – the federal/supranational judiciary played a major role in 
the creation of a free common market.1 In another chapter of the same volume it was also 
emphasized how “free trade and judicial review appear to be natural allies in federal systems of 
government, just as the reality of judicial review tends to be associated with federalism. Judicial 
review, as the American and European Founders realized, is potentially a powerful tool in the 
creation of any integrated economy. It seems uniquely capable of filling in the gaps of a constitution 
whose ostensible purpose is to break down trade barriers among states.”2 For more than twenty 
years since these words were written, the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) has continued contributing to 
fostering economic integration in Europe.3 Nevertheless, increasingly in the last few years, the free 
market jurisprudence of the ECJ has come under scrutiny for the significant challenges that it poses 
to the protection of social and labour rights at the state level.4 Although the ECJ has committed 
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itself to protecting social rights,5 its case law has been criticized for striking an inadequate balance 
between economic freedoms and labour rights and for undermining the protection that workers 
enjoy within the EU member states.6 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the complex interaction between free market 
principles and social rights guarantees in federalism-based constitutional systems by studying the 
protection of the right to strike in Europe in a comparative perspective with the US.7 In particular, 
the chapter explores the tensions that emerge from the overlap and interplay between state law and 
EU law in the regulation of the right to strike and its possible solutions.8 As I argue, EU member 
states have traditionally devised diverse regimes for the protection of the right to strike. The 
development of a judge-made standard for the protection of the right to strike at the EU level, 
however, has significantly challenged the national regulations in the field, highlighting points of 
friction between the conceptions of industrial action allowed at the supranational level and at the 
domestic level. Recently, the ECJ has acknowledged the existence of a fundamental right to strike 
at the EU level.9 The ECJ, however, has balanced the right to strike with the need to ensure a free 
market throughout Europe in which commerce can flow unhinderedly. This has led to a more 
restrictive standard for the protection of the right to strike at EU level than that of many EU member 
states. In other words, because of the growing impact of EU law in the regulation of strike law, the 
effectiveness of the protection of collective labour rights within a significant number of EU member 
states has been challenged. 
As this chapter claims, the difficulties that Europe is currently experiencing in protecting 
collective labour rights are not sui generis. A comparative perspective reveals that tensions between 
competing fundamental rights standards are a recurrent feature of federal arrangements premised on 
the establishment of a free market. Hence, dynamics analogous to those at play in Europe have also 
historically characterized the US because of the interplay between state and federal law. In the early 
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20th century, industrial action in the US was entirely regulated at the state level as the federal 
government lacked regulatory powers in the field of welfare. Federal courts, nevertheless, 
scrutinized collective action for compliance with federal principles of freedom of commerce and 
antitrust. Although the Supreme Court ruled that the US Constitution protected a right to strike, it 
placed serious restrictions on the effective exercise of this right. This state of affairs changed 
dramatically during the New Deal. In the effort to address an unprecedented economic crisis, the 
federal government embraced new powers in the field of labour legislation. A major piece in the 
New Deal puzzle was represented by the Wagner Act,10 a statute which overhauled the regulation of 
industrial relations by setting a federal standard for the protection of the right to strike. Technically 
drafted as an instrument to foster inter-state commerce, the Wagner Act was a successful attempt to 
address the tensions resulting from state labour laws and federal free market principles. Although 
subsequently weakened by congressional amendments and judicial constructions, the Wagner Act 
originally struck a revolutionary balance between social rights and the free market in the US, 
introducing a legislative standard for the protection of industrial action at the federal level. 
 In light of the comparative examination of the US experience in the field of strike law, this 
chapter examines whether, and how, the challenges taking place in the European multilevel system 
can be addressed. To this end, I consider the most recent transformations taking place in the 
framework of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In two milestone decisions, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has recently recognized that collective bargaining and 
collective action are fundamental rights protected under the ECHR.11 This development in the case 
law of the ECtHR, coupled with the entry into force of the EU Lisbon Reform Treaty in 2009, may 
represent a major force for change in the protection of the right to strike at the supranational level in 
Europe. The Lisbon Treaty, in fact, has established an obligation for the EU to accede the ECHR 
and, once the accession will be completed, EU institutions will be subject to review by the ECtHR. 
This may incentive the ECJ to revise its right to strike jurisprudence in a way that is more protective 
of labour rights along the lines drawn by the ECtHR. Yet, a number of uncertainties surround the 
effect of the accession agreement and it is difficult to predict with certainty whether the 
transformations taking place in the ECHR will offer a fully satisfactory answer to the challenges of 
ineffectiveness that currently characterize the field of strike law. From this point of view, additional 
legislative developments at the EU level might be necessary, and even advisable, if Europe wants to 
address the federal dilemma of how to balance free market rules and social rights guarantees in a 
more legitimate way.  
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 The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1, I outline the national regimes for the 
protection of the right to strike in Europe, identifying the main regulatory models and the relevant 
differences that exist between the member states in the protection of industrial action. In Section 2, I 
highlight the growing impact of EU law on the regulation of collective action and analyze the 
critical implications of the case law of the ECJ. The ECJ has recognized a fundamental right to 
strike at the EU level but has subjected it to significant limitations in the name of free market 
principles, thereby placing the protection of industrial action existing in many domestic regulatory 
models under strain. In Section 3, I undertake a comparative examination of the US federal 
experience in the field of strike law and emphasize how the US constitutional system has been 
historically characterized by strong frictions between state labour legislation and the federal push to 
ensure a free common market. At the same time, I explain how the US has addressed this state of 
affairs over time by shifting the protection of strike action at the federal level via the enactment of 
New Deal legislation. I then return to the current European situation and, in Section 4, I assess the 
effect of the recent transformations taking place in the framework of the ECHR. Here, I examine the 
recent case law of the ECtHR and discuss how it could influence the protection of the right to strike 
at the EU level after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the accession of the EU to the 
ECHR. Finally, in Section 5, I reflect on how some additional reforms may be envisaged in the 
constitutional system of the EU to strengthen the protection of industrial action vis-à-vis free market 
principles. 
 As the structure makes clear, the aim of the chapter is mainly analytical. My intention is to 
analyze the complex constitutional phenomena taking place in the European multilevel architecture 
by using the historical experience of the US as a powerful explanatory tool of contemporary 
European reality. By resorting to the comparative method I argue that it is possible to clarify the 
challenges emerging in the protection of the right to strike in Europe and to explain them in light of 
the recurrent tensions between social rights and free market rules which also characterized the US 
federal arrangement in the early 20th century. Albeit with a number of caveats, then, it seems that 
the US experience can also provide some useful lessons for the EU on how to address the challenge 
of ensuring an effective protection of the right to strike within a common transnational market. To 
this end, in the final Section of the chapter I will try to explore possible reforms that Europe may 
undertake to enhance the protection of industrial action. In this last part of the chapter, I will adopt a 
normative stand and, in light of the US experience, suggest that the EU should enact a legislative 
measure – an EU Wagner Act – setting a regulatory standard for the protection of strike action in 
situations which currently fall under the scope of application of EU free market rules. Needless to 
say, this proposal sparks controversy and readers will disagree about the legal feasibility and 
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political success of such a legal act. However, I will endeavour to maintain that this solution –which 
seems to have been recently embraced also by the EU Commission in a March 2012 proposal for a 
regulation on the exercise of the right to strike in the single market– may be a viable option to 
reduce the current tensions between social rights and the free market in the EU constitutional 
system.12 
So far, the protection of social rights in Europe has been primarily conceived as a task for 
the individual EU member states. However, the creation of a free market of continental size has 
made it clear that labour protection at the domestic level cannot be properly insulated from review 
by the supranational judiciary. This has led to the creation of a judge-made standard for the 
protection of collective labour rights at the EU level which is less effective than the standards 
existing in many member states. De facto, through its freedom of movement jurisprudence, the ECJ 
has set up at the EU level a regulation for industrial action having a cross-border dimension that 
displaces states’ strike laws. Yet, to reverse this trend by strengthening the sovereignty of the 
member states in the field of social legislation is wishful thinking. Rather, as the US experience 
demonstrates, the tension between the transnational free market principles and state social rights 
guarantees in federalism-based systems of governance can be addressed by enacting legislation 
protecting labour rights at the supranational level. In the US, during the New Deal, it was 
understood that only a major transfer of policy powers to the federal government would counter-
balance the laissez-faire trends inherent in the inter-state common market. In this chapter, I will 
attempt to argue that Europe also needs to discuss whether to enact an EU regulation protecting 
collective labour rights in ways analogous to the US Wagner Act. The current economic crisis 
makes the reflection about the need for a European New Deal all the more pressing.  
 To anticipate possible criticisms, I should point out that this chapter adopts a comparative 
constitutional law perspective and not a comparative labour law perspective. Of course, the right to 
strike is a labour law right, and many of the most inspiring sources that I will be using in my 
analysis are the work of labour lawyers. However, my intention here is to offer a different 
perspective on the status of industrial relations law in Europe and in the US, one which focuses on 
the constitutional dynamics at play in the two systems and aims to explain the broad challenges that 
emerge from the interaction between state and supranational laws in multilevel constitutional 
arrangements. Readers will therefore forgive me if technical features of national or supranational 
collective labour regulations are omitted or over-generalized in my analysis. In this chapter I will 
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rather attempt to explain that the complex tensions that are emerging in the field of collective labour 
rights in Europe are part of a broader constitutional pattern. The emergence of a multilevel, 
heterarchical architecture for the protection of fundamental rights has generated in Europe 
phenomena typical of federal arrangements.13 As I explained in the first chapter, this has challenged 
the effectiveness and the consistency of fundamental rights standards in a plurality of policy areas. 




1. Context: the protection of the right to strike at the state level in Europe 
 
The recognition of the right to strike in the legal systems of the EU member states is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Throughout the 19th century, collective bargaining and collective action by 
workers was regarded as incompatible with the social and economic stability of the state, and was 
harshly sanctioned in all European nations.14 Attempts to recognize industrial action partially 
succeeded in some European countries during the 1920s, but were soon swept aside by the rise of 
the fascist dictatorships and the needs of World War II (WWII). “Ultimately, it was the victory of 
the democratic powers in western Europe at the end of [WWII] that definitely secured toleration 
and recognition of free collective labour relations in [W]estern Europe.”15 Starting with France in 
1946 and Italy in 1948, the right to strike was enshrined in the Constitutions of a number of 
European states. Legislatures and courts further liberalized the right to strike in the United Kingdom 
(UK),16 Germany,17 and Belgium18 during the 1950s. However, it was not until their transition to 
democracy in the 1970s that a right to strike was recognized in Spain,19 Portugal20 and Greece.21 In 
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the Netherlands, the right to industrial action was formally recognized by the Hoge Raad, the 
Supreme Court, only in 1986.22 Finally, while strikes played a major role in the Polish Solidarność 
movement of the 1980s, a right to take collective action became constitutionally protected in 
Poland23 and other Central and Eastern European countries only after the collapse of the Communist 
regime in the early 1990s.24 
The historical experience of each European country has largely shaped the way in which the 
right to strike is protected at the national level.25 Hence, a broad constitutional protection of the 
right to strike is quite common in the new democracies of Southern and Eastern Europe – largely in 
reaction to the repressive practices of the fascist and communist regimes.26 Northern European 
states, instead, often protect the right to strike exclusively through ordinary legislation and they 
subject it to more severe restrictions. At the same time, the nature of the social and political forces 
prevailing in each Western European country in the post-WWII period, explains for major regional 
variations. For instance, Western democracies that had powerful Communist parties (such as Italy 
and France) codified the right to strike in an attempt to strengthen the role of the labour movement 
and to enshrine new principles of social justice in the Constitution.27 This need, instead, has been 
less compelling where the labour movement was integrated within the political process (as in the 
UK) or where a tradition of social partnership already existed (as in Scandinavia). 
Although there are relevant differences in the degree of protection the right to strike enjoys 
in the legal systems of the EU member states, it may be useful, for analytical purposes, to classify 
the various national regimes into several regulatory models. Needless to say, many classifications of 
the European legislations are possible in the abstract,28 but for the purpose of this work I will 
identify four models of protection of the right to strike that can be ideally placed along a continuum 
that runs from a more liberal to a more restrictive regime. To evaluate the nature of each model I 
consider several specific criteria. A first element is whether the right to strike is recognized as a 
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fundamental constitutional right rather than as a statutory entitlement or a simple common law 
liberty. A second element is whether the right to strike is an individual right or a collective right, to 
be exercised only by trade unions. Another element concerns the procedures that must be followed 
to exercise the right to strike, as well as the limitations that apply to the right to strike and the 
substantive conditions that justify it. A final element, then, concerns the consequences connected 
with the exercise of the right to strike, i.e. the implications of the strike on the individual 
employment contract. 
 France and Italy offer a first model of regulation characterized by an enhanced protection of 
the right to strike. The Preamble of the French Constitution of 1946 (which is recalled by the 
Preamble of the Constitution of 1958) recognizes “the right to strike […] in the framework of the 
laws that regulate it” and, with an almost identical wording, Article 40 of the 1948 Italian 
Constitution affirms that “the right to strike is exercised in the framework of the laws that regulate 
it.” In both legal systems, the right to strike has a solid constitutional foundation and can be 
accounted as a fundamental right of the individual to be exercised collectively (and not as a right of 
the trade unions).29 Moreover, both in France and in Italy, the constitutional provisions on the right 
to strike have not been implemented through ordinary legislation (except in the field of public 
services):30 domestic courts have therefore assumed the task of giving direct application to these 
constitutional clauses and of defining the scope and the limits of the right to strike. As such, in 
France the Cour de Cassation has strictly enforced the constitutional guarantee of the right to strike, 
denying that it can be restricted by a collective agreement and an obligation of industrial peace.31 
According to the case law of the French labour courts, a strike must express a professional claim 
(including in the form of a solidarity action) and therefore purely political strikes should be 
regarded as unlawful. Nevertheless, the Cour de Cassation has acknowledged the legitimacy of 
strikes which have a “macro-social goal,”32 de facto sanctioning the lawfulness of strikes which 
“aim at influencing the social and economic policy of the government which has a direct impact on 
working conditions.”33 
 A very wide understanding of the meaning of the right to strike has also been adopted in 
Italy by the Corte di Cassazione:34 the Court affirmed that the motivation for a strike is immaterial 
for deciding its legitimacy and recognized the admissibility of all forms of protests considered by 
the workers themselves as the most effective to achieve their desired goal (including the sympathy 
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strike, the articulate strike and the politico-economic strike).35 The Corte Costituzionale, at the same 
time, has derived from Article 40 of the Italian Constitution the legitimacy of the political strike, 
except when finalized to the overthrowing of the constitutional order.36 Being a fundamental 
individual right, the right to strike can be freely exercised – without any need to comply a priori 
with mediation or other procedural requirements and without any consequences a posteriori on the 
individual contract of employment. In addition, since the enactment in 1970 of the Workers’ 
Statute37 (a piece of legislation protecting employees’ rights in the workplace),38 the Italian law 
“guarantees striking workers and employees who take part in trade union activities the absence of 
any kind of repercussions [from the employer] other than the loss of pay.”39  
In light of its constitutional status, the right to strike can be restricted in Italy only to uphold 
equivalent constitutional values. To ensure a proper balancing of the right to strike with other 
essential personal rights, however, the Italian Parliament enacted in 1990 a framework statute40 
regulating the right to strike in the sector of essential public services (such as health care, education, 
administration of justice, police, public transportation etc.).41 The statute represents a far-reaching 
attempt to devise a comprehensive regulation for industrial conflicts in public services, with a view 
to protecting the rights of the users and to ensuring a reasonable “conciliation of the exercise of the 
right to strike with the enjoyment of the [other] constitutional rights of the individual.”42 The statute 
requires trade unions to give due notice of their willingness to strike and to indicate the duration of 
the suspension from work and its form.43 During the strike, workers must in any case ensure 
minimal services, to be defined through collective agreements or in the self-regulatory codes of the 
trade unions.44 The statute finally empowers a newly established Guarantee Committee to review 
the self-regulatory codes of trade unions, overview the respect of the legislative procedures, and 
sanction unlawful strikes.45  
 A second model of state regulation of the right to strike emerges from the legal tradition of 
the Nordic countries. Both in Finland and in Sweden, the right to strike is solidly grounded  in the 
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state Constitution.46 At the same time, both systems largely delegate the function of regulating 
industrial conflicts to the social partners through collective agreements, reflecting the historical 
ability of the main union confederations to centralize collective bargaining.47 In the Swedish legal 
system, Article 17 of the Constitution affirms that “any trade union and any employer or any 
association of employers shall have the right to take strike or lock-out actions or any similar 
measures, except as otherwise provided by law or ensuing from an agreement.” The spectrum of 
action which is regarded as permissible is, therefore, very broad and encompasses secondary actions 
as well as boycotts and blockades.48 At the same time, collective agreements usually provide for 
peace obligations which prevent strikes unless the objective of the industrial action falls outside the 
scope of the collective agreement. The right to go on strike is centralized in the trade unions. 
According to the 1976 Codetermination Act,49 unions must notify their decision to stop working at 
least seven working days before the strike, in order to ensure the possibility of a mediation 
procedure.50 
 Similarly, in Finland, the right for unions to strike is derived from the freedom of association 
and to conduct collective bargaining enshrined in Article 13 of the Constitution, and has been 
interpreted by courts as being “permitted for a wide range of reasons and in a wide variety of 
forms.”51 Under Finnish law, workers and employers are even entitled to take secondary action and 
political strikes. Just as in Sweden, however, collective agreements include peace obligations, 
which prohibit industrial action during the time-frame in which a collective contract is in force, 
except when the strike concerns an issue which is not regulated in the collective agreement.52 Also 
in Finland, then, the legislation and the agreements between the national trade unions and the 
employers’ association require “anyone intending to commence a strike […] to give written notice – 
stating the reasons for the strike, its starting time and the extent of the stoppage – to the opposed 
party and to the Office of the National Conciliation Officers at least 14 days beforehand.”53 In the 
Nordic countries, therefore, a solid protection of the right to strike is coupled with wide room for 
collective autonomy, based on the assumption that social partners are capable of adopting a 
responsible and cooperative stand in the resolution of industrial disputes.54 
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 A third model of regulation of the right to strike exists in Germany. The German system is 
characterized by the fact that the right to strike does not enjoy any formal constitutional 
protection.55 Article 9(3) of the Basic Law recognizes the constitutional freedom of association to 
safeguard and improve working and economic conditions. In this context, it has been up to the 
highest domestic courts to derive from this provision a protection of the right to strike.56 Already in 
1955, the Bundesarbeitsgericht recognized a right to strike in the German legal system as an 
essential component of the right to collective bargaining for employers and employees.57 
Nevertheless, in Germany, the right to strike has traditionally been surrounded “with numerous 
limitations, such as the peace obligation during the term of a collective agreement and a prohibition 
on striking for conflicts of rights, as distinct from conflicts of interests.”58 The German system, in 
fact, takes a strictly contractual view of industrial conflict legitimizing only those strikes which aim 
at enhancing the bargaining position of the employees (and prohibiting, instead, political or 
solidarity strikes). In addition, in Germany, the right to strike has never been interpreted as an 
individual right but rather as a trade unions’ right.59 “Only those associations which are allowed to 
conclude collective agreements have the right to call a strike.”60 
 The most characteristic feature of the German regulatory model, however, is represented by 
the so-called principle of ultima ratio. This principle represents the application in the field of labour 
law of the general constitutional principle of Verhältnismäßigkeit, or proportionality.61 According to 
this principle, “a strike is only legal if it is necessary and the ultimate measure to solve the industrial 
conflict.”62 As a consequence, trade unions do not enjoy an unconditional right to pursue collective 
action, even when, in their view, a strike would be the most effective tool to strengthen their 
bargaining position. “In keeping with the principle of last resort, all possibilities of a peaceful 
negotiation for settlement must have been exhausted” before a trade union can go on strike.63 
Labour courts are therefore empowered to assess the proportionality of the industrial action 
undertaken by the trade unions and can, if the case may be, sanction illegal strikes, condemning the 
trade unions to pay damages. Historically, industrial relations between employees’ unions and 
employers’ associations have been very cooperative in Germany and this has kept industrial action 
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to a minimum.64 Yet, by permitting strikes only when they are proportionate, German law designs a 
rather restrictive model of regulation of the right to strike which ensures wide protection for other 
constitutional values (such as the right to property and freedom of commerce).65 
 A regulation of strike akin to the German one also exists in Poland. In the Polish system, the 
right to strike is formally enshrined as a trade unions’ prerogative in Article 59(3) of the 
Constitution, which affirms that “trade unions shall have the right to organize workers’ strikes or 
other forms of protest subject to limitations specified by statute.” The detailed regulation of the 
permitted limits of industrial action is then provided in the 1991 Act on the settlement of collective 
labour disputes.66 As in Germany, however, in Poland industrial action is only permitted for 
disputes over interests, rather than rights: as such “[s]trikes of political or more generally socio-
economic nature are not included in th[e statutory] definition.”67 The law, in addition, sets up an 
obligation for trade unions to engage in negotiations and mediation procedures with employers 
before going on strike.68 Finally, under Polish law, the “strike is treated by the legislator (as well as 
in jurisprudence […]) as a last resort measure, only to be organized when all other possibilities to 
solve the conflict have failed.”69 According to the 1991 Act, indeed, the choice of trade unions to go 
on strike must be the ultima ratio.70 Hence, the Polish legal regulation of the right to strike also 
appears to be based on a strict “proportionality rule: when taking the decisions to call a strike, the 
party representing employee interests shall ensure that demands are commensurate with the losses 
that the strike entails, not only in relation to the parties in dispute but also to third parties.”71 
 The most restrictive regulation of the right to strike, however, is provided by the UK model. 
Traditionally, under English common law, the voluntary interruption of work by employees did not 
enjoy any protection and was, in fact, punished by courts as a tort and a breach of contract.72 In the 
early years of the 20th century, and, again after the end of the WWII, several statutes were enacted 
in the UK to allow workers to undertake industrial action:73 however, “the statutory provisions 
which permit the organization of industrial action and participation in such action are framed in 
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terms of immunities from the tortuous and criminal liability that would otherwise attach.”74 As 
such, it can be argued that “there is no fundamental right to strike” in the UK.75 In the British legal 
system, the strike is a rather a freedom “regulated by statute and common law.”76 The legislative 
framework for the exercise of the freedom to strike has been the object of several subsequent 
reforms, especially during the 1980s, under the pressure brought to bear by the Conservative 
Governments. Currently, it is synthesized in Part V of the Trade Unions and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act of 1992 (TULRCA).77  
 According to the TULRCA, an “act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a 
trade dispute is not actionable in tort on the ground only— (a) that it induces another person to 
break a contract or interferes or induces another person to interfere with its performance.”78 The 
definition of a “trade dispute” for the purposes of TULRCA is to be found in the so-called “golden 
formula,” i.e. Section 244 TULRCA.79 No industrial action is permitted if its goal is to ensure a 
closed-shop policy80 or to impose union recognition.81 Furthermore, the law prohibits secondary 
strikes82 and political strikes: indeed, only “strikes which involve a trade dispute between a trade 
union and the relevant employer are protected and the accepted motivation tends to be restricted to 
economic reasons.”83 The TULRCA, then, sets out a very detailed procedure which trade unions 
must follow before taking industrial action: unions must take a ballot to verify the support of the 
workers in favour of the strike,84 notify the employer (not later than the seventh day before the 
opening day of the ballot) that the unions intend to hold the ballot85 and provide the employer with a 
list of the categories of employees to which the ballot will be proposed.86 As soon as is reasonably 
practicable after the holding of the ballot, the trade union must take such steps as are reasonably 
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necessary to ensure that all persons entitled to vote in the ballot and the employer are informed of 
the results.87 A ballot in relation to industrial action ceases to be effective after four weeks.88  
 Besides the existence of strict procedures limiting and conditioning the exercise of the right 
to strike, British law has traditionally also provided a very limited protection to workers engaging in 
industrial action.89 Until recently, indeed the jurisprudential stand was that “[a]ny form of industrial 
action is a breach of contract.”90 Only in 1999, was the TULRCA modified by the Employment 
Relations Act (ERA)91 to provide a remedy against unfair dismissal for employees who took 
protected industrial action. Accordingly, an employee must be regarded as “unfairly dismissed if—
(a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee took 
protected industrial action”92 and if the dismissal took place within a protected period of eight 
weeks (later increased to twelve weeks by the Employment Relations Act 2004).93 At the same 
time, the guarantee against unfair dismissal does not operate in favour of workers who take 
unofficial action.94 Moreover, under British law “even where employees are found to have been 
unfairly dismissed, they cannot be reinstated against the wishes of the employer and so the only 
remedy is compensation.”95 As a consequence the UK legal system provides a rather hostile 
environment for workers willing to go on strike and can certainly be described as the most 
restrictive model of regulation of the right to strike Europe-wide.96 
 In conclusion, a rapid overview of the regulation of the right to strike in the European legal 
systems reveals that there exist “marked differences between the specific regulations on strikes 
existing in the various [EU] States.”97 Many EU member states such as France, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, ensure the highest possible protection to the right to strike, enshrining it in their 
Constitutions. In some states, social partners have no role in the regulation of the right to strikes 
while in others – notably the Nordic countries – collective bargaining represents a core component 
of the legal framework in which industrial action can be taken. Countries such as Germany and 
Poland are instead endowed with a legislative framework for protecting the right to strike which 
empowers labour courts to exercise a pervasive proportionality analysis to verify the lawfulness of 
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collective action. Finally, the UK has an extremely restrictive legislation, which refuses to 
recognize the strike as a right and treats it rather as a statutory freedom subject to strict substantive 
and procedural requirements. Above this pluralism of state laws operates, however, an increasingly 
important supranational law. 
 
 
2. Challenges: The impact of the case law of European Court of Justice on the protection of 
the right to strike in Europe 
 
The question whether European supranational law protects a right to strike has long beset labour 
lawyers98 and constitutional scholars.99 The project of European integration had been inspired since 
its foundation by the goal of enhancing the economic and social conditions of the European 
peoples.100 Yet, a number of legal constraints and institutional weaknesses seemed to prevent a full 
recognition of the right to strike in the EU legal order. To begin with, the founding treaties of the 
EC did not include any provision regarding the right to strike.101 Rather, when in 1997 the 
Amsterdam Treaty expanded the competences of the EC in the field of social policy, a provision 
was inserted in the founding treaties – Article 137(5) EC Treaty (TEC), now renumbered by the 
Lisbon Treaty as Article 153(5) EU Functioning Treaty (TFEU) – to exclude the application of the 
new competences of the EC from “the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose 
lock-outs.” Secondly, the EC proclaimed in 1989 a Community Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers (CCFSRW), which inter alia protected a right to resort to collective action.102 
The CCFSRW, however, was not signed by all the (then) twelve member states, since the UK 
abstained from any commitment to this instrument.103 The CCFRSW, moreover, lacked any binding 
force, being intended as a political declaration to be implemented by the member states according to 
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the principle of subsidiarity. Lastly, the ECJ showed great “judicial circumspection”104 in protecting 
the right to strike. Although the ECJ acknowledged that the EC institutions’ staff enjoyed a right to 
form trade unions and to act for the protection of its interests,105 for a long time it never officially 
endorsed the opinion of Advocate General (AG) Jacobs in Albany International106 that “the right to 
take collective action in order to protect occupational interests […] is also protected by [EC] 
law.”107 
At the same time, “the lack of a fundamental social right in [EC] sources [was] not totally 
compensated for by [the] references to the ECHR”108 and the European Social Charter (ESC) 
contained in the EU treaties.109 Indeed, major obstacles toward the protection of a right to strike also 
seemed to exist in the legal framework of the Council of Europe.110 On the one hand, the 1950 
ECHR only enshrined a catalogue of civil and political liberties, with almost no attention for social 
and economic rights. Article 11 ECHR affirms that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade 
unions for the protection of his interests.” Yet the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
denied, until recently,111 that Article 11 could be interpreted as protecting a right to strike.112 The 
ECtHR instead repeatedly held that Article 11 imposed a duty on the contracting parties to set up 
domestic mechanisms to enable trade unions to represent their members113 but that this did not 
include a right to collective bargaining114 or collective action.115 On the other hand, the ESC – 
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enacted in 1961 and revised in 1996 – did include an explicit provision, Article 6(4), protecting “the 
right of workers and employers to collective action in case of conflicts of interest, including the 
right to strike.” The ESC, however, did not include any effective mechanism to enforce this right.116 
Compliance by the signatory states is ensured through periodic reviews and only in 1995 was an 
optional Protocol adopted to allow trade unions and employers’ organizations to bring a complaint 
before the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR).117 Compared to the supervision of the 
ECtHR, however, the review by the ECSR appears extremely weak, as it is “hampered by State 
control.”118 Hence, neither the ECHR nor the ESC worked as an effective bulwark for the protection 
of the right to strike at the European level from which the EU institutions could draw inspiration. 
Nevertheless, in the last decade, a number of legal and jurisprudential developments have 
reshaped the framework for the protection of the right to strike at the supranational level, 
highlighting a growing influence of EU law in the regulation of industrial action. To begin with, in 
2000, the EU institutions proclaimed a EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). The CFR pursued 
the goal to restate the case law of the ECJ in the field of fundamental rights. In fact, however, the 
CFR included a number of innovative provisions and quite remarkably merged in the same 
catalogue a set of both civil and political rights and of social and economic rights. Hence, Article 28 
(which is located in the Title IV of the CFR, entitled “Solidarity”) codifies a right of collective 
bargaining and action and reads:119 “Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, 
have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take 
collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.” Until the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the CFR was not vested with binding value.120 Yet, drawing inter alia on the CFR, 
in two joint decisions delivered on 3 December 2007 – International Transport Workers’ 
Federation v. Viking121 and Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets122 – the 
Grand Chamber of the ECJ held that the right to strike is a fundamental right of the EU 
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constitutional order.123 In these decisions, however, the ECJ designed a standard for the protection 
of the right to strike which differs from that in force in a number of EU member states.124 
In Viking, the ECJ was confronted with a preliminary reference from the Court of Appeal for 
England and Wales. The case in the main proceeding concerned a Finnish company, Viking Lines 
which operated ferry services between Helsinki, Finland and Tallinn, Estonia. Viking was running 
its business at a loss and wished to relocate its place of establishment to Estonia in order to benefit 
from lower wages. Viking’s plan to reflag its vessels was met with opposition by the Finnish 
Seamen’s Union (FSU) and its international partner, the London-based International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ITWF). To prevent the relocation, FSU threatened to take industrial action 
against Viking and ITWF requested that its Estonian affiliates refuse to enter into negotiations with 
Viking. Viking brought a case before a UK tribunal to enjoin FSU and ITWF from striking. In its 
complaint, Viking argued that the industrial action taken by the FSU, with the support of ITWF, 
was preventing Viking from relocating its vessels to Estonia and was thus interfering with its 
freedom of movement under EU law. The Court of Appeal therefore asked the ECJ whether the 
collective actions by FSU and ITWF fell outside the scope of EU law or, if not, whether they were 
justified or rather constituted an unwarranted restriction of the free movement rules enshrined in 
Article 43 TEC (current Article 49 TFEU). In his opinion, AG Maduro acknowledged that the case 
presented the ECJ with an issue of “great socio-political sensitivity […touching] on the relationship 
between social rights and the rights to freedom of movement.”125 
The ECJ clearly answered the first question of the referring judge by stating that collective 
action by trade unions “falls, in principle, within the scope of Article 43 TEC”126 and it 
consequently rejected a number of observations that had been raised by the main parties to the 
proceedings and by the intervening governments. Firstly, the ECJ discarded the submission of the 
Danish government that Article 137(5) TEC excluded the competence of the EU in this field. The 
ECJ argued that “the fact that Article 137 TEC does not apply to the right to strike or to the right to 
impose lock-outs is not such as to exclude collective action […] from the application of Article 43 
TEC.”127 Secondly, the ECJ refused to apply by analogy the Albany International doctrine, 
underlining how Albany concerned the application of competition rules whereas Viking concerned 
freedom of movement. Most importantly, however, the ECJ rejected the idea that industrial action 
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fell outside the scope of EU law because the right to strike was a fundamental right. In a remarkable 
paragraph, the ECJ affirmed instead that “the right to take collective action, including the right to 
strike, is recognised both by various international instruments which the Member States have signed 
or cooperated in, such as the [ESC] – to which, moreover, express reference is made in Article 136 
TEC – and Convention No 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise, adopted on 9 July 1948 by the International Labour Organisation – and by instruments 
developed by those Member States at [EC] level or in the context of the [EU], such as the 
[CCFSRW…] and the [CFR].”128 The ECJ thus held that “the right to strike, must […] be 
recognised as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of [EC] law 
the observance of which the Court ensures.”129 
Having recognized for the first time in its jurisprudence that the right to strike is part of the 
constitutional principles of the EU legal order, however, the ECJ underlined how the exercise of 
that right may nonetheless be subject to limitations to ensure the protection of other fundamental 
EU freedoms. Hence, the ECJ moved to examine whether the collective action by the FSU and 
ITWF represented a restriction of the right of free movement and whether it could be regarded as 
justified. According to the ECJ it could not be disputed that “collective action such as that 
envisaged by FSU ha[d] the effect of making less attractive, or even pointless […] Viking’s 
exercise of its right to freedom of establishment”130 and constituted a restriction on freedom of 
establishment within the meaning of Article 43 TEC. To assess whether the restriction of Viking’s 
free movement right was justified, the ECJ engaged in a proportionality analysis of the industrial 
action by the FSU and ITWF. AG Maduro had emphasized how such analysis required a balancing 
of competing interests: “[a]lthough the Treaty establishes the common market, it does not turn a 
blind eye to the workers who are adversely affected by its negative traits. On the contrary, the 
European economic order is firmly anchored in a social contract.”131 Echoing his words, the ECJ 
noticed that “the activities of the [EC] are to include not only an ‘internal market characterised by 
the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital’, but also ‘a policy in the social sphere’”132. Yet, in drawing its balancing test, 
the ECJ affirmed that the industrial action by the FSU and ITWF would only be justified if it 
pursued the protection of workers and if it represented an ultima ratio for the trade unions. 
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The ECJ, in particular, invited the state court to review133 whether “the jobs or conditions of 
employment of the FSU’s members liable to be adversely affected by the reflagging of the [vessel] 
[we]re in fact jeopardised or under serious threat, […] whether the collective action initiated by 
FSU [wa]s suitable for ensuring the achievement of the objective pursued and [whether it did] not 
go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective.”134 Moreover, the ECJ affirmed that it was for 
the national court to examine “whether, under the national rules and collective agreement law 
applicable to that action, FSU did not have other means at its disposal which were less restrictive of 
freedom of establishment in order to bring to a successful conclusion the collective negotiations 
entered into with Viking, and, on the other, whether that trade union had exhausted those means 
before initiating such action.”135 Hence, the ECJ concluded that “collective action such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings, which seeks to induce an undertaking whose registered office is in a 
given Member State to enter into a collective work agreement with a trade union established in that 
State and to apply the terms set out in that agreement to the employees of a subsidiary of that 
undertaking established in another Member State, constitutes a restriction within the meaning of 
[Article 43 TEC]. That restriction may, in principle, be justified by an overriding reason of public 
interest, such as the protection of workers, provided that it is established that the restriction is 
suitable for ensuring the attainment of the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve that objective.”136 
In Laval, the Arbetsdomstoled, the Swedish Labour Court, had raised a preliminary question 
before the ECJ in the context of the proceedings between Laval, a company incorporated under 
Latvian law, and three Swedish trade unions operating in the building sector. Pursuant to the EU 
provisions on the freedom to provide services, Laval concluded a contract with a Swedish developer 
to construct a school in the city of Vaxholm, Sweden. To complete the works, Laval posted a 
number of Latvian workers to Sweden. These workers were members of the Latvian building 
sector’s trade union and Laval was bound by the conditions set in the Latvian collective agreement 
for the building sector. Soon after beginning work in Sweden, Laval was requested by the Swedish 
trade unions to conclude the Swedish collective agreement for the building sector, which required 
Laval to pay a higher wage to its Latvian workers. Refusal by Laval to enter into an agreement 
triggered industrial action by the Swedish unions, through a blockade and a sympathy strike, which 
de facto prevented Laval from continuing its construction works. Laval therefore brought a case 
before the Swedish labour court to obtain, first, a declaration that the collective action by the 
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Swedish unions affecting Laval’s worksite was unlawful; second, an order that such action should 
cease; and, third, an order that the trade unions pay compensation for the loss suffered by Laval. In 
its reference, the Arbetsdomstoled asked the ECJ whether the industrial action by the trade unions in 
the case at hand could be regarded as compatible with the freedom to provide services enshrined in 
Article 49 TEC (current Article 56 TFEU). As such, Laval raised a problem analogous to that of 
Viking, requiring the ECJ “to weigh the exercise by trade unions of their right to resort to collective 
action to defend workers’ interests […] against the exercise, by an undertaking established in the 
Community, of its freedom to provide services, a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
[T]EC.”137 
The ECJ approached the issue of the right to strike in Laval just as it had done in Viking.138 
It rejected the argument that collective action fell outside the scope of Article 49 TEC and rather 
restated the fundamental nature of the right to strike in the EU legal order. The ECJ remarked 
however that “the exercise of that right may nonetheless be subject to certain restrictions.”139 
Hence, it began its review of whether the industrial action at hand constituted a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services, and, if so, whether it could be justified. The ECJ held that the strike of 
the Swedish trade unions was “liable to make it less attractive, or more difficult, for [Laval] to carry 
out construction work in Sweden, and therefore constitute[d] a restriction on the freedom to provide 
service.”140 The ECJ then assessed whether the restriction was proportionate. It recognized that “in 
principle, [industrial] action by a trade union of the host Member State which is aimed at ensuring 
that workers posted in the framework of a transnational provision of services have their terms and 
conditions of employment fixed at a certain level, falls within the objective” of the EU.141 
Nevertheless, the ECJ concluded that in the present case the strike “c[ould] not be justified with 
regard to such an objective”142 and thus affirmed that “collective action […] to force a provider of 
services established in another Member State to enter into negotiations with it on the rates of pay 
for posted workers and to sign a collective agreement the terms of which lay down, as regards some 
of those matters, more favourable conditions than those resulting from the relevant legislative 
provisions”143 was incompatible with Article 49 TEC.144 
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The decisions of the ECJ in Viking and Laval represent an important step forward in the 
protection of the right to strike at the supranational level in Europe and underline the increasing 
impact that EU law exercises in the regulation of social rights. For the first time, the ECJ 
recognized the right to strike as a fundamental right and ruled that the right for workers to take 
industrial action is to be protected as a general constitutional principle of EU law. Yet, the ECJ did 
not hold that the right to strike is absolute. On the contrary, the ECJ affirmed that its exercise can be 
subject to certain restrictions and, most importantly, it held that the right to strike must be exercised 
in conformity with the principle of proportionality. The ECJ subjected the possibility for trade 
unions to go on strike to a review of the suitability, necessity and ultima ratio of the industrial 
action and empowered state courts to “verify whether the union has exhausted all other avenues 
under national law before the industrial action is found appropriate.”145 Taking into account the 
limitations that surround this judicial recognition of the right to strike, many labour lawyers have 
criticized the decisions of the ECJ. As Tonia Novitz argued: “in neither Viking nor Laval did the 
[ECJ] formulate a right to collective action in a manner likely to provide effective legal protection 
of its exercise. Indeed it could be said that other aspects of the Viking and Laval judgments render 
judicial recognition of such a right negligible in terms of its practical effects.”146 
In light of the comparative framework developed in the previous Section, it seems possible 
to argue that several criticisms of the ECJ’s decisions in Viking and Laval “are to some extent 
overstated.”147 The ECJ certainly did not embrace a position as ‘labor-friendly’ as that existing in 
the legal systems of the Scandinavian countries148 – much less did it adopt the broad constitutional 
reading that countries like Italy or France accord to the right to strike.149 However, the solution 
envisaged by the ECJ to recognize a right to strike only inasmuch as its exercise complies with the 
principle of proportionality is not without basis in domestic law. Indeed, this solution reflects the 
rule in force in the industrial relations’ systems of countries like Germany and Poland. As 
mentioned above, in Germany the right to strike is permitted only as an ultima ratio and courts 
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routinely subject industrial action by the trade unions to a strict proportionality test.150 From this 
point of view, therefore, it would appear that the ECJ introduced at the EU level a protection for the 
right to strike which lies somewhere in the middle between the ‘vangard’ and ‘laggard’ models for 
the regulation of industrial action identified in Section 2.151 The standard for the protection of the 
right to strike developed by the ECJ in Viking and Laval is less protective than, say, the Swedish 
standard.152 However,  it is as protective as the German standard.153 And, perhaps, more protective 
than the British standard:154 technically speaking, no fundamental right to strike exists under UK 
law, although, of course, UK courts “have never subjected industrial action to a proportionality test 
considering whether the harm caused to the employer is proportionate to the union’s objectives in 
taking industrial action.”155 
Whatever the appropriateness of these considerations on the compatibility between the 
constitutional standards of the EU and the member states,156 it is nonetheless clear that Viking and 
Laval embody a major challenge to the domestic systems for the protection of the right to strike.157 
The recognition at the supranational level of a right to strike at the conditions set in Viking and 
Laval puts the state regulations of industrial action under pressure and creates a number of tensions 
between national and EU law. These tensions are particularly evident for the EU countries that 
ensure a heightened and advanced system for the protection of the right to strike,158 although they 
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also emerge in other member states.159 The EU standard for the protection of the right to strike does 
not displace national standards tout court. Indeed, the ECJ’s right to strike rules only apply in cases 
of transnational industrial action, i.e. cases where the conflict between unions and employers 
extends to more than one member state and calls into question the EU free movement rules. 
However as interstate commerce expands in the EU, industrial disputes with a cross-border 
dimension increase. In this broadening field, the interplay between EU law and domestic law 
threatens “to undermine the effectiveness with which labour standards, whether originating in law 
or in collective agreement, can be applied at the national level.”160 
For descriptive purposes, I suggest defining the challenge that emerges from the overlap and 
interplay between national and supranational law in the field of industrial action through the notion 
of ineffectiveness I introduced in the first chapter. There, I have argued that the interactions 
between a plurality of fundamental rights standards generate complex constitutional dynamics in the 
European multilevel architecture. The same pattern emerges here. For a number of years, in the 
absence of binding or enforceable standards for the protection of the right to strike at the 
supranational level in Europe, the EU member states were free to regulate the right to strike as they 
thought appropriate. In the last decade, however, the autonomy of the member states has come 
under increased pressure due to the impact of EU law over national law.161 Following the enactment 
of the CFR, in Viking and Laval the ECJ recognized the existence of a fundamental right to strike in 
the EU constitutional order. Yet, by framing the exercise of the right to industrial action as a 
possible interference with the principles of free market, “Laval and Viking draw on a legacy of 
jurisprudence which views with suspicion collective action and rights, appreciating rather the 
exercise by employers of their economic freedoms.”162 As a consequence, the ECJ’s “express 
recognition to the right to strike as a fundamental human right d[id] not lead to enhanced protection 
of that right.”163 The ECJ, in fact, designed a balancing test between free movement and social 
rights which ensures protection of the right to strike only when industrial action is suitable, 
necessary and strictly proportional to the achievement of the workers’ desired goal.  
This jurisprudence places the regulation of the right to strike in the EU member states under 
pressure. As has been convincingly argued: “the ECJ’s case law recognizing a new fundamental 
social right, may, paradoxically, lead to new restrictions on the right to strike in Member States 
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guaranteeing a high level of protection of that right. Thus the ECJ case law constitutes a challenge 
to national labour law systems and its outcome may well be to limit collective autonomy rather than 
strengthen it.”164 By setting a ceiling of protection for collective labour rights in industrial disputes 
with a cross-border dimension, the case law of the ECJ has called into question the effectiveness of 
the protection of the right to strike of many EU member states. To the extent to which the tensions 
between state and supranational laws are a consequence of the difficult balancing between free 
market principles and social rights guarantees in a federalism-based system of governance, the 
European experience does not however seem to be unique. Indeed, exploring in a comparative 
perspective the federal experience of the US can provide useful points of reference to explain the 
dynamics currently at play in Europe and possible lessons to assess how the European legal regime 
may evolve in the future. 
 
 
3. Comparative assessment: The right to strike in the US federal experience 
 
The previous Section has analyzed the increasing impact that supranational law exercises over the 
protection of the right to strike in the EU member states and the complex constitutional challenge 
that this interplay generates on the effectiveness of labour rights. The goal of this Section is to 
introduce a comparative analysis and to explore the extent to which dynamics analogous to those 
currently taking place in Europe can also be detected in the federal experience of the US. As 
Catharine Barnard has convincingly argued, “[s]uperficially, at least, the US is a good comparator 
for the EU. Broadly speaking, both have similar sized economies, both are based on a federal or 
quasi-federal structure and both recognise that, in certain circumstances, ‘federal’ law needs to 
control state activity where the activity interferes with interstate commerce and thus the unity of the 
Union or the single market.”165 Yet, as Ian Eliasoph has recently remarked with surprise, a 
comparative examination of the US experience “has been relatively absent from the vibrant 
‘constitutional’ debates in the [EU] over issues of federalism, the balancing of social and economic 
right, and the proper role of the [ECJ].”166  
A number of conventional arguments are generally put forward against the feasibility and 
usefulness of a comparison between Europe and the US in the field of social rights. These 
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arguments commonly stress the exceptionalism of the US constitutional system for the protection of 
social rights and underline the existence of “a clear dividing line”167 between the European social 
model and the limited guarantee that social and economic rights enjoy in the US. Cass Sunstein has 
surveyed three main explanations for these differences.168 First, the US Constitution dates back to 
the 18th century, and therefore lacks the social and economic guarantees that were largely a creation 
of the 20th century. Secondly, the US has a distinctively libertarian and individualist culture that 
prizes the right to be free from government intrusion. Thirdly, the US Constitution is enforced by 
courts and there has been much reluctance in codifying a catalogue of social rights whose 
enforcement the courts would not be able to properly handle. According to Cass Sunstein, however, 
none of these justifications is entirely satisfactory. Rather, his explanation of why the US is not 
endowed with a strong system for the protection of social rights centers on the judicial 
transformations that took place in the US Supreme Court during the 1970s. Following the 
appointment of conservative justices by the Republican administrations the case law of the federal 
courts in the field of social rights was chilled and this prevented the codification of a second Bill of 
Rights in the US.169 
In this chapter, I do not intend to engage in this debate. Indeed, it is plausible to argue that 
significant differences exist in the constitutional protection of social rights between the US and the 
European states. What I want to suggest, however, is that these differences may be less pronounced 
when we compare the US with the European system as a whole. Most comparative constitutional 
and labour lawyers have explored the differences in the protection of social and labour rights that 
exists between the US and the individual EU member states.170 The picture seems to change 
significantly, instead, if we consider the European multilevel constitutional architecture in its 
entirety as a multilevel, quasi-federal arrangement.171 Indeed, as it has been argued, “the legal order 
of the [EU] seems closer to the American archetype than to the European average.”172 The “tensions 
over whether the central government or the states […] are the most suitable jurisdictions for dealing 
with the relationship between employers and unions” has been at play for long time in the US 
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federal system,173 despite being a rather new phenomenon in Europe. In fact, as one US scholar has 
remarked, “many of the constitutional debates in Europe have a very ‘familiar ring’ to American 
ears.”174 There seems to be, therefore, some value in examining “possible federal dynamics within 
the context of the [EU] to the extent that it shows a relationship with labour law, or broader, social 
policy”175 in a comparative perspective with the US federal experience.  
In addition, there is another reason that pleads in favour of comparing the European regime 
for the protection of the right to strike with the US system. A major difficulty in comparing the 
constitutional protection of social rights in US and Europe is that the US Constitution “has one of 
the thinnest systems of social provision among mature and economically prosperous 
democracies,”176 completely lacking a catalogue of positive social rights, i.e. legal entitlements that 
require positive action by the state. The right to strike is a social right: indeed, “the case usually 
made for the right to strike has a socio-economic character.”177 Yet, the right to strike presents 
features which are rather typical of negative rights. The right to strike primarily protects workers 
and trade unions against unlawful restraints from the government. Needless to say, a major 
challenge to the effective exercise of the right to strike comes from private actors (i.e. employers) 
and therefore a meaningful protection of the right to strike also requires positive government action, 
through legislative means, to ensure that the management does not retaliated against workers when 
these exercise their rights. All this, however, is also true also for many other first generation 
negative rights. Even the right to property, which epitomizes the idea of laissez-faire and negative 
liberty, depends heavily on law and government intervention for protection against private attack.178 
The need for government intervention, therefore, does not contradict the fact that the right to strike 
should be conceptualized as a negative right. If this is so, however, it becomes possible to examine 
how the right to strike has been protected in the US system avoiding the difficulties posed by the 
lack of positive social rights provisions in the US Constitution. 
In light of the above, I will now turn to an historical examination of the US experience in the 
protection of the right to strike and I will explore the similarities and differences that exist between 
the US federal system and the European multilevel architecture in this matter. This comparison does 
neither imply that the two systems are identical nor suggest that they will inevitably evolve in the 
same way. As has been correctly argued, the value of a comparative study “is to be derived not so 
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much from the possibility of finding foreign laws and institutions that we can adopt; rather it is 
derived from the new perspectives on our own system that we can gain from such a study.”179 A 
comparison of the US federal system can operate as a useful mirror to understand the tensions 
between the various levels of government regulation which exist today in Europe.180 The evolving 
experience of US, however, can also offer several models and anti-models for the protection of the 
right to strike that Europe may want to take into account for the future.181 Of course, many of the 
events that will be recalled hereafter have occurred in the US in a remote time and this recommends 
caution in drawing lessons for Europe from the US experience.182 Yet, despite all the differences 
between the two systems in the historical, political and institutional context, the US experience in 
balancing federalism concerns, free market rules and social rights guarantees provides “guideposts 
that are perilous to ignore”183 for Europe. 
In the US, as in most European countries, early pressures in favour of the recognition of the 
right for workers to form trade unions and take industrial action to defend their interests emerged 
during the last decades of the 19th century.184 At that time, the US federal government was 
understood as lacking substantive powers to regulate the field of industrial relations and, as such, 
the questions of unions’ rights were addressed exclusively by the several states in the exercise of 
their general welfare powers.185 Under the state common law, supreme courts in many US states 
came to recognize a right for workers to join trade unions and legalized peaceful primary strikes for 
higher wages or better working conditions.186 Through piecemeal adjudication, most states adopted 
the rule that strikes were legal unless conducted by unlawful means or for unlawful objectives, and 
they excluded government retaliation against workers going on strike.187 Nevertheless, states were 
not endowed with legislation to protect striking workers from retaliation by employers: in fact, 
under the common law, striking workers could be fired for breach of contract and  were subject to 
liability in tort.188 Moreover, many states adopted a restrictive interpretation of what lawful strikes 
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meant and, although holdings varied widely from state to state, some state courts prohibited as 
unlawful all industrial action which did not lead to immediate benefits for the workers.189 
The protection that labour began to enjoy at the state level throughout the progressive era, 
however, was put under pressure by the federal courts.190 To begin with, the US Supreme Court 
interpreted the provisions of the Federal Antitrust Act (Sherman Act)191 broadly as prohibiting 
collective action by trade unions.192 In Loewe v. Lawlor,193 the US Supreme Court ruled that 
concerted action by unions’ members in the pursuit of their interest constituted an unlawful 
combination in violation of the anti-trust rules and an interference with “the liberty of a trader to 
engage in business.”194 Secondly, in a series of decisions epitomized by Lochner v. New York,195 the 
Supreme Court held that the US Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that an individual 
not be deprived of liberty or property without “due process of law”196 included a freedom to enter 
into private contracts without any government restriction.197 Under this substantive reading of the 
“due process” clause, federal courts enforced a laissez-faire theory of economics and struck down 
as unconstitutional a host of state and federal legislations aiming at improving the social and 
working conditions of employees and the relations between labour and management.198 
Ironically, at the height of the Lochner era, the US Supreme Court held in a 1923 decision 
that the “due process” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution protected a 
constitutional right to strike.199 In the case of Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial 
Relations,200 the Supreme Court invalidated a Kansas law that banned strikes in essential industries 
and established an industrial court to solve labour-management disputes, arguing that the state 
statute deprived workers and unions of “property and liberty of contract without due process of 
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law.”201 In its 1926 decision in Dorchy v. Kansas,202 however, the Supreme Court, per Justice 
Brandeis, affirmed that “neither the common law, nor the Fourteenth Amendment [to the US 
Constitution], confers the absolute right to strike”203 and affirmed the conviction inflicted by the 
Kansas Supreme Court against a union official who had organized a strike, holding that “[t]he right 
to carry on business -- be it called liberty or property -- has value [and t]o interfere with this right 
without just cause is unlawful.”204 By and large, therefore, from the late 1890s until the mid 1930s, 
the Supreme Court “developed and applied doctrines that insulated the market place from 
constraints imposed by legislatures or collective action.”205 
By the mid 1930s, however, these doctrines were no longer tenable.206 Although the US 
Congress had already intervened during the early decades of the 20th century in the regulation of 
labour relations in interstate industries,207 the Great Depression had highlighted a need for much 
broader federal intervention in the economy. Pushed into power by a sweeping electoral victory, the 
Roosevelt Administration began a New Deal for the US, enacting major pieces of social 
legislation.208 According to the Administration, the resolution of the tensions between management 
and labour was a key ingredient to economic stabilization and to this end the legal rights of the 
unions had to be strengthened in order to ensure a workable system of collective bargaining.209 In 
1932, Congress enacted the Norris-La Guardia Act,210 “which eliminated federal court jurisdiction 
to enforce yellow dog contracts (agreement not to join a union)”211 and in 1933 Congress passed the 
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),212 which protected unions’ right to conclude collective 
agreements. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. US,213 however, the US Supreme Court invalidated 
NIRA as an unconstitutional exercise of federal power, precipitating one of the most severe 
constitutional crises in US history. As is well known, President Roosevelt threatened to change the 
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composition of the Supreme Court through a “Court-packing plan”214 and Congress enacted a new 
statute, the National Labour Relations Act (NLRA),215 which largely resembled the defunct NIRA. 
Eventually, in 1937 the Supreme Court operated a “switch in time” and upheld the constitutionality 
of the NLRA,216 definitively sanctioning the constitutionality of the New Deal legislation.217 
The NLRA – also named the Wagner Act after its sponsor, Senator Robert Wagner – 
recognized a federal right for employees to organize trade unions and to engage in industrial action 
and prohibited employers from taking anti-union activities. As clarified in its opening provision, the 
NLRA found its legal basis in Article I, §8, cl.3 of the US Constitution – the so-celled “Commerce 
Clause” – and was inspired by the goal to “promote[] the flow of commerce by removing certain 
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the 
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other 
working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and 
employees.”218 Section 7(a) of the law read: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.”219 Moreover, Section 13 affirmed that “[n]othing in this subchapter, 
except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede 
or diminish in any way the right to strike.”220 The NLRA, finally, set up a National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB),221 empowered to act as a mediator in industrial disputes, to investigate unfair labour 
practices, and to certify the representative unions for the purpose of collective bargaining in 
interstate industries.  
 As an exercise of Congress’ power to regulate inter-state commerce, the NLRA only applied 
to private firms operating in the nation-wide market and excluded many employers and workers 
from coverage, including  government employers, agricultural labourers and domestic workers.222 
In the years immediately following the enactment of the NLRA, however, many states adopted state 
labour relations acts. State laws were often modelled after the Wagner Act and extended the 
protection of the rights of labour organizations to intra-state industries.223 Nevertheless, a number of 
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states passed legislation which “place[d] restrictions on unions and on employees as well as on 
employers.”224 For almost two decades after the enactment of the NLRA, the field of industrial 
relations was understood as a policy area under concurrent control by the federal government and 
the states.225 Despite the “trend toward national integration,”226 state law coexisted with the national 
legislation and continued regulating important features of labour-management relations, including 
strikes.227 Over time, however, the application of state law different from federal law created “some 
kind of inconsistency”228 and in the 1959 case of Building Trade Council v. Garmon,229 the 
Supreme Court “held that Congress impliedly intended to exclusively occupy the field of collective 
labour relations and therefore the states [were] preempted from enacting laws attempting to regulate 
conduct which is ‘actually or arguably protected or prohibited’ by the NLRA.”230 
 The recognition of a principle of field pre-emption by federal law over state law in the area 
of industrial relations produced important consequences for the protection of the right to strike. The 
principle neatly separated the regulation of strikes for workers covered by the NLRA, falling under 
the exclusive purview of federal law, from the regulation of strikes for workers not covered by the 
NLRA, which was left to the states. In addition, it excluded that in the field of federal law, state law 
could go beyond the federal minimum, de facto transforming the NLRA into both a floor and a 
ceiling for the protection of the right to strike at the federal level. In the mid-long run, this 
arrangement did not prove positive for the protection of labour rights in the US. As has been 
argued, “[d]espite the crucial importance of the right to strike to the structure of the NLRA, over the 
sixty-plus years of the Act’s existence it has been steadily undercut by congressional amendments 
and judicial decisions.”231 In 1947, Congress enacted the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-
Harley Act),232 which limited the powers of the labour unions, prohibiting secondary boycotts, and 
making it an unfair labour practice for unions to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their 
individual rights to self-organization.233 In 1959, then, Congress enacted the Labor-Management 
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Reporting & Disclosure Act (Landum-Griffin Act),234 which amended the NLRA to “further limit[] 
the right to strike.”235 
 The most significant restrictions to the protection of the right to strike, however, came from 
the case law of the Supreme Court. As James Gray Pope has explained, five decisions were 
especially fatal for the protection of the right to strike of US workers.236 Already in the 1938 case of 
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,237 the Supreme Court ruled that employers enjoyed the 
right to permanently replace strikers. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,238 the Court stated that 
the NLRB had no power to deter unfair labour practice and could only remedy harms in 
proceedings brought before it by private parties. In NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical,239 the Supreme 
Court held that workers did not have a right of self-defence against employers who committed 
unfair labour practice. In 1965, then, in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington,240 the Supreme Court 
ruled that management could lawfully close operating a factory in retaliation against workers who 
choose to unionize. Finally, in Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB,241 the Court affirmed that employers could 
enforce trespass against union organizers, stopping them from accessing their property. By 
elevating “the state common-law rights of employers over the federal statutory rights of workers”242 
these decisions confirm that although “US labor law since the New Deal has undeniably empowered 
US workers by guaranteeing them the right to strike […] the manner in which the law has been 
interpreted and applied has constrained that right and the power it implies […] regulating workers’ 
collective action in ways designed to protect the continuity of production.”243 
 The protection of the right to strike in the state jurisdictions for the employees not covered 
by the federal NLRA reveals instead a more diversified picture. Because the federal courts never 
accepted the idea that the US Constitution included a minimum level of protection for the right to 
strike244 with which states were bound to comply in their jurisdictions,245 the several states have 
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remained free to enact very diverse regulations. The core focus of state legislations has been the 
regulation of the right to strike for public employees.246 A majority of states passed legislation that 
“forbid government employees to strike. In most states whose statutes are silent on the subject, the 
courts have ruled that strikes by government employees are illegal.”247 At the same time, some 
states legalized strikes for public employees. In 1985, for instance, in the case of County Sanitation 
District v. Los Angeles County Employee Ass’n,248 the Supreme Court of California “overturned the 
state’s common law ban on public employees strike”249 as incompatible with the state constitution. 
The recent events that occurred in the state of Ohio – where a contentious total strike ban on public 
employees was passed by the state legislature in March 2011250 and repealed by a popular 
referendum in November of the same year251 – make it clear that major controversies still surround 
the regulation of the right to strike for public employees in many US states.  
 In conclusion, the experience of the US in the protection of the right to strike reveals an 
evolving pattern. The regulation of industrial action originally fell under the general welfare powers 
of the states. For the first three decades of the 20th century, however, the free market jurisprudence 
of the federal courts represented a major challenge to an effective protection of labour unions’ 
rights. Ironically, in Wolff Packing the Supreme Court quashed a strike ban as incompatible with the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution and today that decision “remains available as 
authority for the proposition that there is a constitutional right to strike [in the US].”252 The Wagner 
Act recognized the right to strike as fundamental to the process of collective bargaining and – with 
the goal to secure the “free flow of goods in [interstate] commerce”253 – introduced a heightened 
federal protection of industrial action. However, the protection of the right to strike at the federal 
level was significantly watered-down by congressional amendments and judicial rulings over time. 
Steadily, “[s]tate common law rights of property and contract were elevated above federal statutory 
rights of self-organization and collective action through Lochner-era notions of economic due 
process and interstate commerce.”254 At the same time, the Supreme Court interpreted federal law 
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as pre-empting the field of industrial relations and left states competent only to regulate strikes by 
public employees and other workers not covered by the NLRA. Thus, nowadays the right to strike 
enjoys a limited protection at the federal level that states can neither lower nor increase.  
 
 
4. Recent developments: The case law of European Court of Human Rights 
 
The analysis of the US federal experience has revealed a number of interesting points of analogy 
with the events currently taking place in Europe. The US constitutional architecture has been 
characterized for many decades by tensions between state and federal law in the field of social 
policy and although the US Supreme Court formally acknowledged the existence of a constitutional 
right to strike, its jurisprudence has been rather hostile to an effective protection of industrial action. 
This state of affairs presents “striking parallels”255 with the dynamics that Europe is experiencing 
nowadays due to the challenge posed by Viking and Laval on the effective protection of the right to 
strike at the state level. At the same time, it is evident that major differences still remain between 
the historical experience of the US and contemporary Europe. During the New Deal, the US 
Congress, in the exercise of its commerce powers, enacted a major piece of federal legislation – the 
NLRA – which designed a coherent framework for the protection of the right to strike for 
employers and employees operating in the national market. Over time, of course, the Wagner Act 
was weakened by judicial interpretations and congressional amendments. Nevertheless, at the time 
of its enactment, the NLRA represented an effective way to address the challenge posed by judicial 
review of social rights under free movement rules.256  
In this Section I want to suggest that a number of recent developments in the legal systems 
of the EU and the ECHR may design a possible response to the challenge of ineffectiveness in the 
protection of the right to strike raised by the case law of the ECJ. However, the transformations that 
are taking place in Europe seem to follow a path which is different from that of the US. Rather than 
being based on legislative action, in fact, changes in the regulation of the right to strike in Europe 
may derive primarily from an innovative jurisprudence of the ECtHR. On 12 November 2008, in 
fact, in the case of Demir & Baykara v. Turkey,257 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR delivered a 
landmark decision recognizing that Article 11 ECHR protects a right to collective bargaining. This 
ruling opened the way for the recognition of an ECHR right to strike in the ECtHR’s decision 
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Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey of 21 April 2009.258 The potential influence of these two decisions is 
amplified by the entry into force of the EU Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Pursuant to the new 
Article 6 TEU, the EU shall accede to the ECHR and the negotiations to accomplish this goal are 
already at quite an advanced stage. Once accession is completed, the EU will be subject to a review 
by the ECtHR for compliance with the ECHR. It is hard to anticipate whether the ECtHR will 
necessarily hold decisions like Viking and Laval to be incompatible with Article 11 ECHR. Yet, it is 
worthwhile considering the potential impact of the new right to strike jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
on the constitutional dynamics at play in the EU. 
The ECtHR’s case of Demir & Baykara originated from an application against Turkey 
lodged by two Turkish nationals who were members of Tüm Bel Sen, a trade union representing 
civil servants. In the early 1990s, the trade union entered into a collective agreement with a local 
municipality. The agreement was however challenged in court and was soon annulled and declared 
unenforceable by the Yargıtay, the Turkish Court of Cassation. According to the Court of Cassation, 
the ordinary statute governing collective agreements and the right to strike could not apply to 
relations between civil servants and a public administration. The Court of Cassation further pointed 
out that the legislation in force at the time when the trade union was founded did not allow civil 
servants to form trade unions. Having exhausted the domestic venues of redress, Mr. Demir and 
Mrs. Baykara brought proceedings before the ECtHR, complaining that Turkey had denied them 
first, the right to form trade unions and, second, the right to engage in collective bargaining and 
enter into collective agreements in violation of Article 11 ECHR. On 21 November 2006, the 
Second Section of the ECtHR unanimously held that there had been a violation of Article 11.259 The 
decision, however, was appealed by Turkey before the Grand Chamber. 
The Grand Chamber began its ruling by surveying the evolving Turkish legal framework for 
the regulation of collective bargaining rights for trade unions in the private and public sectors and 
mapping the relevant international and European legal instruments protecting freedom of 
organization and the right to collective bargaining for civil servants. In a remarkable openness 
toward judicial cross-fertilization,260 the ECtHR then clarified that “the methodology”261 it would 
adopt to examine the merits of the complaints submitted under Article 11 ECHR would be to 
interpret the ECHR in light of other international human rights texts and the relevant practice of the 
Contracting parties. The ECtHR observed that “the common international or domestic law standards 
of European States reflect a reality that the Court cannot disregard”262 and underlined how “in 
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searching for common ground among the norms of international law it has never distinguished 
between sources of law according to whether or not they have been signed or ratified by the 
respondent State.”263 The ECtHR thus synthesized its approach stating that: “in defining the 
meaning of terms and notions in the text of the [ECHR], [it] can and must take into account 
elements of international law other than the [ECHR], the interpretation of such elements by 
competent organs, and the practice of European States reflecting their common values. […] In this 
context, it is not necessary for the respondent State to have ratified the entire collection of 
instruments that are applicable in respect of the precise subject matter of the case concerned. It will 
be sufficient […] that the relevant international instruments denote a continuous evolution in the 
norms and principles applied in international law or in the domestic law of the majority of member 
States of the Council of Europe and show, in a precise area, that there is common ground in modern 
societies.”264  
Having explained its methodology, the ECtHR moved to the first question, i.e. whether the 
Turkish prohibition for civil servants to form trade unions was compatible with Article 11 ECHR. 
The ECtHR noticed that Article 11(2) ECHR allowed the restriction of the right to assemble and 
form trade unions for “members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the 
State” but underlined how this provision had “to be construed strictly.”265 The ECtHR, in particular, 
argued that municipal civil servants, who are not engaged in the administration of the State, should 
not be subjected to a limitation of their right to organise and observed how “these considerations 
find support in the majority of the relevant international instruments and in the practice of European 
States,”266 including Article 5 ESC, which guarantees the right of workers to form trade unions and 
does not allow restrictions of this right in respect of members of the administration of the State. 
Having acknowledged that the applicants, as civil servants, could not “be excluded from the scope 
of Article 11 [ECHR]”267 the ECtHR assessed whether the restriction imposed by Turkey on the 
applicants in the present case could still be justified under Article 11(2) ECHR as “[being] 
‘prescribed by law’, pursu[ing] one or more legitimate aims and [being] ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ for the achievement of those aims.”268 The ECtHR noted that the first two tiers of the 
proportionality analysis were satisfied. However, the ECtHR denied that the restriction could be 
regarded as necessary in a democratic society and – quoting the previous decision of the ECtHR 
Second Section – affirmed that “it ha[d] not been shown before it that the absolute prohibition on 
                                                 
263
 Ibid par 78 
264
 Ibid par 85-86 
265
 Ibid par 97 
266
 Ibid par 98 
267
 Ibid par 107 
268
 Ibid par 117  
 174
forming trade unions imposed on civil servants [...] by Turkish law, as it applied at the material 
time, met a ‘pressing social need’. The mere fact that the ‘legislation did not provide for such a 
possibility’ is not sufficient to warrant as radical a measure as the dissolution of a trade union.”269 
The ECtHR thus concluded that there had been “a violation of Article 11 [ECHR] on account of the 
failure to recognise the right of the applicants, as municipal civil servants, to form a trade union.”270 
The ECtHR then moved to the second question raised by the applicants, re the compatibility 
with Article 11 ECHR of the decision by the Turkish Court of Cassation to annul the collective 
agreement signed by the Tüm Bel Sen trade union with the local municipality. The ECtHR 
reassessed its previous case law on the substance of the right of association protected by Article 11 
ECHR. The ECtHR recalled that its jurisprudence had so far identified in Article 11 ECHR the 
“following essential elements […]: the right to form and join a trade union, the prohibition of 
closed-shop agreements and the right for a trade union to seek to persuade the employer to hear 
what it has to say on behalf of its members.”271 In tune with a dynamic interpretation of the ECHR, 
however, the ECtHR affirmed that “[t]his list is not finite. On the contrary, it is subject to evolution 
depending on particular developments in labour relations. In this connection it is appropriate to 
remember that the [ECHR] is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-
day conditions, and in accordance with developments in international law, so as to reflect the 
increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights.”272 The 
ECtHR surveyed a number of international instruments concerning labour standards and 
emphasized how the right to bargain collectively had gained increasing protection under the 
International Labour Organization, Article 6(2) ESC as well as through the relevant EU and 
domestic law and practice. In light of these developments, the ECtHR considered “that its case-law 
to the effect that the right to bargain collectively and to enter into collective agreements does not 
constitute an inherent element of Article 11 should be reconsidered”273 and, with a milestone 
statement, affirmed that: “having regard to the developments in labour law, both international and 
national, and to the practice of Contracting States in such matters, the right to bargain collectively 
with the employer has, in principle, become one of the essential elements of the ‘right to form and 
to join trade unions for the protection of [one’s] interests’ set forth in Article 11 [ECHR].”274 
In light of the foregoing path-breaking conclusion, the ECtHR moved to examine whether 
the interference with the applicants’ trade-union freedom resulting from the annulment of the 
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collective agreement by the Turkish Court of Cassation could be regarded as justified under Article 
11(2) ECHR. The ECtHR, thus, undertook a new proportionality analysis of the action of the 
Turkish judicial institutions, to assess whether the restrictions they had imposed on the applicants’ 
rights were prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and were necessary in a democratic society. 
The ECtHR accepted that, at the material time, the interference was prescribed by law and 
acknowledged that it pursued thegitimate aim of the prevention of disorder.275 Nevertheless, the 
ECtHR rejected the arguments made by the Turkish government that the restriction was necessary 
in a democratic society. The ECtHR noted that “at the material time a number of elements showed 
that the refusal to accept that the applicants, as municipal civil servants, enjoyed the right to bargain 
collectively and thus to persuade the authority to enter into a collective agreement, did not 
correspond to a ‘pressing social need’.”276 Firstly, “the right for civil servants to be able, in 
principle, to bargain collectively, was [already] recognised by international law instruments, both 
universal and regional.”277 Secondly, Turkey had already ratified “the principal instrument[s] 
protecting, internationally, the right for workers to bargain collectively and enter into collective 
agreements”278 and was bound to implement these agreements within its legal system. As such, the 
ECtHR found that “the impugned interference, namely the annulment ex tunc of the collective 
agreement entered into by the applicants’ union following collective bargaining with the authority 
was not ‘necessary in a democratic society’, within the meaning of Article 11(2) [ECHR]”279 and 
concluded that there had been “a violation of Article 11 [ECHR] on this point also, in respect of 
both the applicants’ trade union and the applicants themselves.”280 
The decision of the Grand Chamber in Demir & Baykara represents a major turning point in 
the case law of the ECtHR on the right to industrial action. Although technically the decision 
addresses only the extent to which Article 11 ECHR protects a right for civil servants to form trade 
unions and to engage in collective bargaining, the ruling anticipates the need for protection of the 
right to strike under the ECHR. As is self-evident for labour lawyers, indeed, the right to collective 
bargaining and the right to collective action constitute two faces of the same coin: trade unions are 
endowed with a real bargaining power only to the extent to which they can resort to industrial 
action to strengthen their claims. As such the protection of a right to collective bargaining by 
necessity implies a protection of a right to strike. Not surprisingly, therefore, just a few months after 
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the ground-breaking Demir & Baykara decision, the Third Section of the ECtHR ruled, in Enerji 
Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey, that Article 11 ECHR protected a right to strike.  
The case of Enerji concerned a Turkish trade union representing civil servants working in 
the fields of land registration, energy, infrastructure services and motorway construction. In 1996, 
the trade union expressed its intention to go on strike. In reaction, the Turkish government enacted a 
circular (n° 1996/21) which, inter alia, prohibited public-sector employees from taking part in the 
strike. Ignoring the prohibition of the ministerial circular, a number of workers of the Enerji Yapi-
Yol Sen union went on strike and were subjected to disciplinary sanctions. Unable to obtain redress 
in the domestic courts, the Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen union brought a case before the ECtHR claiming 
that the conduct of the Turkish authorities, and specifically the ministerial circular n° 1996/21, had 
breached its right to trade union freedom. The ECtHR opened its opinion by referring to the Grand 
Chamber’s decision in Demir and Baykara and then addressed the question whether the action of 
the Turkish government amounted to an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 11 
ECHR. The ECtHR recalled how the ECHR requires “legislation to allow trade unions, in a way 
which do not contravene Article 11 [ECHR], to fight for the protection of the interest of their 
members”281 and affirmed, with another ground-breaking statement, that “[t]he strike, which allows 
unions to make their voice heard, constitutes an important aspect for the members of a union to 
protect their interests.”282 To support its statement, the ECtHR noticed how “the right to strike is 
recognized by the supervisory bodies of the International Labor Organization (ILO) as an 
inseparable corollary of the freedom to associate in trade unions.”283 Furthermore, it “recalled that 
also the [ESC] protects the right to strike as a means to ensure the effective exercise of the right to 
collective bargaining.”284 
Having decided that the right to strike enjoyed protection under Article 11 ECHR, the 
ECtHR moved to review whether the interference with the applicant’s right by the Turkish 
government could be regarded as justified under Article 11(2) ECHR. In this regard, the ECtHR 
acknowledged that “in the case at hand, the circular n° 1996/21 enacted in the exercise of a 
normative power constituted a legal basis for the interference.”285 The ECtHR instead expressed 
doubts that the goal sought by the Turkish government in prohibiting the right to strike pursued a 
legitimate end “but it found [it] useless to address the question.”286 The ECtHR, in fact, found that 
the decision of the Turkish authorities could not pass muster even under the last and stricter tier of 
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its proportionality test because the measure could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic 
society. The ECtHR “recognize[d] that the right to strike is not absolute. It can be subject to certain 
conditions and restrictions. As such the principle of trade union freedom can be compatible with a 
strike ban for civil servants exercising essential State function.”287 However, the ECtHR also 
affirmed that “while certain categories of civil servants can be prohibited from taking strike action, 
the ban cannot extend in general to all public servants, as in the present case, or to employees of 
State-run commercial or industrial companies.”288 According to the ECtHR, “a lawful restriction of 
the right to strike shall define as much strictly and clearly as possible the categories of workers 
concerned. In the view of the [ECtHR], in the case at hand, the circular had been drafted in general 
terms, completely depriving all public servants of the right to take strike action, without 
appropriately balancing the imperative needs of Article 11(2) [ECHR].”289 The Court thus found 
that “the adoption and application of the circular did not answer a ‘pressing social need’ and that 
there had been disproportionate interference with the applicant union’s rights enshrined in Article 
11 [ECHR]”290 and condemned Turkey for violating the ECHR.  
Demir & Baykara and Enerji transformed the protection of the right to strike in the ECHR 
system. In the former, the ECtHR ruled for the first time that Article 11 ECHR protects a right for 
workers to engage in collective bargaining and, in the follow-up case, it held that Article 11 ECHR 
also protects a right to take collective action. As has been argued, the decisions “breathe[d] life into 
a hitherto moribund Article 11 [ECHR]”291 and opened a new page in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR in the field of social and economic rights.292 As previously explained,293 the ECtHR had 
traditionally interpreted Article 11 ECHR “in a restrictive conservative manner, limiting its content 
and scope in the area of trade union rights.”294 By resorting to a dynamic interpretation of the 
ECHR and drawing inspiration from the legal instruments in force both in international law and EU 
law and from the evolving practice of the contracting parties, the ECtHR abandoned its previous 
case law and concluded that the rights to collective bargaining and to collective actions are now an 
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essential component of the right to assemble and to form trade unions enshrined in Article 11 
ECHR.295  
Furthermore, in defining the scope of protection of these rights, the ECtHR adopted a ‘labor 
friendly’ approach. In Enerji, in particular, the ECtHR recognized that the right to strike, albeit not 
absolute, may be restricted by state governments only to pursue a legitimate end and if necessary in 
a democratic society. In the ECtHR’s view, therefore, a presumption of legality attaches to 
industrial action, and it is up to the government to demonstrate the proportionality of the 
interference with the worker’s right to strike. From this point of view, it may not be exaggerated to 
claim that the implications of the decisions of the ECtHR could be “dramatic.”296 On the one hand, 
Demir & Baykara and Enerji are likely “to have a significant effect on domestic law”297 especially 
in those countries which are currently endowed with a very restrictive regulation of the right to 
strike.298 On the other hand, the two decisions “naturally raise[] the question about the relationship 
between the [ECJ] and the [ECtHR] case-law concerning the right to collective action.”299 Indeed, 
the ECJ and the ECtHR have reached quite different conclusions in their decisions, reflecting 
alternative understandings of the meaning of the right to strike, of the scope of its protection and of 
the limits to its exercise. However, precisely these transformations that occurred in the case law of 
the ECtHR may lead the ECJ to review its Viking and Laval jurisprudence on the right to strike. 
The ECJ already recognizes the case law of the ECtHR as a guiding source in its human 
rights jurisprudence.300 The impact of the decisions of the ECtHR on the legal system of the EU, in 
addition, would increase after the entry into force of the Accession agreement of the EU to the 
ECHR.301 At the moment the EU is not yet […] a party to the ECHR and therefore [is] not 
answerable directly to the ECtHR.”302 Nevertheless, once the EU becomes a party to the ECHR, it 
seems likely that the ECtHR will review the action of the EU institutions, including the ECJ, for 
compatibility with the ECHR. By the same token, the ECtHR may regard the standard for the 
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protection of the right to strike developed by the ECJ in Viking and Laval as falling short of the 
Enerij benchmark.303 As some have argued, therefore, control by the ECtHR may force the ECJ into 
“aligning itself to the [ECtHR] line.”304 If this were to happen, it seems clear that the 
transformations that have taken place in the ECHR legal order could play a fundamental role in 
addressing the challenge of ineffectiveness produced by the tensions between domestic laws and 
EU law in the field of strike law. Indeed, as Keith Ewing and John Hendy have sharply observed: 
Demir & Baykara and Enerji “provide the best opportunity to clean up the mess left by the ECJ in 
the Viking and Laval cases”305 by strengthening labour rights vis-à-vis economic rules of free 
market and competition. 
Several caveats are, however, due when anticipating the potential transformative effect of 
the ECtHR case law on the protection of the right to strike in the EU legal order.306 In particular, 
Enerij held that Turkey (a non-EU member state) was in violation of the ECHR because its 
legislation set up a total strike ban for public employees, hence depriving the applicants tout court 
of their rights under Article 11 ECHR. Nevertheless, Viking and Laval established a much less 
restrictive regime for the exercise of the right to industrial action. Workers were entrusted with a 
fundamental right to strike but this right was subject to a proportionality analysis, with the goal of 
balancing its exercise together with other fundamental rights (e.g. freedom of movement). As such, 
it is not self-evident that the Viking and Laval standard is necessarily incompatible with Article 11 
ECHR. At the same time, in Enerji, the ECtHR acknowledged that the right to strike is not absolute 
– not to mention the traditional margin of appreciation that the ECtHR recognizes to the contracting 
parties in the application of the ECHR. A final issue to consider, then, is that the ECtHR classically 
rules on the ‘vertical’ obligations stemming from the ECHR: in Enerij, the ECtHR held that a state 
could not disproportionately restrict the Article 11 ECHR right of a private party. It is uncertain, 
however, how Article 11 ECHR would operate in a ‘horizontal’ situation, where i.e. a private party 
claims that its labour rights have been restricted by another private party (e.g. a company) which 
also claims to be exercising its fundamental rights (e.g. to pursue an economic activity). 
In conclusion, in Demir & Baykara and, later, in Enerji, the ECtHR has allowed the right to 
bargain collectively and to take industrial action to become one of the essential elements of the right 
to form and join a trade union for the protection of one’s interests enshrined in Article 11 ECHR. 
These decisions represent a landmark judicial development in the framework of the ECHR, with 
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potentially far reaching consequences also for the EU. As Sophie Robin-Olivier has argued: “as a 
result of the continuous extension of the rights granted to unions under Article 11, in stark contrast 
to the […] developments taking place in the EU, the ECtHR has appeared as the major actor in the 
development of European labour law, from a trade union perspective.”307 The jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR – and the accession of the EU to the ECHR – may put strong pressure on the ECJ to revisit 
its case law on the right to strike with beneficial effects on the challenges which currently 
characterize the European multilevel regime. Yet, as I have tried to emphasise, a number of caveats 
need to be taken into account before concluding too rapidly that the ECJ will inevitably follow 
(willy-nilly) the approach of the ECtHR. Indeed, it may be that the transformations taking place at 
the ECHR level may not suffice to address the challenge of ineffectiveness discussed in Section 2. 
From this point of view, perhaps, other transformations within the EU legal order are needed. The 
next Section will discuss one of these. 
 
 
5. Future prospects: beyond the Lisbon Treaty? 
 
The previous Section has analyzed several recent transformations taking place in the case law of the 
ECtHR and has emphasized their importance for the protection of the right to strike in Europe. At 
the same time, Section 5 has warned about the ability of these judicial developments to offer a fully 
satisfactory answer to the challenge of ineffectiveness that emerges from the interaction between 
domestic and supranational law in the field of labour rights. This Section therefore investigates 
what additional reforms could be undertaken in the EU legal order to ensure a long-term solution to 
the tensions between social rights and free market that currently characterizes the European 
multilevel architecture. In particular, whereas the recent case law of the ECtHR promises an 
uncertain judicial response to the critical balance between market integration and national social 
rights struck by the ECJ in Viking and Laval, in this Section I will explore ways in which a 
legislative response to these dynamics may prove to be more enduring and successful.308 In doing 
this, I walk a path which was traced years ago by Joseph H.H. Weiler and Sybilla Fries, albeit in a 
more general context.309 In a well-known study about the competences of the EU institutions in the 
field of human rights, the two authors emphasized how “it is not only the [ECJ], as one of the 
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institutions of the [EC], that has a duty to ensure the observance of fundamental rights in the field of 
[EC] law, but […] such duty rests, inherently, on all Institutions of the [EC] exercising their 
competences within the field of [EC] law.”310 
As such, I will not focus here on the role of the CFR, although, with the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the CFR has acquired binding value.311 A major factor seems indeed to weaken 
the transformative capacity of the CFR as a legal instrument in the field of strike law. This has not 
so much to do with Protocol No. 30 on the application of the CFR in Poland and the UK. It is well 
known, in fact, that the Lisbon Treaty has introduced into EU primary law a special protocol with 
the goal of excluding “the ability of the [ECJ], or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the [UK], to 
find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the 
[UK] are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.” This 
applies “in particular and for the avoidance of doubt” with the regard to the social rights codified in 
Title IV of the CFR (where Article 28 on the rights to collective bargaining and collective action is 
included). Scholars debate about the real meaning of this Protocol: whereas some have argued that 
Protocol No. 30 “is totally useless [since] it can not prohibit lawyers from requesting the application 
of the rights codified in the CFR,”312 others have emphasized that the Protocol may “contain a 
genuine opt-out”313 in the area of social rights. Beyond the debate on the nature of the Protocol, 
however, there seems to be another fundamental weakness related to the CFR. The CFR was 
already taken into account by the ECJ, despite its lack of legal value, in Viking and Laval and it is 
not clear how its change of status would now compel the ECJ to reconsider its prior case law.314  
 In this Section I therefore explore another path and advance the argument that the most 
effective way of protecting the right to strike in Europe is through the adoption of an EU 
regulation.315 This regulation, to be enacted according to the ordinary EU law-making process, 
should clearly state that industrial action in labour-management disputes having a cross-border 
dimension is protected by EU law and possibly define the means of lawful collective action and the 
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procedure to be followed by unions before going on strike. To substantiate my claim, I will draw 
some lessons from the experience of the US in the field of strike law. As was argued, the 
constitutional experience of the US during the Lochner era provides an anti-model for Europe.316 
However, the New Deal also offers some positive lessons.317 In particular, I will try to explain how 
the adoption of an “EU Wagner Act” may be a possible solution if Europe wants to avoid a “race to 
the bottom” in the protection of social rights.318 In this light, I will also analyze the recent 
Commission’s proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the right to strike in the context of the 
single market and underline both its strengths and weaknesses. Needless to say, the proposal for an 
“EU Wagner Act” is controversial and raises a number of questions about its legal and political 
feasibility. The TFEU, moreover, seemingly includes an express obstacle to the enactment of any 
such legal act. Otherwise, the same US example warns us from putting too much faith in the 
capacity of a legislative measure such as a Wagner Act to address the tensions between social rights 
and a free market in a federal system. Yet, despite all this, I am convinced that it is valuable to 
discuss the possibility of a regulation for the protection of the right to strike in the EU by taking into 
account the US constitutional experience.319 
 The challenge that Europe is facing in the protection of the right to strike is the consequence 
of the increasing impact of EU free market rules over the national regulations of industrial relations. 
As Miguel Poiares Maduro has argued, “European economic integration […] has generated 
pressures towards deregulation and challenged social standards and welfare.”320 Decisions such as 
Viking and Laval have been hailed from a free market perspective321 but criticized from a labour 
law perspective for the repercussions they produce at the national level and for their interference 
with fundamental features of collective labour law and industrial relations of the states. In this 
context, however, it seems misplaced to complain that the EU is violating “prerogatives of Member 
                                                 
316
 See I.H. Eliasoph (n 166) 467; D. Nicol (n 255) 308 
317
 In this chapter I am trying to explore how the US can provide useful guideposts for Europe in tackling the challenges 
of balancing free market and labour protection in a federalism-based system of government. It may sound obvious, but 
it is probably safe clarifying, that this does not imply that the US is a perfect system nor excludes that there may be 
ways in which the US can learn from Europe in the protection of social rights. This, in itself, could be the object of an 
entirely new research. See eg G. Katrougalos (n 167) 225 
318
 Catherine Barnard, ‘Regulating Competitive Federalism in the European Union? The Case of EC Social Policy’ in Jo 
Shaw (ed), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (Hart Publishing 2000) 49, 57 
319
 In undertaking this comparative exercise I am fully aware of the warnings by Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and 
Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37:1 Modern Law Review 1 in too easily advising the “transplant” of legal 
solutions from one legal system to another in the field of labour law. Yet, I am convinced (and I will try to demonstrate) 
that the strong institutional similarities between the European and US constitutional arrangements based on federalism, 
makes the use of comparative sources appropriate and reliable in advancing reforms de jure condendo 
320
 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and Social Rights in the EU’ in 
Philip Alston et al (eds), The Eu and Human Rights (OUP 1999) 449, 464 
321
 See eg Frank Benyon, Direct Investment, National Champions and the EU Treaty Freedoms (Hart Publishing 2010) 
 183 
States”322 and to recall the good old days in which nation states were sovereign in regulating their 
industrial relations systems without any EU interference.323 The tensions currently occurring within 
the European multilevel arrangement oblige us to reconsider the strategy needed to take social 
rights seriously. The problem today is not the existence of a transnational common market in which 
goods, services and capitals are free to move unhindered. The problem is, rather, that the creation of 
a Europe-wide continental market “has not been compensated for by social policies arising at the 
level of the [EU].”324 The case of the right to strike demonstrates how national responses are no 
longer conceivable in a multilevel architecture in which a transnational court can umpire conflicts 
between federal free movement rules and state labour law guarantees. 
 This is where the genius of the New Deal emerges. In the US, the challenge of combining a 
continental market in which commerce could freely flow with the need to protect social rights (a 
need that the Great Depression had made ever more pressing) was ensured through a massive 
transfer of competences to the federal government. Bruce Ackerman has famously described the 
New Deal as a turning point in US constitutional history – a constitutional moment even in the 
absence of constitutional amendments.325 It is from the New Deal “that we date the modern 
interventionist national government, with its comprehensive labor and welfare policies, its extended 
web of national regulatory measures covering vital economic sectors formerly outside the scope of 
federal controls.”326 As explained in Section 4, a major piece in the New Deal puzzle was the 
Wagner Act. The NLRA set up a solid template for the regulation of labour-management relations, 
giving a legislative recognition to the right to strike for workers engaged in interstate commerce and 
grounding the protection of collective action directly in federal law. By setting up at the federal 
level a protection that was no longer possible at the state level, the Wagner Act represented the most 
effective response to the challenge of combining free markets and social rights in the US federal 
system. I have already emphasized how the NLRA was slowly weakened by judicial interpretation 
and legislative amendments.327 Yet this should not blind us from appreciating that, at the time of its 
enactment, “in some ways the Wagner Act amounted to a workers’ bill of rights.”328 
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Although it may “seem odd to draw on the US model to save the European social model 
from [its current] challenges”329 I argue that the EU should endow itself with its own Wagner Act. 
This could be done with the enactment of a regulation which clearly establishes the prima facie 
lawfulness of industrial action taken by unions and workers to protect their economic interests. The 
regulation would be applicable in all cross-border situations (i.e. when industrial action takes place 
at the transnational level), leaving the member states free to regulate collective action in purely 
internal situations (i.e. when industrial action has no implication on the functioning of the internal 
market). To secure clarity and adequately balance free movement rules and social protections, the 
regulation could specify the reasons and forms which legitimize industrial action and the possible 
procedure to be followed by trade unions before going on strike. Although this solution may 
represent a step backward for countries which ensure a broad constitutional right to strike and show 
a tolerant attitude to conflict, the compromise may still be acceptable. Indeed, a regulation of 
permitted industrial action would free the right to strike from the prior judicial assessment of its 
proportionality and ultima ratio which is currently required under the Viking and Laval standard. 
Additionally, as Claire Kilpatrick has explained in relations to the Posted Workers Directive, 
the adoption of EU legislative measures dealing with the internal market and the protection of social 
rights may have several advantages.330 First, legislation offers a structure. Second, it gives valuable 
detail and certainty about what is lawful or not. Third, it allows for adaptation. Fourth, it provides a 
vehicle for the consolidation and codification of the case law of the ECJ. At the same time, 
however, legislation also allows for reaction to the ECJ jurisprudence, providing an opportunity to 
“steer future interpretative developments in the area at issue by signalling to the [ECJ] the views of 
other institutions as expressed in legislative output […] Or it may represent an attempt to curb or 
curtail aspects of [ECJ] jurisprudence considered undesirable by one or more of the other 
institutions.”331 Last but not least, legislation has a democratic imprimatur. Evidence, indeed, 
reveals that the ECJ takes legislative output seriously332 and that it rarely challenges a statutory 
intervention of the EU legislature even when the latter differs from the ECJ’s previous case law. 
From this point of view, an EU law regulating the exercise of the right to strike in transnational 
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disputes in a way which is more protective for labour than the Viking and Laval standard would 
oblige the ECJ to reconsider its case law. Precisely this effect was produced by the NLRA: the 
Wagner Act – despite its merely statutory and non-constitutional nature – forced the Supreme Court 
to reconsider its previous jurisprudence on the extension of federal powers and economic due 
process, thus opening a new page in the history of US constitutional law. 
All this leads us to think about the possible legal basis for this regulation. From a 
constitutional law point of view, it would seem that the most appropriate basis for an EU measure 
regulating the right to strike would be Article 28 EU CFR. The provision, in fact, recognizes a right 
to collective bargaining and collective action “in accordance with EU law.” This provision “per se 
may form the impetus for the introduction of new legislation,”333 exactly as happens in national 
systems where constitutional provisions recognizing a right to strike have been the basis for state 
legislation in labour-management relations. However, it is well known that the CFR includes a 
general clause, Article 51(2), which states that the CFR “does not extend the field of application of 
Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or 
modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.” A similar statement is made in Article 6(1)(2) 
TEU which affirms that “[t]he provisions of the [CFR] shall not extend in any way the competences 
of the [EU] as defined in the Treaties.” Furthermore, as mentioned above,334 the UK and Poland 
secured during the negotiation of Lisbon Treaty the adoption of a special Protocol No. 30 which 
aims at excluding the application of the CFR – and notably Title IV, which includes Article 28 – in 
the UK and Poland. All these factors make it unlikely that the CFR can be used as a source of 
legislative action at the EU level. 
From a labour law point of view, then, an adequate legal basis for the enactment of a EU act 
regulating the right to strike would be Article 151 TFEU, which details the competences of the EU 
in the field of social policy and the commitment of the EU to ensure “proper social protection [and] 
dialogue between management and labour.”335 It is well known, however, that a major textual 
obstacle prevents the EU institutions from resorting to the general EU competence in the field of 
social policy to protect a right to strike. According to the already mentioned Article 153(5) TFEU, 
“[t]he provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or 
the right to impose lock-outs.” It is ironic that a strong lobby in favour of the codification of this 
provision in the EU treaties has come not only from the UK (the EU member state with the lowest 
standard of protection of industrial action) but also from countries such as the Nordic states, with an 
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enhanced national legislation for the protection of the right to strike.336 These countries thought that, 
with this no-competence clause in the EU treaties, they could insulate their domestic systems from 
the influence of EU law. In fact, Viking and Laval swept aside this expectation denying that former 
Article 137(5) TEC could limit the application of the EU free movement rules when action by trade 
unions interfered with freedom of establishment or freedom to provide services. However, Article 
153(5) remains now in the statute books – with the single effect of preventing the EU from 
regulating the right to strike in a more ‘labour-friendly’ way under its social policy competences. 
Not all is lost, however. The US experience can once again suggest a way of finding a legal 
basis in the EU treaties to adopt an EU regulation on the right to strike. The Wagner Act, in fact, 
was enacted by the US Congress in the exercise of its commerce powers, i.e. under the general 
power that the federal legislature has “[t]o regulate commerce […] among the several states.” As 
James Gray Pope has explained: “This was the result of a conscious choice by the bill’s creator, 
Senator Robert Wagner of New York. Labor leaders and others had urged the Senator to ground his 
bill not on Congress’s commerce power but on its human rights powers. […] Philosophically, 
Senator Wagner took a similar view of his bill […] But Senator Wagner adhered to the commerce 
power as a constitutional justification.”337 This was politically the wisest strategy to ensure that the 
statute would obtain sufficient support throughout the legislative process and later stand review 
before the Supreme Court (which had already struck down the NIRA as an unconstitutional exercise 
of congressional power).338 This choice, of course, had its drawbacks.339 However, the NLRA 
ensured that labour rights would be better protected than it was under the prior jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court on the understanding that “[e]xperience has proved that protection by law of the 
right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, 
impairment, or interruption”340 rather than damages it. 
The EU could follow the same path. A regulation on strike action could be based on the EU 
competence to regulate the internal market.341 The general provision of Article 26 TFEU and the 
specific clauses on the free movement of goods, free movement of services and freedom of 
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establishment could supply a sufficient justification for the EU to legislate in this field. The 
example of the Posted Workers Directive shows that it is possible to resort to a legal basis in the EU 
treaties dealing with the internal market to also ensure the protection of labour rights:342 indeed, as 
the Directive clarifies “promotion of the transnational provision of services requires a climate of fair 
competition and measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers.”343 At the same time, it is 
well known that the issue of strike action loomed large during the debates leading to the adoption of 
the Monti Regulation344 on the functioning of the internal market in relation to the free movement 
of goods among the member states.345 In its final version, under the pressure of the trade unions, the 
Monti Regulation excluded the field of industrial action from its discipline, stating that: “This 
Regulation may not be interpreted as affecting in any way the exercise of fundamental rights as 
recognised in Member States, including the right or freedom to strike. These rights may also include 
the right or freedom to take other actions covered by the specific industrial relations systems in 
Member States.”346 The regulation under discussion here should instead follow a different path and 
set up a framework for the protection of the right to strike. 
 The direction suggested in this chapter seems to have been recently followed by the EU 
Commission which, on 21 March 2012, brought forward a proposal for a regulation “On the 
exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and 
the freedom to provide services.”347 The Commission’s proposal – which draws from the report of 9 
May 2010 by former Commissioner Mario Monti,348 and is thus referred in jargon as the Monti 2 
Regulation349 – pursues the goal to “lay[] down the general principles and rules applicable at Union 
level with respect to the exercise of the fundamental right to take collective action within the 
context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.”350 As the 
Commission stated in the explanatory memorandum accompanying its proposal, the regulation 
seeks to address the “tensions between the freedoms to provide services and of establishment, and 
the exercise of fundamental rights such as the right of collective bargaining and the right to 
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industrial action”351 exposed by the ECJ’s decisions in Viking and Laval. According to the 
Commission, in fact, a regulatory intervention at the EU level would be, among the various policy 
options, “the most effective and efficient solution to address the specific objective [of] reducing 
tensions between national industrial relation systems and the freedom to provide services.”352 From 
this point of view, henceforth, the ratio of the Commission’s proposal strikingly corresponds to the 
arguments advanced before in favor of a Wagner Act-style legislative intervention at the EU level. 
 As a legal basis for its proposal, however, the Commission argued that the regulation should 
be based on Article 352 TFEU, which states that “[i]f action by the [EU] should prove necessary, 
within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in 
the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the [EU] 
Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.” Hence, whereas I had suggested that the EU 
institutions could adopt the regulation on the basis of the internal market powers, which may be 
equated to the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution, the Commission proposed as a legal basis 
Article 352 TFEU, which may be seen as the EU’s equivalent to Article I, §8, cl.18 of the US 
Constitution, the so-called “Necessary and Proper Clause”. It is noteworthy, however, that also the 
Commission did not found an insurmountable obstacle in drafting its proposal in the existence of 
Article 153(5) TFEU. Rather, as it clarified in its explanatory memorandum: “Article 153(5) TFEU 
excludes the right to strike from the range of matters that can be regulated across the EU by way of 
minimum standards through Directives. However, the [ECJ] rulings have clearly shown that the fact 
that Article 153 does not apply to the right to strike does not as such exclude collective action from 
the scope of EU law.”353 As such, the Commission’s proposal reflects the understanding that, after 
Viking and Laval, the goal to shield national industrial relations systems from EU law, originally 
pursued by Article 153(5), has become moot and that action at the EU level is now permitted to 
ensure greater protection of labor rights. 
 Nevertheless, from the point of view of the content, the proposed regulation does not seem 
to enshrine any ground-braking provision. After stating in a somehow cryptic way, in Article 1(2), 
that the regulation shall not affect, in the purely internal situations,354 “the exercise of fundamental 
rights as recognised in the Member States, including the right or freedom to strike or to take other 
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action covered by the specific industrial relations systems in Member States in accordance with 
national law and practices”, the regulation reads in Article 2 that “[t]he exercise of the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services enshrined in the Treaty shall respect the 
fundamental right to take collective action, including the right or freedom to strike, and conversely, 
the exercise of the fundamental right to take collective action, including the right or freedom to 
strike, shall respect these economic freedoms.” This provision, which represents the central clause 
of the regulation, in fact, simply restates the general principle of proportionality, which, in line with 
the practice of the ECJ, is the standard tool for the reconciliation of different, conflicting 
constitutional interests. Nevertheless, precisely because the application of the principle of 
proportionality by the ECJ was at the core of the Viking and Laval rulings (and at the core of the 
criticism to these decisions) it is difficult to see how this provision of the proposed regulation is 
likely to trigger a change in the case law of the ECJ and allegedly enhance the social dimension of 
the EU. Article 3 of Commission’s proposal, then, contains some procedural provisions on 
mediation and conciliation of labour-management disputes.355 Yet, it is unclear to what extent these 
procedures will be uniformly available throughout the EU until the social partners agree on a proper 
contractual regime of alternative dispute resolutions in transnational labour disputes.356 
 Overall, in the end, the Commission’s proposal for a Monti 2 Regulation on the exercise of 
the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services may be regarded as consistent with the argument advanced in this 
chapter that action at the EU level is required to address the tensions between state social rights 
guarantees and EU free movement rules. The Commission’s proposal certainly raises a number of 
critical questions.357 First, is the legal basis chosen for the regulation the most appropriate one or is 
it likely, given the requirement of unanimous consent by the Council in Article 352 TFEU, to 
increase the political difficulties for its adoption? Second, is the substantive provision of the 
regulation, which defines the conditions under which the right to strike can be exercised in 
transnational labour disputes, likely to improve the existing EU standard for the protection of the 
                                                 
355
 Article 3(2) of the proposed Monti 2 Regulation in particular emphasizes the proactive role of the social partners at 
the EU level, stating that “management and labour at European level may, acting within the scope of their rights, 
competences and roles established by the Treaty, conclude agreements at Union level or establish guidelines with 
respect to the modalities and procedures for mediation, conciliation or other mechanisms for the extrajudicial or out-of-
court settlement of disputes […] with a cross-border character.” 
356
 Article 3(1) of the proposed Monti 2 Regulation allows those member states which already have mechanisms of 
alternative dispute resolutions to use them where the labor-management dispute is transnational in character. The 
proposed Regulation does not require however those member states which do not yet have mechanisms of alternative 
dispute resolutions to introduce them. As a consequence, it would seem that a certain asymmetry is likely to exist 
between the member states until the social partner regulate the field with agreements at the EU level 
357
 For a more detailed examination of the Commission’s proposal see Federico Fabbrini, ‘Le droit de grève dans un 
marché commun: les défis européens à la lumière de l’expérience américaine’ [2012] Revue française des affaires 
sociales  
 190
right to strike or will it simply codify the proportionality-based case law of the ECJ in Viking and 
Laval? Third, are the procedural provisions of the regulation, which introduce several innovative 
opportunities for the use of mechanisms of alternative dispute resolutions in labor-management 
conflicts, likely to innovate the existing legal framework or will they be dependent on subsequent 
and uncertain action by the social partners? Despite these relevant concerns, nevertheless, the 
Commission’s proposal appears to be moving in the right direction, recommending the enactment of 
a regulation at the EU level as the most adequate response to the challenge posed by Viking and 
Laval.  
The decisions of the ECJ in Viking and Laval have demonstrated that insulating national 
systems of industrial relations from the impact of EU law is no longer an option.358 The interaction 
between domestic and supranational law is now such that any meaningful attempt to counter-
balance the pressures emerging from EU free market rules must also take place at the EU level. As 
such, the enactment of an EU Wagner Act would acknowledge that only an EU legislative measure 
regulating the exercise of transnational industrial action can offer a satisfactory answer to the 
challenge of ineffectiveness posed by Viking and Laval. Arguments in favour of an EU social policy 
attempt to reintroduce political control over the economic sphere at the supranational level. Just like 
the US federal government during the New Deal, “[t]he [EU] would become the relevant level for 
the establishment and protection of social rights.”359 At the same time, the adoption by the EU 
political branches of an act regulating the right to strike in cross border situations would also cast a 
form of social legitimacy in an area which de facto is now pre-empted by EU law.360 It seems 
“uncontrovertible that the political institutions may adopt measures of human rights in all those 
fields which are controlled materially by [EC] law, either under exclusive or concurrent 
jurisdiction, and in which the object of the human rights legislation would be either [EC] 
institutions or complementary to [EC] laws and policies.”361 
Needless to say, the proposal for an EU Act on the regulation of the right to strike meets 
with many difficulties. The topic is extremely controversial and the social partners find it difficult, 
even now, to agree on a common basis for action.362 The EU law-making process is burdensome 
and, at the moment, a consensus among the relevant institutional actors seems to be missing on the 
need to enact a similar directive and, even more, on its possible content.363 While the EU Parliament 
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has traditionally played a key “pro-labour” role,364 strong disagreement is likely to emerge within 
the EU Council – where all 27 EU member states are represented – between countries which may 
be willing to enhance the protection of the right to strike at the supranational level and countries, 
such as the UK, which greatly fear any such development.365 If the regulation was to be adopted 
under Article 352 TFEU, as proposed by the Commission, this would require unanimity and each 
EU member state would thus be able to veto the Commission’s proposal.366 The possibility of 
resorting to qualified majority voting would be left open if instead the regulation was to be adopted 
under the internal market powers of the EU. Nevertheless, as long as Article 153(5) TFEU textually 
excludes the field of strike law from the application of the EU competences in the social sphere, it 
would seem that the enactment of legislation in this field, in the absence of a widespread or 
unanimous political consensus among the states, would be unlikely because of the following 
credible threat: states being outvoted in the Council could start judicial proceeding before the ECJ 
for ultra vires action by the EU institutions.367  
In addition, one should also not forget the warnings of the US experience concerning the 
enactment of a federal overhaul in the field of industrial relations. The Wagner Act designed a 
coherent and effective framework for the regulation of the right to strike for workers engaged in 
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interstate commerce, but it did not prevent the subsequent legislative and judicial developments that 
dealt a heavy blow to the protection of the right to collective action in the US. An EU Wagner Act 
would not be immune from similar dynamics. Some of these risks could perhaps be prevented by 
carefully drafting the EU regulation in order to ensure specific labour protections (e.g. codifying a 
prohibition for employers to fire or permanently replace striking workers or defining in a clear 
manner the room for permitted sympathy strikes etc.). However, it is widely recognized that 
legislation is often the result of political bargains and incompletely theorized agreements between 
institutional actors.368 As such, “the open texture of language and the obscure wording and complex 
architecture resulting from legislative compromises facilitates the introduction of new meaning”369 
through judicial interpretation. Nothing, then, prevents a subsequent EU legislature to amend, or 
even repeal, what the previous EU legislature enacted. From this point of view, of course, the 
adoption of an EU Wagner Act would inevitably lay on shaky foundations, its success being tied to 
friendly judicial constructions and continuing political support. 
Despite all this, it is time for Europe to begin seriously discussing the future of its 
transnational system of industrial relations and of the protection of the right to strike. The 
unprecedented financial crisis that the EU is currently experiencing (and that many analogize to the 
Great Depression in the US) is making this debate all the more momentous. This Section has argued 
that a possible response to the challenges currently affecting the regulation of collective action may 
come from an EU Wagner Act – an EU regulation setting a comprehensive legislative framework 
for the protection of transnational actions with a cross-border dimension. I have sketched what the 
possible legal basis and content of this regulation could be and then analyzed some of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the recent and ambitious Commission’s proposal for a regulation on the exercise 
of the right to strike in the context of the single market. My aim has not been to focus on the 
technicalities of the EU legislative intervention in this field. In my view, labour lawyers with their 
technical expertise can undertake this task much better. As a comparative constitutional lawyer, 
rather, my goal has been to demonstrate how the constitutional dynamics of tensions taking place in 
the European multilevel architecture are typical of federal arrangements and, in order to be 
addressed, require a response at the supranational level. From this point of view, the recent 
Commission’s proposal, despite raising several relevant questions in terms of content, appears to be 
moving in the right direction. Adopting an EU legislative measure on the protection of the right to 
strike may be a legally daunting if not politically impossible task. Nevertheless, if Europe wants to 
tackle the tensions between national and supranational laws in the field of industrial action, it may 
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need a EU Wagner Act. If Europe wants to solve the clash between market integration and 





The purpose of this chapter has been to analyze the protection of the right to strike in Europe in a 
comparative perspective with the US. The European architecture for the protection of fundamental 
rights is increasingly described as a multilevel system in which national and supranational laws 
intertwine. The existence of a plurality of sources and standards for the protection of fundamental 
rights generates, however, complex constitutional dynamics. As I have argued, the emergence at the 
EU level of a judge-made standard for the protection of the right to strike has created new 
challenges for those member states which ensure an enhanced protection of collective labour rights. 
As I explained in Section 1, the EU member states have traditionally offered different models for 
the regulation of industrial action: while some states have very protective labour law regimes which 
recognize the right to strike as a constitutional right, others subject industrial action to more 
limitations – either through social partners’ agreements or through a proportionality review – not to 
mention the UK where strike is not even regarded as a right but is simply a statutory immunity from 
common law principles. Beyond this fragmented picture, however, the impact of EU law in the field 
of strike law is becoming increasingly significant. As I detailed in Section 2, in Viking and Laval, 
the ECJ recognized that the right to strike is a fundamental right in the EU constitutional order. 
However, to uphold the continuing functioning of the EU common market, the ECJ has subjected 
the right to strike to severe restrictions that have challenged the protection of the right to collective 
action as it exists in many member states. 
The interaction between national and EU law in the field of labour relations has thus 
exposed several tensions. Yet, this state of affairs is not a sui generis phenomenon. Rather, as I 
endeavoured to explain in Section 3, the tension between state and transnational laws is a recurrent 
feature of multilevel, federalism-based constitutional systems. In the US, indeed, striking a balance 
between state labour rights and federal free market rules has also proved problematic for long time. 
In the early 20th century, state social legislation was subject to judicial review by the federal 
judiciary and, although the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a constitutional right to 
strike, it deprived this right of much meaning in order to ensure that interstate commerce would not 
be impaired. The New Deal, however, profoundly changed the status quo by acknowledging that if 
social rights were to be taken seriously vis-à-vis free market rules, this had to be done at the federal 
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level. The Wagner Act established a comprehensive system of labour-management relations and 
codified a statutory right for workers to go on strike. The Wagner Act was later interpreted to pre-
empt state legislation but in the field not covered by federal laws, states have maintained very 
diverse regulatory regimes for industrial action. Despite its slow weakening through legislative 
amendments and judicial constructions, the Wagner Act still remains today the basic framework for 
the regulation and the protection of the right to strike at the federal level in the US. 
In light of the US experience, in Section 4, I explored the implications of the most recent 
transformations taking place in the case law of the ECHR. In the recent Demir & Baykara and 
Enerji decisions, the ECtHR has acknowledged that Article 11 ECHR protects a right to collective 
bargaining and collective action. These milestone decisions have opened a new perspective in the 
protection of strike action at the European level and could have a major influence on the ECJ. As 
the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force, the EU is now bound to accede the ECHR and, once this 
happens, the ECJ (like the other EU institutions) will be subject to review by the ECtHR for 
compliance with ECHR standards. As a consequence of these transformations, it could be envisaged 
that the ECJ will revise its Viking and Laval jurisprudence and align itself to the new labour-
protective case law of the ECtHR. Yet, as I cautioned, it is difficult to predict whether this shift will 
necessarily occur as several factors distinguish the context and the content of the rulings of the two 
European supranational courts and it may be perhaps possible for them to avoid an undesirable 
clash. If this is the case, then other solutions to the challenge of ineffectiveness that emerge from 
the interaction between state and EU law will be needed. To this end, in Section 5, I discussed the 
possibility for the EU to enact a legislative measure that democratically regulates the contours of 
industrial action at the supranational level in Europe. 
As things currently stand in Europe, the exercise of collective action in industrial conflicts 
with a cross-border dimension is de facto subtracted from the regulations provided by the member 
states and subjected to the judge-made standard developed by the ECJ in Viking and Laval. In 
devising a framework for the right to strike at the supranational level that complies with the EU free 
market principle, the ECJ has substantially pre-empted state regulations of industrial action in 
transnational labour disputes. Since states cannot go beyond the ceiling of protection of the right to 
strike provided at the EU level it appears that only a legislative reform at the supranational level 
would be capable of striking a new balance between free market rules and social rights guarantees 
which is more protective of the right to collective action. Hence, the proposal for a Wagner Act. As 
in the US during the New Deal, when it was understood that only a major transfer of policy powers 
to the federal government would counter-balance the laissez-faire trends inherent in the inter-state 
common market, Europe also needs to discuss endowing itself with an EU regulation protecting the 
 195 
right to strike in ways that are analogous to those in the US Wagner Act. Of course, this proposal is 
controversial and difficult to realize, not least due to the hurdle of Article 153(5) TFEU. Yet, I have 
examined ways in which the EU might enact this bill under its internal market competences and 
reported how the Commission recently advanced a proposal for a regulation on the exercise of the 
right to strike in the single market based on Article 352 TFEU. Since the substantial regulation of 
transnational industrial action is now provided by the ECJ’s case law on free movement, it would 
seem a fortiori that the democratic institutions which enjoy the legitimacy to adopt internal market 
legislation in the EU system of governance should be able to regulate the field.  
Of course, an EU Wagner Act would not be a panacea. The same example of the US Wagner 
Act warns us from placing too much faith in the capacity of a legislative act to provide a long-
lasting protection of the right to collective action. At the same time, the lessons that Europe should 
desperately seek to learn from the US experience is that no successful protection of labour rights 
can be ensured in a federalism-based constitutional arrangement as long as the tension between 
social rights and free market corresponds with conflicts between, on the one hand, state laws and 
practice and, on the other, federal rules and principles. If social rights are to be taken seriously in 
Europe, this requires a new foundation for the protection of social rights at the EU level along the 
lines drawn in the US by the New Deal. The challenge of ineffectiveness characterizing the field of 
strike law and emerging from the complex interaction between a plurality of fundamental rights 
standards in Europe can be addressed only by enhancing the mechanisms for the protection of 
collective labour action at the supranational level in Europe. State sovereigntism is no longer an 
option. To quote Mauro Cappelletti and David Golay once again it is clear that also in the field of 
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Abortion laws in Europe and the United States (US) have increasingly converged throughout the 
last thirty years.  In the early 1980s, the refrain among many comparative lawyers was that, among 
Western countries, the US stood alone in recognizing a broad individual right to the voluntary 
interruption of pregnancy. Conversely, most European states subjected abortion to stricter 
regulations or prohibited it tout court.1 Already during the mid-1990s, however, scholars 
emphasized that the US was retreating from its earlier, very liberal position, by permitting states to 
restrict a woman’s right to an abortion.2 Simultaneously, European countries were widening the 
conditions under which women could choose whether to terminate their pregnancies, often under 
the pressures of the rising supranational laws.3 
An assessment of the abortion laws on each side of the Atlantic at the end of the 2010s 
highlights an even clearer pattern of convergence. In the US, the federal government4 and many 
state legislatures have enacted laws that further constrain women’s access to abortion.5 These 
measures have gradually pushed back the time period during which a woman can obtain an 
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abortion, from the end of her second trimester to somewhere closer to the end of her first trimester.6 
Moreover, a bill enacted in March 2011 by the state of South Dakota7 has introduced a system of 
mandatory counseling for the first time in the US, which is not dissimilar from that in effect in 
several European states. The bill states that women seeking abortions in South Dakota must first 
participate in a directed consultation at a pro-life pregnancy center.8 
Meanwhile, a number of member states in the European Union (EU) have liberalized their 
abortion legislations over the last few years.9 In addition, the strictest abortion bans have come 
under the scrutiny of the European supranational courts. In a landmark ruling, A., B. & C. v. 
Ireland,10 decided in December 2010, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that 
Ireland, the country in the EU with perhaps the most restrictive prohibition on abortion,11 had 
violated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by failing to provide accessible and 
effective procedural mechanisms by which a woman could establish her fundamental right to a 
lawful abortion when her life was in peril due to her pregnancy.12 The ruling generated widespread 
public reaction,13 and the resulting dialogue on the most appropriate way of complying with the 
ECtHR’s decision played a major role in the ensuing Irish electoral debate.14  
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the constitutional dynamics at play in the field of 
abortion law in the US federal and European multilevel constitutional systems. Other works already 
deal with the similarities and differences between the US and European approaches to the complex 
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questions raised by abortion.15 These scholarly assessments, however, usually compare European 
countries individually with the US. When these assessments consider the jurisprudence of 
supranational jurisdictions (such as the ECtHR or the EU Court of Justice (ECJ)), it is mainly to 
better explain the internal legal framework of a specific European state. 
In this chapter, I plan to take into account the European system as a whole. The European 
system, in fact, can be described as a multilevel constitutional architecture in which national, 
supranational (EU) and international (ECHR) laws intertwine.16 The pluralist nature of the 
European constitutional architecture is particularly evident in the field of fundamental rights.  Each 
of the three layers comprising the European structure is endowed with norms and institutions for the 
protection of human rights that overlap and interact with one another.17 The dominant perception 
among European constitutional lawyers is that the European multilevel system is a sui generis 
architecture. However, as I have argued in the first chapter of this thesis, the European 
constitutional system for the protection of fundamental rights can be meaningfully compared with 
other federal arrangements and can be better understood when compared as such. 
Therefore, this chapter analyzes the ways in which the complex interactions among national 
and transnational norms and institutions in Europe affect abortion law by comparing the European 
multilevel architecture to the US federal system. In particular, the chapter claims that, whereas 
several differences exist in the regulation of abortion among the EU member states, the growing 
impact of EU and ECHR law has generated new pressures and challenges in the domestic legal 
systems that restrict abortion. Consequently, a number of tensions and inconsistencies currently 
characterize the European abortion regime. As the comparative assessment of the US constitutional 
experience emphasizes, however, analogous constitutional dynamics have also been at play in the 
US system because of the interplay between state and federal rules. 
Abortion regulations among the states have varied greatly in the US. Since the 1970s, the 
federal judiciary has recognized that the US Constitution protects a woman’s right to choose 
whether to terminate her pregnancy. This recognition established a more consistent framework for 
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the protection of the right to abortion. At the same time, no uniform, federal abortion law exists in 
the US because the states are relatively autonomous in regulating pregnancy and other family law 
issues.  Using the US experience as a comparative tool, this chapter examines whether a similar 
development is foreseeable in Europe, with the recognition of a transnational minimum standard for 
the protection of abortion rights, which can be integrated or superseded, but not lowered by 
domestic rules. Hence, the chapter considers the recent decision of the ECtHR in the case A., B. & 
C. v. Ireland, as well as the potential impact of the entry into force of the EU Lisbon Treaty and its 
binding Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
In comparing the peculiar dynamics that characterize the regulation and protection of 
abortion rights in pluralist, heterarchical constitutional arrangements like the European multilevel 
architecture and the US federal system, this chapter’s aim is primarily analytical.18 My goal is to 
underline, from a descriptive point of view, how comparable constitutional challenges arise from 
the two systems, rather than to advocate, from a prescriptive point of view, the migration of 
constitutional solutions from one system to the other.19 The US example is used as a mirror to 
better appreciate the complexities and tensions that are at play in the European framework of 
abortion laws—not as a model that should be imported into the European context. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 summarizes EU member states’ abortion laws.  
Section 2 describes the growing influence that the EU and the ECHR exercise upon domestic 
abortion laws and highlights the challenges and tensions that emerge from this overlap. Section 3 
argues that these inconsistencies are neither unique nor exceptional and explains how comparable 
dynamics have also been at play in the US federal system. Section 4 analyzes the recent decision of 
the ECtHR in A., B. & C. v. Ireland and evaluates its implication for the protection of abortion 
rights in Europe. Finally, Section 5 assesses the impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
and discusses the potential role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the review of domestic 
abortion laws. 
Before getting started, I believe a final warning is in order: I am aware that when dealing 
with a controversial topic such as abortion, it is difficult for an author to resist the influence of his 
or her personal conceptions regarding the serious moral questions at the core of abortion issues.  
From this point of view, the very fact that I formulate the issue as a “woman’s right to an abortion” 
will reveal my inclination towards a more liberal position, which supports the protection of 
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abortion20—a position with which pro-life advocates would certainly disagree. Having revealed my 
subjective viewpoint on the moral issue presented, I have sought to adopt, throughout my 
assessment, an analytical stance, which will use a comparative methodology to explore the complex 
constitutional phenomena characterizing the European abortion regime for what they are, rather 
than for what they should be. 
In the concluding part of the chapter, however, I will abandon analytical neutrality and 
advance what is a normative argument in favor of greater protection for abortion rights at the 
supranational level in Europe. In a nutshell, I will emphasize how the existence in some EU states 
of strict criminal bans on abortion, coupled with the possibility for pregnant women to escape the 
prohibition by travelling to another EU state where abortion is permitted, has discriminatory effects 
upon well-off and low-income women, raising serious questions of equality. In discussing the future 
alternative scenarios for the European abortion regime, therefore, I will suggest that the creation of 
a system of soft pluralism, with stricter review of domestic abortion laws to ensure their conformity 
with transnational human rights standards, is an advisable option in the EU. 
 
 
1. Context: States’ abortion laws 
 
Abortion law in Europe is quite diversified.21 A plurality of the EU member states recognizes, in a 
more or less liberal fashion, a right—based mostly on statutory law—for a pregnant woman to have 
an abortion within a certain number of weeks from the inception of pregnancy. In several states, 
however, abortion is not regarded as a woman’s right; rather, it is only permitted under certain 
conditions and pursuant to specific procedures, which often include mandated medical advice and 
counseling sessions. In addition, some EU member states still have extremely restrictive abortion 
laws, which criminalize all forms of abortion, except when deemed necessary to save the life or 
protect the health of the pregnant woman from severe injury. 
Criminal bans on abortions appeared in the statute books of European states during the 19th 
century, originally to protect the life of women because, because medical techniques for abortion 
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were then not considered sufficiently reliable to prevent endangering the health of the women.22 
Over time, however, these measures began to serve the purpose of safeguarding a traditional 
concept of the family and morals.23 This view largely survived the enactment of post-World War II 
liberal Constitutions. Since the 1960s, however, social and political pressures to reform criminal 
bans on abortion began to rise in many countries of Western Europe.24 Starting with the United 
Kingdom (UK), which legalized abortion in 1967,25 measures legalizing or decriminalizing abortion 
were successfully enacted in a few years in Scandinavia, Austria,26 France,27 West Germany,28 
Italy,29 and the Netherlands.30  
A second wave of reforms then took place between the late 1980s and 1990s in Belgium,31 
and—after the transition to democracy—in Greece32 and Spain.33 The collapse of the Soviet block, 
where abortion was already lawful, also prompted some of the new democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe to enact legislation re-affirming the legality of abortion.34 In the aftermath of 
unification, Germany revised its abortion legislation, harmonizing the (more restrictive) Western 
and (more liberal) Eastern German abortion laws.35 In the last decade, liberal abortion legislation 
has been adopted in Portugal36 and new, more permissive, abortion acts have been passed in 
France37 and Spain.38 
Nevertheless, although there is a general trend toward the gradual liberalization of abortion 
laws in Europe, opposing pressures exist and merit attention.39 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Ireland tightened its anti-abortion regime by reinstating the strict nineteenth century criminal ban on 
                                                 
22
 See A. Eser and H.G. Koch (n 21) 19 
23
 Ibid 31 
24
 See Rebecca Cook and Bernard Dickens, ‘Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform’ (2003) 25 Human 
Rights Quarterly 3 
25
 See infra text accompanying n 45–54 
26
 See Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBL], No. 60/1974, von 23 Januar 1974 (Austria). The Act, which amended the 
Strafgesetzbuch, was upheld by the Verfassungsgerichtshof in its decision of 11 October 1974, VfGH 7400 - JBL 1974 
27
 See infra text accompanying n 64–70 
28
 See infra text accompanying n 83–85 
29
 See infra text accompanying n 55–58 
30
 Joyce Outshoorn, ‘Policy-Making on Abortion: Arenas, Actors and Arguments in the Netherland’ in Dorothy 
McBride Stetson (ed), Abortion Politics (Routledge 1996) 
31
 See Perrine Humblet et al, ‘Developments in Abortion Policy in a Context of Illegality: The Belgian Case from 1971 
until 1990’ (1995) 6 European Journal of Public Health 288  
32
 See Nomos (1978: 821) (Greece) 
33
 See Belén Cambronero-Saiz et al, ‘Abortion in Democratic Spain’ (2007) 15 Reproductive Health Matters 85, 86  
34
 See Patrick Flood, ‘Abortion and the Right to Life in Post-Communist Eastern European and Russia’ (2002) 36 East 
European Quarterly 191  
35
 See Eva Maleck-Lewy, ‘Between Self-Determination and State Supervision: Women and the Abortion Law in Post-
Unification Germany’ [1995] Social Politics 62 
36
 See infra text accompanying n 71–73 
37
 See infra text accompanying n 67–70 
38
 See infra text accompanying n 74–80 
39
 See A. Eser and H. G. Koch (n 21) 18 
 203 
abortion and amending the Constitution to enshrine the fundamental right to life of the unborn.40  
Equally restrictive pulls emerged in some post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Especially in Poland where abortion on demand was widely available during the Communist 
regime, reforms in the 1990s resulted in backward movement, with a substantial prohibition of the 
voluntary termination of pregnancies.41  
In light of the differences existing among the various abortion laws in Europe, it is possible 
to resort to the analytical distinction between vanguard and laggard states advanced by Ann 
Althouse42 and to classify the national abortion legislations in four models. Abortion is permitted in 
the first three legislative models, which can be placed in a continuum from a more “liberal” to a 
more “restrictive” one, considering criteria such as the time-limitations during which women can 
have an abortion and the conditions and procedures that define their right or ability to choose an 
abortion.43 A fourth, alternative, model of legislation is represented by those EU member states that 
prohibit abortion tout court, save in limited, exceptional circumstances. In these systems, the right 
to life of the unborn is regarded as paramount. As a consequence, women are denied any right to 
choose whether to terminate their pregnancies. 
The UK has a fairly liberal legislative model of abortion.44 The Abortion Act 1967,45 as 
amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990,46 states that pregnancy can be 
lawfully terminated up to the 24th week if “the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, 
greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman or any existing children of her family.”47 In addition, abortion is always permitted 
if “the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health 
of the pregnant woman,”48 if “the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the 
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pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated,”49 or if “there is a substantial risk 
that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities.”50 
The consent of two registered medical practitioners is required to perform an abortion,51 
except when terminating the pregnancy is “immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent 
grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.”52 Nevertheless, in 
determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve a risk of injury to the health of 
a woman, doctors may also consider “the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable 
environment.”53 As a consequence, women may obtain elective abortions for a wide variety of 
social reasons.54 Otherwise, the law neither sets counseling duties nor imposes waiting periods or 
parental / spousal consent / notification requirements. 
A different model of regulation of the right to abortion is represented by the 1978 Italian 
legislation,55 shaped largely on the French Loi relative à l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse of 
1975,56 which was, however, recently amended.57 Abortion is decriminalized and can lawfully be 
obtained in the first ninety days of pregnancy when “continuance of pregnancy, delivery or 
maternity would involve a serious risk for the physical and psychological health [of the woman] in 
light of her state of health, or her economic, social and family conditions or the circumstances in 
which conception occurred or in view of the anomalies and malformations of the fetus.”58 After the 
first trimester, abortion is only permitted when there is a medically certified risk for the life of the 
pregnant woman or for her physical and psychological health.59 
                                                 
49
 Ibid Section 1(1)(c) 
50
 Ibid Section 1(1)(d) 
51
 Ibid Section 1(1) 
52
 Ibid Section 1(4) 
53
 Ibid Section 1(2) 
54
 See Christina Schlegel, ‘Landmark in German Abortion Law: The German 1995 Compromise Compared with 
English Law’ (1997) 11 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 36 (highlighting how “although according 
to the letter of the law and the intent of the legislator, there is no abortion on demand in England, in fact a woman 
seeking an abortion ‘only’ has to find two registered medical practitioners to certify the wide socio-medical grounds 
that justify abortion.”) 
55
 Legge 22 maggio 1978, n. 194 (G.U. 22 maggio 1978, n. 140)(It.). The Corte Costituzionale  had already declared 
unconstitutional the provision of the Italian Codice Penale punishing abortion to the extent to which it did not include 
an exception for a pregnant woman whose life was in peril.  See C.Cost sent. 27/1975.  For an overview of the Italian 
abortion law, see generally Lucio Valerio Moscarini, ‘Aborto. Profili costituzionali e disciplina legislativa’ in 
Enciclopedia Giuridica (Treccani 1988) vol 1, ad vocem 
56
 Loi 75–17 du 17 janvier 1975 relative à l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse J.O.R.F., 18 janvier 1975, p. 739 
(Fr.). The abortion act was challenged before the Conseil Constitutionnel, which declared it constitutional in its 
Décision 75–17 DC 
57
 See infra text accompanying n 67–73 
58
 Article 4, Legge 194/1978 (my translation: “la prosecuzione della gravidanza, il parto o la maternità comporterebbero 
un serio pericolo per la sua salute fisica o psichica [della donna], in relazione o al suo stato di salute, o alle sue 
condizioni economiche, o sociali o familiari, o alle circostanze in cui è avvenuto il concepimento, o a previsioni di 
anomalie o malformazioni del concepito.”)  
59
 Ibid Article 6 
 205 
Before obtaining an abortion in the first trimester, however, women are required to undergo 
compulsory non-directive counseling. Social assistants, family planning centers, or the woman’s 
physician must discuss together with the woman any possible alternative solution to abortion and 
help her to overcome all the problems of a social nature that may push her to seek an abortion.60 If 
at the end of the counseling process a woman still wants an abortion, she has the right to receive a 
document certifying her pregnancy and her desire to terminate it. After a waiting period of seven 
days, she can obtain an abortion in any hospital or authorized private clinic.61 Spousal notifications 
are suggested but not required by the law,62 and the requirement of parental consent for minor aged 
girls seeking an abortion can also be lifted thorough a judicial bypass.63 
France provided a similar regulation in 1975, allowing a woman to seek an abortion within 
the first ten weeks of pregnancy,64 after mandatory counseling,65 and a seven-day waiting period.66  
In 2001, however, a new bill67 extended the possibility of seeking a termination of pregnancy “in a 
situation of stress” up to the twelfth week.68 More importantly, the new bill abolished the 
mandatory counseling procedure, except for underage girls.69 Now, counseling is only 
“systematically suggested, before and after the voluntary interruption of pregnancy.”70 A system 
akin to the Italian one, instead, has recently been adopted in Portugal.71 A right to abortion exists 
“by option of the woman, within the first ten weeks of pregnancy.”72 Women who seek an abortion 
must undergo mandatory counseling and a three-day mandatory waiting period has also been 
established.73 
Spain too has finally recently enacted a new abortion act74 along the above-mentioned 
model, with the explicit purpose of reflecting “the consensus of the international community in this 
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field”75 and “the legislative trend prevailing among [European] states.”76 Contrary to the Ley 
organica 9/1985, which simply stated that abortion “will not be punishable”77 if performed with the 
consent of the woman by a physician at any time for medical reasons, within twelve weeks of 
pregnancy in the case of rape and up to the twenty-second week in case of fetal impairment, the 
new Ley organica 2/2010 has introduced a right to abortion “at the request of the woman”78 up to 
the fourteenth week of pregnancy, after a three-day waiting period and a counseling meeting in 
which women are informed about the means of social assistance and public support available for 
mothers.79 Abortion is then permitted until the twenty-second week on medical grounds and when 
there are risks of fetal impairment or with no limit if a medical team certifies that the fetus has no 
reasonable possibility of surviving delivery.80 
In contrast, Germany has the most restrictive model of abortion regulation among the EU 
member states in which abortion is permitted.81 After unification, an Act was adopted in 1992,82 
which, in order to harmonize the law in force in East Germany83 (where women had a right to 
abortion until the twelfth week of pregnancy after mandatory counseling) and in West Germany84 
(where abortion was prohibited save on four enumerated grounds),85 made first-trimester abortions 
lawful after mandatory counseling. Nevertheless, in 1993, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, following 
a 1975 precedent86 quashing the first West German Abortion Act,87 declared the 1992 Act 
unconstitutional,88 arguing that the State had a duty to protect human life, and that, therefore, 
legislation ought to express a clear disapproval of abortions.89 
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In reaction to this decision, the German Parliament enacted a new abortion Act in 1995,90 
amending, among other things, the Criminal Code. On the basis of the new law, abortion is 
unlawful, but may not be punished,91 if it is performed at the request of the woman, by a medical 
practitioner, before the end of the twelfth week of pregnancy, after a mandatory counseling session 
and a three-day waiting period,92 In contrast, abortion is “not unlawful”93  if performed, at any time, 
under medical indication to prevent danger to the life of or serious harm to the health of the woman 
or, within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, on criminal-ethical grounds, e.g., because the 
pregnancy was the result of rape.94 
The mandatory counseling process is a peculiar feature of the 1995 German Abortion Act.95  
Following an explicit request by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the law clarifies that the counseling 
must be pro-life oriented;96 that is, it must be directed toward encouraging the woman to continue 
the pregnancy and to open her to the perspective of a life with the child.  Social workers and family 
planning centers must therefore inform women that the unborn has a right to life and that abortion 
can only be performed under exceptional circumstances. From this point of view, the regulation of 
abortion via the instruments of criminal law and the imposition of a directive counseling procedure 
highlight the German legal system’s restrictive attitude toward the voluntary interruption of 
pregnancy.97 At the same time, however, the possibility for a woman to obtain an abortion during 
the first trimester, if she still wishes to do so after the mandatory counseling and three-day waiting 
period, differentiates the German law from the legislative model of the last group of EU countries—
Malta, Poland and Ireland—where abortion is generally always prohibited, with only a few, 
narrowly tailored exceptions.98 
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Poland swiftly enacted legislation banning elective abortion in 1993, following the collapse 
of the Communist regime.99 The new Act permits abortion only if: (1) a physician, other than the 
one which performs the abortion, certifies that the pregnancy is endangering the mother’s life or 
health; (2) up to viability (i.e., up to the twenty-fourth week), if the fetus is seriously impaired; or 
(3) up to the twelfth week, if pregnancy resulted from rape.100 Terminating pregnancy outside these 
cases may be punished with three years’ imprisonment. A legislative attempt to reform the law and 
re-introduce a right to abortion in the first trimester on grounds of material or personal hardship 
failed in 1996. The Trybunał Konstytcyjny declared the bill incompatible with the Constitution, 
interpreting the right to life provision of the Polish Constitution as protecting the unborn.101 
Of all European countries, Ireland has the most restrictive legislation on abortion.102 On the 
basis of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,103 the content of which was re-affirmed in the 
Health (Family Planning) Act 1979,104 “[e]very woman, being with child, who, with intent to 
procure her own miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious 
thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent […]. to 
procure the miscarriage […] shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life.”105 Contrary to the 
interpretation of the 1861 Act offered by the English courts,106 Irish tribunals have traditionally 
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adopted a narrow construction of the provision excluding the lifting of criminal sanctions, even 
when abortion is carried out to preserve the life or the health of the woman.107 
In 1983, to prevent a possible recognition of a right to abortion by judicial fiat,108 an 
amendment to the Irish Constitution was adopted by popular referendum, which enshrined a right to 
life of the unborn in Irish fundamental law.109 According to the Eighth Amendment, codified as 
Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution, “the State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, 
with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far 
as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.”110 The amendment generated a cluster 
of litigation. Much of this litigation dealt with the issue of whether the state could prohibit 
distribution of information on abortion services provided in other EU countries. This litigation 
involved the ECJ and the ECtHR111 and eventually led to the adoption of two further constitutional 
amendments explicitly guaranteeing a right to travel to other states in order to obtain an abortion,112 
as well as a right to provide information about abortion services performed overseas.113 
The specific consequences of Article 40.3.3 on the prohibition of abortion were addressed in 
the seminal X. case.114 This case involved a fourteen-year-old rape victim who became pregnant. 
The girl wanted an abortion and showed clear signs of suicidal tendencies if she could not obtain 
one. Her family agreed to bring her to England for the abortion. On the Attorney General’s 
application, however, the Irish High Court issued an injunction prohibiting the girl from leaving 
Ireland on the basis of the new constitutional provision protecting the life of the unborn. According 
to the Court, the “risk that the defendant may take her own life if an order is made is much less and 
is of a different order of magnitude than the certainty that the life of the unborn will be terminated if 
the order is not made.”115 
The decision of the High Court sparked widespread controversy and was quickly overruled 
by a majority of the Irish Supreme Court. On appeal, Chief Justice Finlay framed a new test to 
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review the lawfulness of an abortion in light of Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution: “if it is 
established as a matter of probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct 
from the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of her pregnancy, such 
termination is permissible.”116 The Court recognized that suicide could be considered as a real and 
substantial risk to the life of the woman and therefore concluded that the defendant had a right to 
obtain an abortion in Ireland.117 Attempts have been made since the X. case to restrict the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Article 40.3.3 by enacting new constitutional amendments directed at 
excluding suicide from the conditions that may justify a therapeutic abortion. All of these attempts, 
however, have failed in popular referenda.118 
As a result, the current status of abortion law in Ireland appears to be that, constitutionally, 
termination of pregnancy is unlawful “unless it meets the conditions laid down by the Supreme 
Court in the X. case.”119 Women have both a constitutional right to travel to seek an abortion 
overseas and to obtain information about abortion services provided in other EU member states 
pursuant to the 1995 Information Act.120 However, no specific regulation exists on the basis of 
which a woman can establish her right to obtain a lawful abortion in Ireland on grounds of a real 
and serious risk to her life, including a risk of suicide.121 In fact, no lawful abortion is known to 
have ever been carried out in Ireland,122 effectively making Ireland the EU country in which 
abortion is most severely restricted. 
As the preceding survey clarifies, a variety of regulatory models exists in the EU member 
states in the field of abortion law. In all legal systems, however, abortion is permitted at any time, at 
least according to the law in the books, if necessary to save the life of the woman. Almost every 
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country recognizes the right to an abortion on medical grounds, to varying degrees. Further, a clear 
trend exists among a majority of states toward the legalization of elective abortion roughly within 
the first trimester of pregnancy, either upon the simple request of the woman, or upon the request of 
the woman certified (on wide social grounds) by medical doctors, or after a mandatory counseling 
period, be it of a neutral or life-oriented kind. Finally, all state abortion laws are subject to the 
increasing influence of supranational laws. 
 
 
3. Challenges: the impact of supranational law on states’ abortion laws 
 
In the last two decades, the legal orders of the EU and the ECHR have steadily increased their 
involvement in the field of abortion law, and both the ECJ and the ECtHR have reviewed states’ 
abortion legislations with growing frequency.123 Although the authority to regulate abortion rights 
remains primarily in the purview of the EU member states, a series of substantive checks and 
procedural balances on the exercise of national sovereignty have been developed in this area. The 
jurisprudence of the two European supranational courts, in particular, has slowly increased the floor 
of protection ensured to the right of abortion Europe-wide.124 As a consequence, as David Cole has 
argued, the interplay between European and domestic laws on abortion has now reached such a 
level of complexity that national “isolationism is impossible, even on an issue as strongly felt as 
abortion.”125  
In the 1991 Grogan case,126 the ECJ had the opportunity to rule on the abortion issue in the 
context of an order for a preliminary reference by the Irish High Court.127 In this case, the Society 
for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) had requested an injunction prohibiting the 
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representatives of three student unions from advertising the names and contacts details of overseas 
abortion providers, arguing that the recently enacted Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution 
banned the publication of any such information.128 In its preliminary reference, the High Court 
asked the ECJ whether abortion could be considered a service within the meaning of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) Treaty (EECT)129 and, therefore, whether a national ban on 
information about abortion services overseas was contrary to EEC law, including the fundamental 
rights protected by EEC law.130 
Advocate General (AG) Van Gerven acknowledged that medical termination of pregnancy 
constituted a service within the meaning of the EECT. Therefore, he devoted most of his opinion to 
examining whether the Irish prohibition on distributing information about abortion services that are 
lawfully available in other EU states could be regarded as “consistent with or not incompatible 
with” the general principles of EU law, including respect for fundamental rights.131 However, the 
AG found that the Irish restriction was justified in light of the public interest pursued by the state 
and of the “high priority” the Irish Constitution attached to the protection of unborn life.132 In 
addition, the AG concluded that the ban on information sought by SPUC did not disproportionately 
infringe upon freedom of information, which is protected as a general principle of EEC law and is 
thus binding upon the member states “in an area covered by EEC law.”133 
The ECJ followed only the very first part of the opinion of the AG, stating that “medical 
termination of pregnancy, performed in accordance with the law of the State in which it is carried 
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out, constitutes a service within the meaning of the EECT.”134 The ECJ rejected the contention 
made by SPUC that abortion could not be regarded as a service since it is immoral and stated that it 
would not “substitute its assessment for that of the legislature in those Member States where the 
activities in question are practiced legally.”135 However, on the controversial question of the 
compatibility of the Irish ban on the publication of information with EEC law, the ECJ refused to 
take a position, arguing that the link between the Irish student unions and the UK abortion providers 
was “too tenuous”136 to trigger the application of EEC law.137 
The ECJ, therefore, failed to address directly the confrontation between the Irish ban and EU 
fundamental rights,138 showing a certain reluctance to deal with the “thorny issue” of abortion.139 
Nevertheless, by stating that a member state had the power to prohibit student unions from 
distributing information about abortion clinics that are lawfully operating in another EU state, so 
long as “the clinics in question have no involvement in the distribution of the said information,”140 
the ECJ “left open the possibility that, should a party directly connected to providing abortion 
become involved, the outcome could be different.”141 In addition, by concluding that abortion was a 
service within the meaning of the EECT,142 the ECJ made clear “that Ireland’s treatment of access 
to abortion was not simply a matter of Irish law”143 but also a matter of concern for EU law.144 
Ireland understood the pressures arising from the EU legal system on domestic abortion 
legislation. On the eve of the approval of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, Ireland obtained from its 
EU partners the enactment of an additional protocol to the EU Treaty stating that “nothing in the 
Treaty on European Union, or in the Treaties establishing the European Communities, or in the 
Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the application in Ireland of 
Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.”145 Nevertheless, the “special case” approach sought 
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by Ireland produced domestic public outcry,146 forcing Ireland to retract its position by adding a 
“negative declaration” to the EU Treaty, restricting the meaning of the Protocol.147 Consequentially, 
it seems that the status of EU law vis-à-vis Irish abortion law has not changed very much at all.148 
The ECtHR has followed a more direct path toward involvement in abortion rights.149 When 
the ECHR was adopted in 1950, abortion was of course still regarded as a criminal issue in all of the 
signatory parties. Therefore, it was not the intention of the drafters of the ECHR to codify a 
substantive limitation on the national powers to regulate abortion.150 Nevertheless, the ECHR does 
include a number of provisionssuch as the right to life,151 the right to respect for private and 
family life,152 and freedom of information153which, over time, became increasingly relevant in 
litigation challenging member states’ abortion legislations.154    
Until the 1990s, the ECtHR did not have the opportunity to decide cases concerning national 
abortion laws. Prior to the 1998 enactment of the 11th Additional Protocol to the ECHR, all 
individual applications lodged before the ECtHR were first addressed by the European Human 
Rights Commission (ECommHR).155 In the few abortion cases raised before the Strasbourg 
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institution, the ECommHR adopted a prudent stand:156 on the one hand, it declared inadmissible the 
challenges, based on the right-to-life provision of the ECHR,157 made against some liberal domestic 
abortion laws (including the 1967 UK Abortion Act).158 On the other hand, it rejected on the merits 
a challenge against the restrictive 1975 German abortion statute, which was raised on the basis of 
the right-to-privacy provision of the ECHR.159 
The first abortion case before the ECtHR arose out of the SPUC controversy in Ireland, 
which had previously compelled the ECJ to intervene.160 Pursuant to Article 40.3.3 of the Irish 
Constitution, the SPUC had obtained an injunction from the Irish High Court,161 later confirmed by 
the Supreme Court,162 which perpetually prohibited two Dublin-based family planning and 
counseling clinics from providing information concerning the availability of abortion services in the 
UK.163 Having exhausted their domestic remedies, the two clinics lodged an appeal before the 
ECHR supervisory bodies, arguing that the Irish ban unduly limited their freedom of expression.  
The ECommHR declared the case admissible,164 and in its preliminary report, found that the law 
violated Article 10 ECHR because the ban was not prescribed by law, since it was not reasonably 
foreseeable that Article 40.3.3 would have been interpreted as prohibiting the non-directive 
counseling conducted by the two clinics.165 
The decision of the ECommHR laid the foundation for the ruling of ECtHR in Open 
Door,166 which also found a violation of Article 10 ECHR.167 However, in Open Door, the ECtHR 
did not follow the reasoning of the ECommHR; rather, in a fifteen-to-eight majority opinion, the 
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ECtHR concluded that the national measure under review could not pass judicial scrutiny, even 
under a more restrictive test.168 According to the ECtHR, the prohibition barring the two clinics 
from providing information about abortion services overseas could be regarded as prescribed by 
law—that is, grounded in the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution—and necessary to pursue 
the legitimate aim of the Irish State to protect the life of the unborn.169 But, the “absolute nature”170 
of the “restraint imposed on the applicants from receiving or imparting information was 
disproportionate to the aims pursued”171 and was thus in violation of the right to freedom of 
information.172   
After declaring in Open Door that a state’s ban on the circulation of information about 
abortion was contrary to the ECHR’s clause on freedom of expression,173 the ECtHR was asked to 
review a number of other national measures directly regulating abortion for their compatibility with 
the ECHR’s right-to-life and right-to-privacy clauses. Whereas the ECtHR has rejected all pro-life 
claims raised against permissive state abortion laws,174 it has also “carefully avoided stating 
whether abortion is protected under the ECHR,”175 leaving to the contracting parties a margin of 
appreciation to determine the availability and legal status of abortion.176 Yet, the ECtHR has 
squarely affirmed that “legislation regulating abortion falls under the sphere of Article 8 [ECHR] 
and statutory abortion restrictions may constitute an interference with women’s private lives.”177 
In a series of cases challenging national laws on abortion on the basis of Article 2 ECHR, 
the ECtHR has deferred to domestic legislation,178 rejecting the argument that the fetus could be 
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regarded as a person within the meaning of the ECHR.179 In Boso,180 the Court upheld the Italian 
abortion statute, arguing that the domestic legislation struck “a fair balance between, on the one 
hand, the need to ensure protection of the fetus and, on the other [hand], the woman’s interests.”181 
In addition, in Vo,182 the ECtHRwhile expressing its awareness that it was neither desirable, nor 
even possible as matters stood, to answer in the abstract the question when life begins and “whether 
the unborn child is a person for the purposes of Article 2 of the [ECHR]”183 concluded that the 
French law at issue did not violate the right-to-life clause of ECHR.184  
In Tysiąc,185 however, the ECtHR took the important step of finding a violation of Article 8 
ECHR in the operation of the restrictive Polish abortion law.186 The case involved a Polish woman 
suffering from a pathological optical disease. Having become pregnant, the woman was informed 
by several medical practitioners that pregnancy and delivery might cause a serious deterioration in 
her optical condition. As a consequence, she sought a medical termination of pregnancy on the basis 
of Polish law, which permits abortion when pregnancy seriously threatens the health of the 
woman.187 Nevertheless, the doctors refused to grant the woman the health certificate necessary to 
obtain an abortion in public hospitals. The woman was forced to deliver the baby and, as expected, 
her conditions deteriorated badly, and she became practically blind.188  
The applicant raised a facial challenge against the Polish abortion law, arguing that the 
prohibition on a voluntary interruption of pregnancy amounted to an interference with her Article 8 
ECHR right to respect for private life.189 The ECtHR, instead, took the view that “the circumstances 
of the applicant’s case and in particular the nature of her complaint [we]re more appropriately 
examined from the standpoint of the respondent State’s . . . positive obligations.”190 According to 
the ECtHR, Article 8 ECHR establishes not only a negative limit on the power of the state to 
interfere with the person’s physical and psychological integrity, but also “a positive obligation [for 
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the state] to secure to its citizens their right to effective respect for this integrity.”191 In the case at 
hand, the national authorities had failed to comply with this duty.192 
As highlighted by the ECtHR, the Polish abortion act did allow for termination of pregnancy 
on health grounds, an exception that the applicant’s condition should certainly have triggered. 
Nevertheless, the Polish legislation lacked “any effective mechanisms capable of determining 
whether the conditions for obtaining a lawful abortion had been met in [the applicant’s] case.”193 
The absence of a clear, time-sensitive procedure for ascertaining in a fair and independent manner 
whether a woman had a right to interrupt her pregnancy on health grounds had a “chilling effect on 
doctors when deciding whether the requirements of legal abortion are met in an individual case.”194 
In the ECtHR’s view, “once the legislature decides to allow abortion, it must not structure its legal 
framework in a way which would limit real possibilities to obtain it.”195 
The decision of the ECtHR in Tysiąc is “significant because it confirms that women’s right 
to access legal abortions may not be illusory.”196 At the same time, in stressing the positive duties 
that states have in adopting all relevant measures to make legal abortion practically available, the 
ECtHR focused only on the procedural aspects of abortion law. The ECtHR followed the same 
approach in the D. case,197 where it declared the complaint of a woman who could not obtain an 
abortion in Ireland on grounds of fetal impairments as inadmissible since the applicant had not 
explored all of the domestic procedural avenues that might have been available to make her claim 
heard, including a constitutional challenge to the Irish Supreme Court.198 
From this point of view, the approach of the ECHR judicial branch seems far more prudent 
than that of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,199 which has recently, albeit in a 
non-binding form, expressed its concern that in many of the contracting states “numerous 
conditions are imposed and restrict the effective access to safe, affordable, acceptable and 
appropriate abortion services.”200 The Parliamentary Assembly explicitly advocates that “abortion 
should not be banned within reasonable gestational limits.”201 Rather, Tysiąc indicates “the 
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ECtHR’s unwillingness to address substantive violations of abortion rights, even when there is a 
legal basis for abortion, and propensity to rely on procedural violations to remedy the wrong.”202 
In conclusion, the jurisprudence of the ECJ and the ECtHR highlights the increasing impact 
of supranational law over states’ regulations of abortion.203 On the one hand, the ECJwhile 
strategically avoiding a clash with the state authorities on the human rights questions raised by a 
ban on the circulation of information about abortion204has clearly affirmed that abortion 
represents a service within the meaning of EU law and is thus subjected to EU supervision.205 On 
the other hand, the ECtHRwhile falling short of recognizing a right to abortion in the penumbras 
of the ECHR206has built up a solid jurisprudential framework, which prohibits states from 
abridging freedom of information about abortion services and requires them to ensure adequate 
procedural mechanisms to make the right to abortion, where it exists, effective.207 
From this point of view, a contextual analysis of the national abortion regulations and of the 
law of the EU and the ECHR illuminates the complex dynamics that arise in the European 
multilevel constitutional architecture.  Although at this point, it appears that there is no direct legal 
incompatibility between the national laws, especially those dictating a restrictive regulation of 
abortion, and the principles established by supranational jurisdictions, several tensions and 
challenges shape the interrelationship between some national legal systems and the normative order 
established by the EU treaties and the ECHR.208 
Ireland can still prohibit abortion, as EU law does not prevent it from doing so.  
Nevertheless, EU law requires abortion to be treated as a service and demands that Irish people be 
allowed to seek all services, including abortions, overseas and be free to receive information about 
them. By the same token, Poland can still prohibit abortion save on health grounds, as ECHR law 
does not prevent it from doing so. Yet if abortion on health ground is permitted, ECHR law requires 
Poland to ensure that adequate and effective procedures are in place to this end. To make sense of 
this complex picture, I suggested in the first chapter of this thesis to employ the concept of 
inconsistency, as a catch-word that well describes the pressures and frictions emerging from the 
interplay of distinct bodies of laws pushing in opposite directions. 
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Until the 1990s, abortion law was exclusively in the purview of national states, with major 
variations in the choice of regulation pursued by the EU countries reflecting a distinction between 
vanguard and laggard states.209 However, also in this field, developments in both the framework of 
the EU and in the ECHR system have proven thatto quote the famous statement of Koen 
Lenaerts“there is simply no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke”210 against 
the evolution of supranational law.211 The ECJ and the ECtHR have, step-by-step, developed a 
series of substantive checks and procedural balances that have slowly enhanced the floor of 
protection ensured to abortion rights Europe-wide. This has created a series of pressures in those 
states which are endowed with extremely restrictive abortion laws, while leaving the vanguard 
states free to provide even more advanced forms of protection for abortion rights. It is now 
necessary to investigate whether these dynamics are uniquely European and how such phenomena 
might prospectively develop in the future. 
 
 
3. Comparative assessment: the right to abortion in the US constitutional experience 
 
As the previous Section has highlighted, a series of pressures and complex constitutional tensions 
characterize the field of abortion rights in the European multilevel architecture. However, these 
inconsistencies are not a peculiarly European phenomenon; rather, analogous issues arise in other 
constitutional systems that are “premised on regulatory federalism regarding abortion policy.”212 
From a comparative point of view, it seems possible to argue, albeit with several caveats, that the 
dynamics arising in the field of abortion law in Europe are not dissimilar from those at play in those 
federal systems in which different abortion legislations are in force in the various constituent states, 
and in which a federal court must review the states’ regulations on the basis of a transnational law 
protecting fundamental rights.213 
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As Stephen Gardbaum has convincingly explained, this seems to be particularly the case in 
the United States of America (US).214 Whereas in other federal systems, such as Canada or 
Switzerland, criminal law and, by implication, the regulation of abortion, is a field of federal 
competence215 and is thus subjected to a uniform federal legislation, or lack thereof,216 in the US, 
jurisdiction over criminal law and abortion belongs to the constituent states, albeit under constraints 
imposed by the federal government.217 In addition, contrary to other federal countries such as 
Australia, where criminal law and, by implication, the regulation of abortion, is also within the 
competences of the constituent states218 but is essentially addressed in a uniform manner,219 the US 
has historically displayed a wide variation in the way in which the several states have regulated 
abortion rights.220 
Therefore, a comparative assessment of the US constitutional experience can illuminate the 
challenges and developments at play in the field of abortion law in the European system.221 A 
number of clarifications, however, are necessary.222 The comparison between the constitutional 
dynamics shaping the issue of abortion in the US and Europe neither implies that the two systems 
are identical nor suggests that the two systems will necessarily develop along the same lines.  
Despite the fact that the EU and the ECHR “have increasingly taken on the features of full-blown 
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constitutional structures,”223 there are still some significant differences between the European 
multilevel architecture and the US federal system, and many of these differences are likely to 
remain for at least the near future. 
As I have explained in the first chapter, however, the US federal system and the European 
multilevel architecture share an important structural analogy: they both feature a pluralist 
constitutional arrangement for the protection of fundamental rights in which rights are 
simultaneously recognized at the state and federal or supranational levels and adjudicated by a 
plurality of institutions operating in these multiple layers.224 Hence, a comparative assessment of 
how the US constitutional system has dealt with abortion rights issues over time raises useful 
insights for understanding the current European challenges. In addition, this comparison provides 
some cautionary tales that help observers appreciate the possible scenarios that might open up in the 
future in the European multilevel human rights system.225 
Abortion laws in the US in the early 1960s closely resembled the European laws of the same 
time. During the 19th century, all of the states of the federation had enacted criminal bans on 
abortion, with the primary aim of protecting the potential mother from the abortionist.226 By the turn 
of the century, however, anti-abortion laws had been redrafted with the goal of protecting the fetus 
rather than protecting the woman and had acquired a “symbolic social curb […of] women’s 
autonomy over their own bodies [and…] sexual relations.”227 The standard format of abortion 
legislation in US states “typically made it a crime for anyone to perform an abortion and also 
usually made it a crime for a woman to obtain one.”228 Most states only allowed the termination of 
pregnancy when strictly necessary to save the woman’s life.229 
By the 1960s, however, pressures had emerged in many states to change restrictive abortion 
legislations, either by reforming them or by abolishing them.230 In 1962, the American Law Institute 
(ALI) published its Model Penal Code, which, in reconsidering the entire system of US criminal 
law, also offered a model of reform for abortion laws.231 The Code removed the criminal sanctions 
for the performance of an abortion when the medical practitioner certifies that “there is substantial 
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risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the 
mother or that the child would be born with grave physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy 
resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse.”232 In the following years, a number of 
state legislatures amended their codes to incorporate the changes suggested by the ALI.233 Others 
adopted even more liberal reforms, allowing abortion on demand up to the first trimester or later.234 
Because the reform of state laws proceeded unevenly, however, advocates for changes 
began to mount challenges against restrictive abortion laws before the state judiciary.235 For 
instance, in 1969, the California Supreme Court found that the state’s act prohibiting abortion, 
except when necessary to save the woman’s life was unconstitutionally vague under the state 
Constitution.236 Also the federal judiciary, however, soon became a forum for legal attacks against 
restrictive state abortion laws. Since the late 1920s, indeed, the US Supreme Court had begun 
interpreting the “due process” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution237 to 
“incorporate” parts of the first ten amendments to the US Constitution, commonly referred to as the 
Bill of Rights.238 As a result of this transformative jurisprudence, the US Supreme Court mandated 
states’ adherence to and protection of many of the fundamental rights articulated in the Bill of 
Rights, and plaintiffs were empowered to rely on these rights to challenge states’ legislations before 
the federal judiciary.239 In the early 1970s, thus, federal district and circuit courts began to embrace 
claims that restrictive state abortion laws conflicted with the fundamental right guarantees protected 
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by the US Constitution240 and most specifically with, the right to privacy which the Supreme Court 
had recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.241 
Needless to say, the 18th century Bill of Rights of the US Constitutionmuch like the 20th 
century fundamental laws of the EU member states, the ECHR, and the EU treatiesdoes not 
contain an explicit, textual protection for the right to an abortion.242 In the paramount 1973 Roe v. 
Wade decision,243 however, the US Supreme Court found that the federal Constitution protected an 
unenumerated right to abortion and that state laws prohibiting abortion were unconstitutional.244 In 
Roe, the Supreme Court invalidated an old Texas statute, which made abortion a crime in all 
circumstances.245 On the same day that the Court delivered its Roe judgment, it also struck down, in 
Doe v. Bolton,246 another more modern abortion statute from Georgia that criminalized abortion 
except on medical grounds.247 
Writing for a seven-to-two majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun stated that the 
right to privacy was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy.”248 The Court rejected the argument that a woman’s right to abortion was absolute; 
rather, it acknowledged that “some state regulation in areas protected by that right is 
appropriate.”249 Like the ECtHR,250 the Court refused to speculate on “the difficult question of 
when life begins.”251 But it unequivocally stated that the fetus could not be regarded as a person 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to justify restrictive states’ anti-abortion 
statutes.252 
In light of this constitutional assessment, the Court developed its well-known “trimesters 
guidelines,” clearly dictating the legitimate contours within which a state could regulate abortion:253 
“(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester [of pregnancy], the abortion 
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s 
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attending physician; (b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the 
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion 
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. (c) For the stage subsequent to 
viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, 
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”254 
The Roe decision generated strong reactions255 and effectively transformed the issue of 
abortion into “the central legal problem” of contemporary US constitutional law. 256 Attempts were 
made at the federal level to overrule Roe through the enactment of a human life amendment257 and 
to limit Roe’s impact by prohibiting the financing of abortion through federal funds.258 The main 
responses to the decision nevertheless occurred at the state level.259 Indeed, Roe “federalized (rather 
than nationalized) abortion policy, making state legislatures supporting players in abortion 
policymaking.”260 In many states, “legislatures responded to Roe by enacting new restrictions that 
attempted to reduce the number of abortions without challenging what came to be called Roe’s 
‘central premise’that the Constitution barred states from making it a criminal offense to have or 
perform any abortion.”261 
Whereas a handful of states enacted statutes that were facially incompatible with Roe and 
thus directly defied the decision of the Supreme Court,262 other states passed legislation purporting 
to circumvent the Court’s decision by denying public financing for abortion and setting strict 
conditions under which abortions would be allowed, such as requiring abortions to be performed in 
hospitals, requiring prior parental and spousal consent, and waiting periods.263 In a series of 
decisions in the twenty years following Roe, the Supreme Court struck down many such state laws, 
including:  the imposition of spousal consent,264 mandatory waiting periods,265 and the requirement 
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that abortions be performed only in hospitals.266 In Bigelow v. Virginia,267 the Court struck down a 
Virginia statute, which, much like the Irish ban challenged before the ECJ in Grogan,268 prohibited 
the advertising of abortion providers in other US states.269  
At the same time, the Supreme Court upheld state laws imposing women’s informed 
consent,270 requiring parental notification,271 and foreclosing both state and federal public funding 
for elective abortions.272 In addition, under the influence of newly appointed judges and, possibly, 
under pressure from states’ legislatures, the Court incrementally retracted from Roe’s rigid trimester 
formula.273 The reasoning of the Court in Roe had been criticized, from a liberal perspective, for 
overemphasizing the role of medical doctors in the decision and failing to address the issue of 
women’s autonomy and equality.274 In contrast, conservative critics found that Roe’s prohibition of 
any state regulation of abortions during the first and second trimesters represented an unwarranted 
interference by the federal judicial branch in a matter that should be decided by the state legislature, 
through the states’ democratic processes.275 
This eventually paved the way for the Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey.276 In a plurality opinion jointly written by Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter, the 
Supreme Court upheld Roe’s core holding that “a State may not prohibit any woman from making 
the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”277 However, it rejected Roe’s 
trimester framework, replacing it with the “undue burden” test.278 Under this test, a state’s 
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regulation of abortion would be regarded as “invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”279 
Applying the undue burden test in Casey, the Supreme Court upheld a number of provisions 
in the Pennsylvania law at issue, including the imposition of informed consent and a waiting period 
for women seeking abortions.280 However, the Court struck down the spousal notification 
requirement, arguing that due to the threat of violence that a woman might face if she had to inform 
her partner of her decision to seek an abortion,281 the provision represented a substantial obstacle to 
a woman’s right to choose and was comparable, for all practical effects, to a proviso “outlaw[ing] 
abortion in all cases.”282 Therefore, it has been argued that Casey saved Roe.283 At the same time, 
however, the Court made clear “that state regulations [would] almost invariably pass[] muster,”284 
unless they attempted to bar abortion tout court.285 
Although it has been argued that Casey somehow “settled the abortion dispute, both by 
establishing a majoritarian, split-the-difference standards, and perhaps more importantly, by 
providing a template that helps states determine what types of abortion regulations can be 
constitutionally pursued,”286 the two decades following the decision featured a wide array of 
activities by both the federal and the state legislatures.287 In 1994, the US Congress enacted its first 
piece of legislation in the field of abortion law, making it a federal crime to harass and obstruct 
lawful providers of abortion.288 In 2003, Congress enacted a ban on the performance of abortion 
through the “intact dilate and extraction” technique (referred to by its critics as “partial birth 
abortion”),289 an act that—despite the existence of a contrary precedent,290 federalism concerns,291 
and limited legislative findings292—was upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart.293 
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At the state level, several scholars have emphasized how states were generally uninterested 
in pushing the boundaries of Casey294 or Gonzales by enacting measures that challenged Roe 
outright.295 Nevertheless, it appears that in the last twenty years many states have enacted 
increasingly restrictive abortion laws.296 The latest and most remarkable example is perhaps 
represented by South Dakota, which recently introduced, for the first time in the US, a directive 
counseling requirement, similar to the German model,297 which obliges women seeking an abortion 
to consult with pro-life pregnancy centers, even if they seek an abortion during the first trimester of 
pregnancy.298 Because of such legislative experimentations, wide variations among states’  
approaches to abortion exist today, even though all such legislation must take place within the 
framework of permissible limitations set by the Supreme Court.299 The contemporary picture of 
abortion regulation in the states of the US highlights a “crazy-quilt pattern of the laws—a diversity 
that resembles the diversity of state law during the ‘reform’ period of the late 1960s.”300 
On the one hand, a number of states have passed legislation that restricts abortion to the 
greatest extent permitted by federal law.301 To this end, together with more traditional provisions 
imposing parental notification, waiting periods, or informed consent requirements,302 recent 
statutory enactments require women to hear about all potential medical complications that could 
arise from an abortion (even those complications that are irrelevant in their cases),303 require 
women to hear ultrasounds of the fetus,304 and, as mentioned, undergo directive counseling.305 A 
series of demanding targeted regulations for abortion providers are also in force in several states.306  
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Finally, whereas the unenforceable pre-Roe statutory prohibitions of abortion remain on many 
states’ statutory books,307 some states have enacted so-called trigger laws, which would 
automatically outlaw abortion if the Supreme Court were to overrule Roe.308 
On the other hand, a number of states have autonomously decided to supersede the federal 
standard by offering even greater constitutional protection for the right to an abortion than the 
federal minimum.309 Following the lead of the California Supreme Court,310 nine state superior 
courts have concluded that their state constitutions contained an independent right to abortion.311 In 
addition, inferior courts in nine other states have recognized a state constitutional right to abortion 
or privacy.312 Finally, broad recognition of the right to abortion without any major statutory 
limitations is provided in the legislation of many other states with the consequence that, even in the 
unlikely case that the Supreme Court overrules Roe, abortion would be lawful in a plurality of US 
states.313 
In conclusion, the assessment of the US constitutional experience in the field of abortion law 
highlights an evolving pattern. Historically, the competence over criminal law belonged to the 
several states and  by the late 1960s, wide variations existed in the ways in which each state 
regulated abortion. The Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision imposed a unifying standard, 
recognizing a woman’s fundamental right to decide privately whether to carry on a pregnancy and 
precluding states from criminalizing abortion. Since that decision, however, the Supreme Court has 
taken a number of retreating steps, recognizing wider room for states to maneuver, albeit within the 
limits of the Casey undue burden test. As a consequence, significant differences remain today in the 
regulation of abortion in the several US states, but a common floor of protection—recognizing a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy at least during the first trimester of pregnancy—is solidly 
grounded in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the US Constitution.314 
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4. Recent developments: the case law of the European Human Rights Court  
 
The dynamics at play in the US constitutional system have produced over time a more consistent 
framework for the regulation of abortion rights throughout the US, while still preserving a degree of 
diversity among the several states. The US Supreme Court now ensures a minimum federal standard 
of protection for the right to an abortion:  states can supersede this standard and integrate it, but they 
cannot place undue burdens that would substantially impair a woman’s right to an abortion. In light 
of the US experience, this Section addresses the question whether a comparable evolution toward 
the definition of a supranational minimum standard for the protection of abortion rights can be 
detected in the most recent transformations taking place in the law in the books and the law in 
action in the European human rights system. To this end, I focus on the recent decision of the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR – the December 2010 ruling in A., B. & C. v. Ireland – and on the May 
2011 follow up case of R.R. v. Poland.315 
The case concerned three women, two Irish citizens and a Lithuanian citizen residing in 
Ireland, who had to travel to England to terminate their pregnancies due to the Irish prohibition on 
abortion.316 The first applicant was an unmarried and unemployed woman, who already had four 
children and sought an abortion for reasons of health and well-being and out of a concern that an 
additional pregnancy would make it impossible for her to raise her children.317 The second applicant 
had become pregnant unintentionally and had been initially warned that there was a substantial risk 
of an ectopic pregnancy. By the time she decided to seek an abortion, the risk had been excluded 
but the woman was willing to terminate her pregnancy out of well-being concerns.318 The third 
applicant had become pregnant after a three-year chemotherapeutic treatment for a rare form of 
cancer. Although the pregnancy seriously threatened a recurrence of the cancer and imperiled her 
life, the woman was unable to obtain advice from Irish doctors on whether she was entitled to an 
abortion in Ireland, and she therefore decided to seek an abortion in England out of concern for her 
life.319 
All of the applicants complained that the Irish prohibition on abortion restricted their ECHR 
rights.320 They maintained that the criminalization of abortion violated Article 3, since it produced 
stigma and prejudice against women seeking an abortion, which humiliated and degraded their 
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dignity.321 They also claimed that the prohibition of abortion was contrary to Article 14, which 
prohibits discrimination, and Article 13, which requires contracting parties to the ECHR to set up 
effective domestic remedies to vindicate their conventional rights.322 The third applicant 
complained that the impossibility of obtaining advice as to the medical implications of a pregnancy 
for her cancer also amounted to a violation of Article 2, which enshrines the right to life.323 Finally, 
all the applicants claimed that the Irish prohibition of abortion represented an undue interference 
with their right to respect for private life protected by Article 8.324 
The ECtHR began its opinion by explaining the Irish legal framework on abortion in great 
detail and reporting the criticisms and proposals for reform that had been discussed both at the 
national and international levels.325 It then addressed the admissibility issue, distinguishing the 
present case from the D. case.326 As far as the first two petitioners were concerned, the ECtHR 
stated that they could not be required to pursue and exhaust the domestic avenues of recourse before 
applying to the ECtHR as it was clear that a domestic complaint alleging a violation of the ECHR 
due to the impossible nature of obtaining an abortion in Ireland for health and well-being reasons 
did not have “any prospect of success, going against […] the history, text and judicial interpretation 
of Article 40.3.3 of the [Irish] Constitution.”327 As far as the third petitioner was concerned, the 
ECtHR underlined how the lack of domestic legislation implementing the right to abortion to save 
the life of the mother was at the core of her complaint and therefore had to be addressed on the 
merits. 
On the substantive issues of the case, the ECtHR summarily rejected the claim of a violation 
of Article 3 ECHR, arguing that the “facts alleged d[id] not disclose a level of severity falling 
within the scope” of the contested provision.328 The Court also rebuffed the third applicant’s 
complaint under Article 2 ECHR because “there was no legal impediment to the third applicant 
travelling for an abortion abroad.”329 The ECtHR then moved to address the alleged violation of 
Article 8 ECHR by considering separately the complaint of the first two applicants “that they could 
not obtain an abortion for health and / or well-being reasons in Ireland,”330 and later, the complaint 
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of the third petitioner “about the absence of any legislative implementation of Article 40.3.3 of the 
[Irish] Constitution.”331  
According to the ECtHR, although Article 8 ECHR could not “be interpreted as conferring a 
right to abortion,”332 its well-consolidated case law made it clear that “legislation regulating the 
interruption of pregnancy touches upon the sphere of the private life of the woman,”333 protected by 
Article 8 ECHR.334 As a consequence: “[t]he prohibition in Ireland of abortion where sought for 
reasons of health and / or well-being about which the first and second applicants complained, and 
the third applicant’s alleged inability to establish her qualification for a lawful abortion in Ireland, 
come within the scope of their right to respect for their private lives and accordingly Article 8.”335 
Nevertheless, the “difference in the substantive complaints of the first and second applicants, on the 
one hand, and that of the third applicant on the other, require[d] separate determination of the 
question whether there ha[d]  been a breach of Article 8.”336  
The third applicant’s case raised an issue that had already been considered by the ECtHR:  
that is, the existence of a series of positive obligations stemming from Article 8 ECHR that require 
the contracting parties to set-up an effective legal framework at the domestic level to verify whether 
the conditions for obtaining a lawful abortion had been met.337 In contrast, the first two applicants’ 
cases raised a novel issue:  they presented the ECtHR with the first “opportunity to develop certain 
general Convention principles on the minimum degree of protection to which a woman seeking an 
abortion would be entitled”338 and to expound upon the negative obligations that limit the authority 
of the contracting parties to prohibit voluntary termination of pregnancy. 
The ECtHR reached different conclusions in the two scenarios, agreeing unanimously on a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR with regard to the third applicant but dividing sharply on the complaint 
of the first two applicants.339  In the case of the third applicant, the ECtHR, by drawing heavily on 
the Tysiąc precedent,340 remarked how Article 8 ECHR “may also impose on a State certain positive 
obligations”341 and that these obligations may require “the implementation, where appropriate, of 
                                                 
331
 Ibid. However, the ECtHR did not address the complaints under Articles 13 and 14 ECHR because, according to the 
ECtHR, its decision based on Article 8 was decisive and rendered consideration of Articles 13 and 14 unnecessary. 
332
 A., B. and C. par 214 
333
 Ibid par 213 
334
 See supra text accompanying n 185–92 
335
 A., B. and C. par 214 
336
 Ibid   
337
 See supra text accompanying n 185–92 
338
 A., B. and C. par 193 
339
 See Diletta Tega, ‘Corte Europea dei diritti: l’aborto tra margine di apprezzamento statale e consenso esterno’  
[2011] Quaderni Costituzionali 159 (providing an early comment on the decision). See also Fiona de Londras, ‘Ireland 
Is Still in Denial Over Abortion’ The Guardian (London, 16th December 2010) 6; Carl O’Brien, ‘State Loses Case on 
Woman’s Abortion Right’ Irish Times (Dublin 17th December 2010) 
340
 See supra text accompanying n 185–98 
341
 A., B. and C. par 244 
 233 
specific measures in an abortion context.”342 The ECtHR underlined how, under the X. doctrine of 
the Irish Supreme Court, abortion could be obtained lawfully in Ireland when there was a real and 
substantial risk to the life of the mother—as distinct from the health of the mother—and this risk 
could only be avoided by a termination of the pregnancy.343 The ECtHR then noted that the case of 
the third applicant would fit within this category; however, it found that no effective mechanisms 
existed under domestic law to ensure a right to an abortion in such life-saving situations.344 The 
ECtHR noted a variety of factors that revealed the ineffectiveness of Irish domestic law in ensuring 
that a woman could access an abortion when necessary to save her life. 
First, the ECtHR raised “a number of concerns as to the effectiveness of [the medical] 
consultation procedure as a means of establishing the third applicant’s qualification for a lawful 
abortion in Ireland.”345 The ECtHR emphasized that no legal framework existed “whereby any 
difference of opinion between the woman and her doctor or between different doctors consulted, or 
whereby an understandable hesitancy on the part of a woman or doctor, could be examined and 
resolved.”346 The ECtHR then remarked how the existence of severe criminal sanctions for unlawful 
abortions “constitute[s] a significant chilling factor for both women and doctors in the medical 
consultation process.”347 
Second, the ECtHR underlined how a constitutional complaint was not a satisfactory means 
of protecting the third applicant’s right to respect for her private life. Constitutional courts are not 
“the appropriate fora for the primary determination as to whether a woman qualifies for an abortion 
which is lawfully available in a State”348 because “it would be wrong to turn the High Court into a 
‘licensing authority’ for abortions.”349 Furthermore, “it would be equally inappropriate to require 
women to take on such complex constitutional proceedings when their underlying constitutional 
right to an abortion in the case of a qualifying risk to life was not disputable.”350 
The ECtHR concluded that Ireland had violated Article 8 ECHR by failing to provide the 
third applicant, whose life was at risk due to her pregnancy, with adequate procedures by which she 
could establish her right to a lawful abortion in Ireland. In the ECtHR’s view: “[t]he uncertainty 
generated by the lack of legislative implementation of Article 40.3.3 [of the Irish Constitution], and 
more particularly by the lack of effective and accessible procedures to establish a right to an 
abortion under that provision, has resulted in a striking discordance between the theoretical right to 
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a lawful abortion in Ireland on grounds of a relevant risk to a woman’s life and the reality of its 
practical implementation.”351 The ECtHR found that this amounted to a violation of Article 8 
ECHR. 
In contrast, in the case of the first two applicants, eleven out of seventeen judges of the 
ECtHR’s Grand Chamber concluded that Ireland had not violated the negative obligations 
stemming from Article 8 ECHR, which prohibits contracting parties from interfering with the right 
to respect for private life. The majority of the ECtHR acknowledged that “the prohibition of the 
termination of the first and second applicants’ pregnancies sought for reasons of health and / or 
well-being amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their private lives.”352  
However, in undertaking the three-tier proportionality test, required by Article 8(2) ECHR to verify 
whether the interference was “in accordance with the law,” pursued a “legitimate aim,” and was 
“necessary in a democratic society,”353 the ECtHR concluded that the Irish prohibition of abortion 
did not disproportionately interfere with the first and second applicants’ right to respect for private 
life.354 
On the first issue, whether the interference with Article 8 ECHR was in accordance with the 
law, the ECtHR simply recalled its Open Door ruling.355 On the second issue, whether the 
interference pursued a legitimate aim, the ECtHR remarked how under Irish law, the right to life of 
the unborn was based “on profound moral values concerning the nature of life which were reflected 
in the stance of the majority of the Irish people against abortion during the 1983 referendum and 
which have not been demonstrated to have relevantly changed since then.”356 The ECtHR hence 
affirmed “that the impugned restriction […] pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of 
morals.”357 Finally, on the third and most relevant question, whether the interference with Article 8 
ECHR was necessary in a democratic society, the ECtHR clarified that in the present case, it had to 
“examine whether the prohibition of abortion in Ireland for health and / or well-being reasons struck 
a fair balance between, on the one hand, the first and second applicants’ right to respect for their 
private lives under Article 8 and, on the other hand, profound moral values of the Irish people.”358 
Given “the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised by the question of abortion,”359 
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however, the ECtHR decided that Ireland enjoyed a “broad margin of appreciation”360 in 
determining whether a fair balance was struck between the two conflicting values.361 
The ECtHR also examined “whether this wide margin of appreciation is narrowed by the 
existence of a relevant consensus” among the other European states and, significantly, underlined 
how “a substantial majority of the Contracting States of the Council of Europe […] allow[] abortion 
on broader grounds than accorded under Irish law.”362 In the factual part of the decision, the ECtHR 
had already remarked how: “Abortion is available on request (according to certain criteria including 
gestational limits) in some 30 Contracting States. An abortion justified on health grounds is 
available in some 40 Contracting States and justified on well-being grounds in some 35 such States.  
Three Contracting States prohibit abortion in all circumstances (Andorra, Malta and San Marino).  
In recent years, certain States have extended the grounds on which abortion can be obtained 
(Monaco, Montenegro, Portugal and Spain).”363 
Despite the existence of a clear European trend in favor of the legalization of abortion,364 the 
majority of the ECtHR denied that “this consensus decisively narrow[ed] the broad margin of 
appreciation of the State.”365 To justify this conclusion, the ECtHR affirmed that there was no 
agreement on the “scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life”366 and that “this consensus 
[could] not be a decisive factor in the Court’s examination of whether the impugned prohibition on 
abortion in Ireland for health and well-being reasons struck a fair balance between the conflicting 
rights and interests, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of the Convention.”367  
Therefore, the ECtHR denied “that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well-
being reasons, based as it is on the profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of life 
[…] and as to the consequent protection to be accorded to the right to life of the unborn, exceed[ed] 
the margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to the Irish State.”368 In addition, the ECtHR 
mentioned in passing how Irish women still had “the option of lawfully travelling to another 
State”369 to seek an abortion and to receive information about abortion services overseas (without 
considering, however, the discriminatory effects that this possibility has on high-income and low-
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income women).370 The ECtHR thus concluded that there had been no violation of Article 8 ECHR 
as regards the first and second applicants. 
The decision of the majority of the ECtHR prompted a vigorous dissent by six judges. In a 
joint opinion, the minority disagreed with the majority’s finding that Ireland had not violated 
Article 8 ECHR with regard to the first and second applicants and blamed the majority for: 
“[I]nappropriately conflat[ing…] the question of the beginning of life (and, as a consequence, the 
right to life), the States’ margin of appreciation in this regard, with the margin of appreciation that 
States have in weighing the right to life of the fetus against the right to life of the mother or her 
right to health and well-being.”371 Rather, the dissenting judges argued that the court should 
consider two elements when applying the proportionality test. 
The first element considered was the existence of a “clear […] consensus amongst a 
substantial majority of the Contracting States of the Council of Europe towards allowing 
abortion.”372 According to the dissenting judges, the precedents of the ECtHR demonstrated that, 
whenever a consensus existed, this “decisively narrow[ed] the margin of appreciation” given to the 
member states.373 As the dissent’s opinion emphasized: “[T]his approach is commensurate with the 
‘harmonising’ role of the Convention’s case-law:  indeed, one of the paramount functions of the 
case-law is to gradually create a harmonious application of human rights protection, cutting across 
the national boundaries of the Contracting States and allowing the individuals within their 
jurisdiction to enjoy, without discrimination, equal protection regardless of their place of 
residence.”374 
Given the existence of a “strong” consensus in the case at hand, 375 according to the 
dissenting judges, the decision of the ECtHR to refrain from narrowing the margin of appreciation 
granted to Ireland out of concern for the profound moral values of the Irish people amounted to a 
“real and dangerous” disregard of established precedents. 376 Indeed, in the dissent’s view, it is only 
when no European consensus exists that the ECtHR should “refrain[] from playing its harmonising 
role, preferring not to become the first European body to ‘legislate’ on a matter still undecided at 
European level.”377 The second element that, according to the dissenting judges, the court should 
consider when applying the proportionality test was the “striking”378 severity of “the (rather 
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archaic) law,”379 which punished abortion in Ireland with the sentence of life imprisonment.380 The 
dissenting judges concluded that it was “clear that in the circumstances of the case there has been a 
violation of Article 8 with regard to the first two applicants.”381 
In conclusion, the analysis of A., B. & C. v. Ireland reveals that the ECtHR has fallen short 
of bringing Europe along the path set forth by the US Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.382 The 
ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 ECHR as far as the third applicant was concerned because 
Ireland had breached its positive obligations to set up an adequate domestic legal framework by 
which the petitioner could establish her right to a lawful abortion for life-saving purposes.  
However, a majority of the ECtHR concluded that the Irish prohibition of abortion on health and 
well-being grounds did not amount to a disproportionate interference with the first and second 
applicants’ rights to respect for private life. Yet, although the ECtHR has not delivered a decision 
analogous to Roe v. Wade, it is difficult to predict what the consequences of the ruling will be, both 
for the member states and the future case law of the ECtHR.383 
Indeed, in May 2011, the Fourth Section of the ECtHR delivered another innovative 
abortion decision that, widely quoting A., B. & C. v. Ireland, marked a further step toward the 
protection of the right to an abortion at the supranational level in Europe. The case, R.R. v. 
Poland,384 concerned a Polish woman who, although she was informed since the early days of 
pregnancy that her fetus might be affected by a serious genetic disease, was not able to obtain the 
medical test needed to ascertain the impairment of the fetus and eventually delivered a baby 
affected by the Turner syndrome. In her application to the ECtHR, the woman complained that it 
was impossible for her to obtain timely prenatal tests because the medical doctors with whom she 
consulted had intentionally postponed all genetic examinations. Because of these deliberate medical 
delays, the woman was unable to obtain an abortion within the time limits provided by the law, 
which permits termination of pregnancy within the first twenty-four weeks for reasons of fetal 
impairment.385 
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In its decision, the ECtHR ruled that Poland had violated Article 8 ECHR.  By recalling its 
precedents, the ECtHR remarked that “[w]hile a broad margin of appreciation is accorded to the 
State as regards the circumstances in which an abortion will be permitted in a State, once that 
decision is taken the legal framework devised for this purpose should be ‘shaped in a coherent 
manner.’”386 The ECtHR emphasized the “critical importance”387 of the time factor in a woman’s 
decision to terminate a pregnancy and underlined how it had “not been demonstrated that Polish law 
as applied to the applicant’s case contained any effective mechanisms which would have enabled 
the applicant to seek access to a diagnostic service, decisive for the possibility of exercising her 
right to take an informed decision as to whether to seek an abortion or not.”388 It thus concluded that 
the Polish authorities had “failed to comply with their positive obligations to secure to the applicant 
effective respect for her private life and that there ha[d] therefore been a breach of Article 8.”389 
In an unprecedented move, however, the ECtHR also found Poland in violation of Article 3 
ECHR, which sets up an absolute prohibition against torture and inhumane and degrading 
treatments. In the ECtHR’s view, “ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to 
fall within the scope of Article 3.”390 However, the circumstances of the case unequivocally led to 
the conclusion that this minimum threshold of severity had been passed. The ECtHR noted that the 
applicant had “tried, repeatedly and with perseverance, through numerous visits to doctors and 
through her written requests and complaints, to obtain access to genetic tests which would have 
provided her with information confirming or dispelling her fears; to no avail.”391 In addition, it 
emphasized how the applicant “was in a situation of great vulnerability. Like any other pregnant 
woman in her situation, she was deeply distressed by information that the fetus could be affected 
with some malformation.”392     
As the ECtHR explained, however, although the woman “suffered acute anguish […h]er 
concerns were not properly acknowledged and addressed by the health professionals dealing with 
her case […who showed no regard for] the temporal aspect of the applicant’s predicament.”393  
Because of the deliberate delay by the medical doctors, the woman “obtained the results of the tests 
when it was already too late for her to make an informed decision on whether to continue the 
pregnancy or to have recourse to legal abortion as the time limit provided for by [the Polish 
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Abortion Act] had already expired.”394 In light of the conduct of the public authorities, the ECtHR 
expressed its “regret that the applicant was so shabbily treated by the doctors dealing with her case” 
and concluded that the humiliation suffered by the woman and the impossibility of availing herself 
of a lawful abortion on fetal impairment grounds amounted to a violation of Article 3. 395 
In the end, the R.R. v. Poland decision finding a violation of Article 3 ECHR in the Polish 
abortion context, suggests that the Grand Chamber ruling in A., B. & C.  v. Ireland is not an 
obstacle for further judicial developments and greater supranational protection of the dignity of 
women in the field of abortion rights. In addition, the R.R. v. Poland decision predicts that the 
complex questions of balancing state sovereignty and women’s autonomy will remain a core feature 
of the ECtHR case law in the years to come.396 At the same, whether the creation of a more 
consistent framework for the regulation of abortion rights in Europe remains a possible scenario 
will also depend on transformations taking place in the EU constitutional system. 
 
 
5. Future prospects: beyond the Lisbon Treaty 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, that entered into force on December 1, 2009,397 has significantly reshaped the 
EU human rights architecture and its connection with the systems for the protection of fundamental 
rights established at the national and international levels.398 The Lisbon Treaty rescued most of the 
substantive and institutional innovations contained in the abandoned 2003 Constitutional Treaty and 
can therefore be regarded as a momentous reform of the EU constitutional system.399 Its potential 
impact on the protection of fundamental rights and on the controversial issue of the right to an 
abortion needs to be considered. The Lisbon Treaty has provided the legal basis for the accession of 
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the EU to the ECHR, paving the way for external supervision by the ECtHR on the human rights 
conduct of the EU.400 
In addition, pursuant to the new Article 6(1) of the EU Treaty (TEU), the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (CFR), which was only proclaimed in 2001 by the EU institutions, has now 
acquired the “same legal value” as the other EU treaties (that is, the formal status of EU 
constitutional law).401 The CFR is the first written EU Bill of Rights402 and was initially conceived 
as a codification of the fundamental rights recognized by the ECJ. The CFR, however, contains a 
complete and coherent catalogue of rights that extends well beyond a mere jurisprudential 
restatement; rather, it features one of the most advanced human rights instruments worldwide.403 
Hence the CFR includes a number of provisions404 that are relevant to the issue of abortion 
including, safeguarding a right to life,405 protecting private life406 and recognizing a general 
principle of equality without discrimination.407 
The CFR binds all the EU institutions and the member states when they act within the scope 
of application of EU law.408 Since the ECJ had already acknowledged in Grogan that abortion 
constituted a service within the meaning of EU law,409 it would appear that any national regulation 
on abortion would fall within the scope of application of EU law and would thus be subject to 
compliance with the fundamental rights principles contained in the CFR.410 At the same time, 
whereas in the early 1990s, in the Grogan case, the ECJ was able to get around the Irish domestic 
ban on information about abortion services on purely economic grounds,411 it would seem that 
today, given the binding nature of the CFR, any possible challenge to a national measure restricting 
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abortion would inevitably require the ECJ to consider the human rights issues involved in the case. 
This clearly shifts the theoretical underpinnings of the ECJ’s oversight from an internal market 
paradigm toward a fundamental rights paradigm.412 
The potential for the above scenario to take place in the abstract seems to be confirmed by 
the legal safeguards that a few EU member states have adopted to prevent such a future 
development.413 Protocol No. 30 on the Application of the CFR,414 which Poland and the UK 
secured from the other EU member states during the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty, represents 
the first piece of evidence in this regard.415 The Protocol is attached to the EU treaties and has their 
same legal status. It affirms that the CFR “does not extend the ability of the [ECJ], or any court or 
tribunal of Poland or of the [UK], to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, 
practices or action of Poland or of the [UK] are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms 
and principles that it reaffirms.”416 
The UK and Poland sought the adoption of the Protocol in order to limit the impact of the 
CFR upon their national legal systems. For the UK, its support of the Protocol did not stem from a 
concern for its permissive abortion law, but, rather (as explained in chapter 4 on strike laws), out of 
fear that the social rights provisions of the CFR could destabilize its labor market.417 In contrast, 
Poland primarily viewed the Protocol as a legal instrument to shield its restrictive abortion 
regulation from EU supervision.418 This is confirmed by the non-binding unilateral declaration No. 
61 in which Poland makes further efforts to affirm its position that the CFR “does not affect in any 
way the right of Member States to legislate in the sphere of public morality, family law, as well as 
the protection of human dignity and respect for human physical and moral integrity.”419   
The redundancy with which the treaties affirm that the CFR does not extend the 
competences of the EU provides additional evidence of several member states’ concerns when 
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considering a binding CFR; namely, its possible spill-over into the domestic legal systems through 
the human rights adjudication of both the ECJ and the national courts.420 This same idea is restated 
multiple times, including in Article 6(1)(2) TEU, in Article 51(2) of the CFR itself, in the joint non-
binding declaration No. 1 of the EU member states annexed to the EU treaties,421 and in the 
unilateral declaration No. 53 by the Czech Republic on the CFR.422 In light of the Grogan case, it is 
uncertain whether these provisions will effectively prevent the ECJ from ruling on a new abortion 
case.423 Still, importantly, the EU treaties contain other ad hoc clauses designed to protect specific 
national abortion laws.424     
For example, in its 2003 Accession Agreement to the EU, Malta obtained a special 
provision, Protocol No. 7, which leaves unaffected “the application in the territory of Malta of 
national legislation relating to abortion.”425 Moreover, the consolidated version of the EU treaties 
post-Lisbon has preserved the 1992 Irish protocol (renumbering it as Protocol No. 35),426 ensuring 
that “nothing in the [EU treaties] shall affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution of Ireland.”427 The December 2008 Conclusions adopted by the European Council after 
the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the first Irish referendum of 2008 and paving the way to the 
second, successful, Irish referendum in 2009,428 provided an additional “guarantee that the 
provisions of the Irish Constitution in relation to the right to life […] and the family are not in any 
way affected by the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon attributes legal status to the [CFR].”429  
Legal scholars debate whether these provisions of the EU treaties can be truly effective.430  
Contrary to the purely political declarations, the additional Protocols have the same legal value as 
the EU treaties; however, scholars have argued that, for instance, Protocol No. 30 “is totally useless: 
it can not prohibit lawyers from requesting the application of the rights codified in the CFR.”431 In 
addition, if one considers that Protocol No. 30 purportedly only aims to “clarify the application of 
the [CFR] in relation to the laws and administrative actions of Poland and the [UK] and of its 
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justiciability within Poland and the [UK],”432 it would seem that its effect is not to opt-out from the 
CFR.433 Rather, Protocol No. 30 “is an exercise in smoke and mirrors,” largely motivated for 
presentational reasons. 434 
At the same time, the concessions granted in the Irish and Maltese abortion protocols, as 
well as the political reassurances that the European Council made to Ireland after the first 
unsuccessful referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, reveal a pattern. These concessions reflect a trend to 
accommodate in the EU treaties “the distrust of several states toward the EU”435 and its human 
rights instruments. In this context, it is not easy to imagine that the ECJ will, in practice, fully 
incorporate the fundamental rights guarantees included in the CFR within the legal systems of the 
member states, along the lines pursued by the US Supreme Court in its gradual incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights into the legal systems of the states.436 Nor is it easy to imagine that the ECJ will 
inaugurate a review of domestic legislation limiting abortion rights for its compatibility with the 
transnational human rights standard enshrined in the CFR at any time in the near future.437 
Still, as Miguel Poiares Maduro has persuasively argued, the CFR has a double 
constitutional life.438 On the one hand, it is regarded as “a simple consolidation of the previous 
fundamental rights acquis aimed at guaranteeing regime legitimacy.”439 On the other hand, the CFR 
can be seen as “a bill of rights of a political community, a constitutional document that is part of a 
complete political contract among citizens and that therefore legitimises new claims and an 
increased incorporation at the state level.”440 At the moment, it is impossible to predict which of 
these two visions will prevail. Yet, the US experience with its Bill of Rights demonstrates that 
“intentions and outcomes may differ greatly.”441 Nothing precludes the CFR from becoming a 
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powerful federalizing element that sets the minimum human rights standard with which states shall 
comply “to an extent that the Union can actually function.”442 
De jure condendo, a similar development may even be advisable in the field of abortion 
rights on the basis of an equality argument. I do not intend to articulate here a complete normative 
theory of equality as a justification for protecting the right to abortion in Europe, comparable to the 
claims made by a number of distinguished US scholars in favor of grounding the central premise of 
Roe v. Wade in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment of the US Constitution.443 
What I want to briefly suggest, however, is that in the European context too, the regulation of 
abortion raises a number of equality concerns.444 In fact, in a multilevel constitutional system, 
states’ bans on abortion can produce discriminatory effects that are hard to accept. 
In the previous Sections, I explained how a minority of EU member states, notably Ireland, 
Poland, and Malta, have enacted extremely restrictive abortion laws, prohibiting women from 
obtaining an abortion at home except when necessary to save their lives or protect against grave 
injury their health.445 At the same time, women residing in these states have a right—protected 
under EU law, ECHR law, and now often also codified under domestic law—to be informed about 
abortion providers in other EU countries. In addition, women in these countries have the right to 
travel abroad if they want to terminate their pregnancies.446 Women are able to exercise these rights 
without facing any risk of prosecution or subjection to the severe domestic criminal sanctions 
against abortion.447  
The possibility for a woman to escape the restrictive domestic abortion bans by going 
abroad and to avoid prosecution in her home state has shaped the jurisprudence of the European 
supranational courts.448 In fact, this go-around is precisely what prompted AG Van Gerven in 
Grogan to conclude that the Irish ban on information about abortion services was not 
disproportionate.449 In his opinion, AG Van Gerven clearly affirmed that “a ban on pregnant women 
going abroad or a rule under which they would be subjected to unsolicited examinations upon their 
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return from abroad”450 would never be tolerated under EU law. Furthermore, the ECtHR cited the 
fact that the Irish law granted women the ability to opt-out of the abortion ban by “lawfully 
travelling to another State”451 as one of the justifications for its ruling in A., B. & C. v. Ireland.452 
The consequence of all this is that the Irish, Polish and Maltese abortion domestic bans, 
along with their equivalents, effectively constrain only those women who cannot side-step the 
national prohibition by travelling to another EU state.453 In other words, these laws only prohibit 
abortion to those women who do not possess sufficient private economic resources to leave their 
countries to terminate a pregnancy. This situation is clearly discriminatory, as the undue burden of 
an unwanted pregnancy is only imposed on low-income women.454   
Nevertheless, in its argument before the ECtHR in A., B. & C. v. Ireland, the Irish 
government, while openly acknowledging that in 2007 at least 4,686 women travelled to the UK to 
have an abortion,455 it still resolutely argued that Ireland’s high protection of the unborn child’s 
right to life justified a domestic prohibition on abortion.456 In the same case, the majority of the 
ECtHR did not address whether the Irish abortion ban was compatible with the non-discrimination 
clause of the ECHR. The Grand Chamber majority laconically stated that: “[Although] it may even 
be the case […] that the impugned prohibition on abortion is to a large extent ineffective in 
protecting the unborn in the sense that a substantial number of women take the option open to them 
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in law of travelling abroad for an abortion not available in Ireland […] it is not possible to be more 
conclusive.”457  
Yet a legal regime that discriminates between women by making abortion possible and 
lawful only for the women that can financially afford it and making it impossible and unlawful for 
the poor, conflicts with the principles of equality that should govern any liberal democratic 
constitutional system.458 From this point of view, Article 21 of the CFR codifies a general principle 
of equality in the EU basic laws for the first time and expressly prohibits any discrimination on 
grounds of property.459 De lege ferenda, therefore, it might be desirable for the ECJ, in cooperation 
with the national courts, to take the appropriate steps to enforce this fundamental guarantee of the 
CFR if necessary also by quashing national abortion legislations that discriminately impact low-
income women.460 
Needless to say, because of the previously mentioned legal constraints on the application of 
the CFR, the scenario I am depicting is perhaps unlikely to occur in the near future. In any case, a 
ruling by the ECJ that national bans on abortion violate the CFR would likely raise a loud public 
reaction, equivalent to that following Roe v. Wade: the decision would be welcomed by some and 
demonized by others. From a purely normative point of view, however, a judicial opinion stating 
that laws prohibiting abortion are incompatible with the EU’s non-discrimination principle would 
simply be the acknowledgment that restrictive domestic rules having a disparate impact on rich and 
poor women can no longer be acceptable in an “ever closer Union.”   
In conclusion, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty represents a potential turning point 
for the protection of fundamental rights in the EU constitutional system. As the CFR, in particular, 
has acquired binding legal value, the EU will now be endowed with a comprehensive and advanced 
Bill of rights on the basis of which actions by the supranational institutions and the member states 
that fall within the scope of application of EU law may be reviewed.461 Nevertheless, whether this 
transformation will have a major impact on the domestic legal systems of the EU countries remains 
to be seen. Some states have inserted a number of legal caveats and reservations into the EU treaties 
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in order to prevent the ECJ and the national courts from consistently making use of the CFR to 
review national laws, including abortion laws.462  
As things stand now, the European abortion regime reflects what may be called a system of 
“hard pluralism.”463 Despite the existence of a growing consensus among the EU member states in 
favor of legalizing abortion, relevant regulatory differences persist among EU countries. The rise of 
supranational law through the case law of the ECJ and the ECtHR has placed growing constraints 
upon, and new challenges for, the regulatory autonomy of the member states, but has not reached 
the point of prohibiting states from maintaining restrictive abortion laws. Thus, while the possibility 
for pregnant women to travel from one state to another to seek termination of pregnancy is solidly 
grounded in the fabric of both EU and ECHR law, the transnational floor for protecting abortion 
rights enforced throughout Europe is still very weak. 
Yet, from a normative standpoint, the existence of strict national abortion bans in a 
multilevel system in which resourceful women can evade the domestic restrictions by travelling to 
other EU states has discriminatory effects that undermine the principle of equality. In this situation, 
if the ECJ, in cooperation with national courts and under the CFR, were to review the most 
restrictive domestic abortion laws, it could foster the establishment of a less discriminatory legal 
regime.  Such a regime may be called a system of “soft pluralism.” Under this framework, a 
woman’s right to an elective abortion, at least in the early phase of pregnancy, would be recognized 
at the supranational level, while states would still be free to integrate (or qualify or supersede, but 
not impair) this supranational standard to reflect their domestic policy preferences. 
Indeed, as the United States’ experience with abortion rights shows, the imposition of a 
uniform transnational standard that does not allow for any local variation is bound to fail in a 
federal union that is premised upon states maintaining a degree of autonomy.464 At the same time, a 
minimum standard across the federal, multilevel architecture to protect a woman’s right to choose 
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whether to terminate her pregnancy appears to be a necessary condition to avoid discrimination and 
to ensure “a single and comprehensive vision of justice” for all members of the polity. 465 Whether 
the European abortion regime will evolve from a system of hard pluralism to one of soft pluralism, 






 At the dawn of the second decade of the twenty-first century, abortion and reproductive rights 
continue to remain extremely controversial topics on both sides of the Atlantic. In early April 2011 
in the US, conservative opposition toward the allocation of federal funds to abortion providers 
almost derailed the difficult budget deal reached between Congress and the President and threatened 
to shut down the federal government.467 Simultaneously in Europe, major protests accompanied the 
enactment by the Hungarian nationalist government of the new Constitution, which now includes a 
provision to protect embryonic and fetal life “from the moment of conception,”468 a measure that 
critics describe as contrasting with EU fundamental rights and European constitutional values.469 At 
the same time, as Ireland’s continuing difficulties in implementing the ECtHR ruling indicate, 
nothing suggests that the heated constitutional debates over abortion are likely to scale down in the 
near future. 470 
This chapter has analyzed the implications that arise in the field of abortion law from the 
complex interaction among national and supranational laws in Europe. Section 1 surveyed the main 
regulatory models that emerge from the states’ legislation and practice in the field of abortion law.  
It underlined the growing trend in favor of the protection of a right to voluntary termination of 
pregnancy in Europe and the exceptions to this consensus, reflected in the strong disapproval of 
abortion in the laws of countries such as Ireland, Malta, and Poland. Section 2 examined the rising 
impact of EU and ECHR law in the field of abortion law and explained how the case law of the ECJ 
and the ECtHR has incrementally produced a set of substantive checks and procedural balances on 
the autonomy of the member states in the regulation of abortion. 
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I have argued that the overlap between domestic and transnational norms in the European 
multilevel architecture generates a new challenge of inconsistency in the field of abortion law.  
Section 3, however, made it clear that the constitutional dynamics at play in the European 
multilevel system are not unique. Indeed, a comparative assessment highlights that a number of 
tensions have also characterized the US constitutional experience with abortion law. While states’ 
laws differed in the early 1970s, the Roe v. Wade decision of the US Supreme Court established a 
federal constitutional right for women to interrupt their pregnancies. The recognition of a federal 
minimum standard for the protection of the right to an abortion, however, has not prevented the 
states from further intervening in the field and, as a result, a plurality of regulatory models are still 
in place today throughout the US 
Whether the recent developments occurring in the European multilevel architecture point 
toward an analogous evolution is unclear. Section 4 examined the recent Grand Chamber decision 
of the ECtHR in A., B. & C. v. Ireland and explained why the ruling cannot be fully regarded as 
Europe’s equivalent to Roe v. Wade. The ECtHR unanimously ruled that Ireland had violated the 
ECHR for failing to provide an adequate legal framework by which a woman whose life was in 
peril due to her pregnancy could establish her right to an abortion in Ireland. At the same time, 
however, a majority of the ECtHR rejected the facial challenge against the Irish abortion ban, 
recognizing, despite the growing European pro-choice consensus, a margin of appreciation to the 
ECHR contracting parties in the field of abortion law. 
Section 5 assessed the CFR and the alternative scenarios that opened up in the EU 
constitutional system after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A number of legal constraints 
have been placed in EU primary law to prevent the ECJ and the national courts from developing a 
substantive CFR-based review of member states’ restrictive abortion laws. Yet, as I have argued, 
from a normative point of view, a CFR-based review of member states’ abortion laws may be the 
only satisfactory solution to the discrimination resulting from a regime in which resourceful women 
are able to escape domestic abortion bans by travelling abroad, and poor women are not. Whether 
the CFR will play the same constitutionalizing role in the EU multilevel architecture that the Bill of 
























This thesis has analyzed the constitutional dynamics taking place in European multilevel human 
rights architecture. Its purpose has been to examine the implications that emerge from the overlap 
and interplay between state and transnational laws dealing with the protection of fundamental 
rights. In the last two decades, the protection of fundamental rights has blossomed in Europe. 
Rights have gained in importance and status at the state level, in the legal order of the European 
Union (EU) and in the framework of the European Convention on Human Right (ECHR). At the 
same time, institutions for the protection of rights – and notably courts adjudicating rights’ claims – 
have seen their role strengthened everywhere in Europe. Yet, the consequences of these profound 
constitutional transformations have remained largely unexplored since the prevailing scholarly 
narratives have offered only a partial assessment of the new European legal reality. 
 To examine the dynamics at play in the European architecture, this thesis has advanced a 
new, “neo-federalist”, narrative based on a comparison with the federal arrangement for the 
protection of right of the United States of America (US). As it has been explained, the US federal 
system presents numerous empirical and normative features which make it a particularly suitable 
example for comparison with the European multilevel architecture. The US is structurally 
characterized by a plurality of Bills of Rights and by a multiplicity of courts adjudicating them. In 
addition, the US has historically experienced an enduring normative tension between the need to 
ensure uniformity and the desire to accommodate diversity in the field of human rights. As it has 
been argued, therefore, a comparative-based assessment of the European multilevel system can shed 
essential insights to understand the dynamics at play in the field of fundamental rights in Europe. 
 The thesis, in particular, has identified two set of dynamics taking place in the European 
architecture. The thesis has explained that the interplay between different state and transnational 
human rights standards generates several challenges. A challenge of ineffectiveness was identified 
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in those cases where transnational law operates as a ceiling for the protection of a given human 
right, interacting with the more advanced standards existing in several vanguard member states; 
while a challenge of inconsistency was identified in those cases where transnational law operates as 
a floor for the protection of a given human right, interacting with the less advanced standards 
existing in several laggard member states. The thesis, however, has underlined how the European 
architecture is also subject to ongoing transformations. Judicial and institutional changes constantly 
reshape the multilevel system and further reforms can be envisaged de jure condendo to address the 
remaining challenges in the protection of fundamental rights in Europe.  
 To provide empirical backing to the analytical framework it developed, the thesis has then 
taken into account four case studies, dealing with the right to due process for suspected terrorists, 
the right to vote for non-citizens, the right to strike and the right to abortion. The case studies 
covered the four “generations” of rights conventionally identified in constitutional scholarship 
(civil, political, social and “new generation” rights). In all cases the thesis found the recurrence of 
analogous patterns. Hence, it was underlined that states vary in the degree of protection they accord 
to each considered right; that the impact of transnational human rights law is relative, since it 
depends from the vanguard or laggard nature of the underlying state law; and that the European 
architecture for the protection of fundamental rights can be reformed – and often should be 
reformed – to ensure a more effective and consistent protection of human rights in Europe.  
 In analyzing the protection of fundamental rights in Europe, this thesis has focused on the 
constitutional dynamics emerging from the interaction between state and transnational human rights 
standards in several substantive areas of the law. In exploring the labyrinth of fundamental rights in 
Europe, the question of what are the implications of a multilevel human right system has been the 
guiding thread of the analysis. It goes without saying, however, that other threads could have been 
followed and that further threads will need to be followed in the future. Many interesting issues of 
contemporary European human rights law have not been the object of this research and I am aware 
of the limited purpose of my inquiry. At the same time, as the European system for the protection of 
fundamental rights evolves, new questions arise and new investigations will become necessary. 
Among others, I would like to suggest in particular three debates which promise to bear fruitful 
developments for the future study of European human rights law. 
 A first debate – which was already mentioned in several parts of this thesis, but which will 
require supplementary, ad hoc, examination – is that about the accession of the EU to the ECHR. 
The EU and the ECHR were both established in the aftermath of World War II to ensure peace and 
prosperity in Europe, but had never been formally connected. The issue of the accession of the EU 
to the ECHR had been for long on the agenda of the EU institutions but was never accomplished, 
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for either legal or political reasons. Now, after the Lisbon Treaty mandated the accession of the EU 
to the ECHR, the process for the reunification of the two institutions is under way, but will still take 
several years to be completed. While some uncertainty remains about the precise effects of the 
accession, it seems plausible to maintain that this event has the potentials to change in relevant 
ways the European architecture for the protection of fundamental rights, notably by fostering the 
convergence between EU and ECHR standards. 
 A second debate worth attention, regards the ECHR and its future influence in the legal 
system of the member states. On this issue, it may be noticed that two potentially opposing trends 
are currently underway. On the one hand, in the last decade, the ECHR has experienced a 
remarkable process of incorporation in the legal systems of the states. Many states have attributed to 
the ECHR a quasi-constitutional status, either in law or in practice, and courts in multiple 
jurisdictions routinely resort to the ECHR to exercise constitutional review of legislation. The 
interaction between the EU and the ECHR (including the prospective accession of the former to the 
latter) sustains this development. On the other hand, however, recent inter-governmental proposals 
have been brought forward to curb the role of the ECtHR and limit the capacity of the ECHR to 
form the basis for domestic human rights review. At the moment, it is unclear which of these trends 
will succeed. Yet, the result of this enjeux will determine whether the states’ systems of human 
rights adjudication will develop in either a more open or a more autarchic direction. 
 A third debate, finally, concerns the relationship between the system for the protection of 
fundamental rights of the EU and the legal orders of the member states, and especially the 
implications of the political mechanism set up in Article 7 EU Treaty to ensure member states’ 
compliance with the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and human rights on which the EU is founded. Indeed, while so far the EU political branches 
have had few opportunities to reflect on their role in policing respect for fundamental rights by the 
states, a number of recent developments taking place, particularly, in Hungary have raised concerns 
about the sustainability of the rule of law within several EU member states. As the ghosts of 
intolerance return alive in many regions of the European continent, it would seem imperative for the 
EU institutions to re-consider the nature of their supervision on the human rights practice of the 
member states and pressing questions thus emerge as to what supranational checks and balances are 
due to ensure the protection of basic rights in the emerging EU polity. 
 Whatever the future of the European human rights regime will be, nevertheless, it would 
seem that at least one point remains out of the fray. The tension between unity and diversity, the 
blend between centrifugal and centripetal forces and the search for a workable balance between the 
need of homogeneity and the desire for heterogeneity will continue to remain at the core of the 
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European normative space. By analyzing in a comparative perspective the constitutional experience 
of the US, and by emphasizing how the US tradition of federalism embodies values of freedom, 
pluralism and self-governance, this thesis has argued the European multilevel human rights 
architecture can be meaningfully re-conceptualized as a “neo-federal” system. In the European 
multilevel architecture, as in the US constitutional system, the never-ending quest for unitas in 
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